Unit 2 Primary Containment Vessel Internal Investigation

December 21, 2017

IRID TEPCO


Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

1

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1. Conditions inside the Unit 2 Primary Containment Vessel


According to accident development analysis, it is assumed that part of the melted fuel fell to the plenum at the bottom of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) or onto the pedestal, with some still remaining in the core.



Steam was observed during the PCV Internal Investigation.

2. Primary Containment Vessel Internal Investigation results in Jan. – Feb. 2017

It was found that a part of grating was missing during the pre-investigation of the inside of the pedestal conducted through the guide pipe during the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) Internal Investigation from January to February, 2017.




(Reference) Photo taken during periodic inspection inside Unit 2 pedestal

% The TIP guide pipe and its supports were removed to inspect Unit 5.

Images provided and processed by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)


3. Outline of the next PCV Internal Investigation





4. Investigation method (1/2)

- The telescopic device used in the PCV internal investigation conducted between Jan. to Feb. 2017 will be improved so that it can extend further and has an investigation unit (camera, dosimeter and temperature gauge) affixed to the end.
- After the investigation device reaches the area above the missing part of the grating inside the pedestal, the investigation unit will be lowered to examine under the platform.
- This improvement will enable the investigation device to reach the end of the guide pipe inside the pedestal, much further than during the investigation conducted in January~February, and allow conditions above the platform, such as the CRD housing, to be reexamined.




Images provided by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

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4. Investigation method (2/2)

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- Just like the PCV internal investigation conducted in January~February, a boundary will be formed as shown below by sealing the sliding part of the guide pipe with double O-rings and pressurizing the pipe with nitrogen to prevent gas inside PCV from leaking outside and affecting the surrounding environment during the investigation.
- A similar boundary will be formed for the sliding part of the cable as well.
- Dust concentration will be monitored during the operation to check that gas inside the PCV does not leak or affect the surrounding environment.




No.	Coming investigation	Previous investigation
1	Guide pipe and extendable pipe have been lengthened. End of the device can reach about 1.4m from the inside wall of the pedestal.	End of the device could reach about 0.1m from the inside wall of the pedestal.
2	Lowering mechanism added. (Cable feeding mechanism added)	No lowering mechanism
3	Dosimeter and temperature gauge mounted in addition to camera	Only camera mounted
4	Fogging countermeasures added. (Distance between camera and light can be adjusted to improve visibility.)	Distance between camera and light was fixed.

5. Main equipment improvements (2/4) ① Lengthening of guide pipe and extendable pipe



The guide pipe has been lengthened by making the investigation device on the end (investigation unit) smaller and lighter, and by strengthening the guide pipe.




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5. Main equipment improvements (3/4)


2Lowering mechanism, **3**dosimeter and temperature gauge






Investigation End device outline view








Motion of light when responding to fog (concept diagram)

9

6. PCV internal investigation point





Operation	FY2017			
Operation	December	January	February	
Advance preparation	Training As of 1 Shipping ⊽ O	2/21 n site preparation		
PCV internal investigation		PCV interna	l investigation	