

Summary of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management October 27, 2016

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment



Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:



(Sea-side impermeable wall

1. Eliminate contamination sources

(Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

2. **Isolate** water from contamination

- ③ Pump up groundwater for bypassing
- 4 Pump up groundwater near buildings
- (5) Land-side impermeable walls
- 6 Waterproof pavement

3. Prevent leakage of contaminated water

- (7) Soil improvement by sodium silicate
- 8 Sea-side impermeable walls
- (9) Increase tanks (welded-joint tanks)

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Multi-nuclide removal equipment etc.

Progress Status and Future Challenges of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of TEPCO Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4 (Outline)

Progress status

The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 25-35°C^{*1} for the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings in the air^{*2}. It was evaluated that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

* 1 The values varied somewhat depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.

* 2 In September 2016, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated as less than 0.00037 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose by natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).

Dismantling of the Unit 1 R/B cover wall panels

To help remove rubble on the Unit 1 Reactor Building (R/B) top floor, dismantling of wall panels (18 in total) started from September 13 and 13 panels had been dismantled up until October 26. The dismantling of all 18 panels will be completed by November.


No significant variation attributable to the work was identified at the dust monitors installed in the workplace and near the site boundary.

Following the dismantling of wall panels, pillars and beams of the building cover will be modified to install windbreak sheets.

Dose reduction by installing shields on the Unit 3 R/B top floor

Prior to setting up a cover for Unit 3 spent-fuel removal, shields are being installed to reduce the dose on the R/B top floor. The average dose rate on the R/B top floor was reduced by 86% as of September compared to pre-installation.

Installation of large shields will be completed in November. Following the subsequent installation of complementary shields for the large shields, a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine will also be installed.



Reduction of heat stroke cases Measures to prevent heat stroke were

enhanced, including: newly installing WBGT (heat index)* indicators and other instruments in places where many workers can see them; and checking health conditions using check sheets. Other frameworks promoted included: introducing dedicated breathable clothing on site and reducing the usage rate of full-face masks. Through these measures, the number of heat stroke cases due to work reduced from 12 last fiscal year to four this fiscal year.


Measures to prevent heat stroke will continue to further improve the environment from the following fiscal year onward.

WBGT (heat index): Index using three perspectives of humidity, radiation heat and temperature, which significantly impact on the heat balance of human bodies

Status of the land-side impermeable walls

On the sea side of the land-side impermeable walls, the underground temperature declined below 0°C throughout the scope requiring freezing, except the unfrozen parts under the sea-water pipe trenches and the areas above the groundwater level.

On the mountain side, an application to change the implementation plan was submitted on October 17 to expand the freezing scope from 95%. The change included freezing two unfrozen sections: "West (1)" and "West (5).



Water drippage from the multi-nuclide removal equipment into the building On October 15 and 17, water drippage


On October 15 and 17, water drippage from the multi-nuclide removal equipment was identified. The dripped water remained within the building and no leakage outside was identified.

Causes will be investigated and countermeasures implemented.

Water drippage from a flange tank to the fence inside

On October 6, water drippage from the side flange part was identified at a flange tank. It was also confirmed that the drippage ceased by reducing the tank's water level to below the drippage location. The dripped water remained within the fences no leakage outside was identified. Similar flange parts of the leakage tank are being repaired.

The flange parts of other flange tanks will be inspected systematically.



Dose reduction for accumulatedwater treatment in the Unit 1 T/B

To prepare for accumulated-water treatment of the Unit 1 Turbine Building (T/B), work has been underway from October 5 to remove and dilute water in the Unit 1 condenser, in which high-density contaminated water accumulated immediately after the disaster and flush the high-dose pipes linking to the condenser.

After reducing the dose and removing work area obstacles, pipes and pumps will be installed to remove accumulated water on the basement floor within this fiscal year.

Status of the Radioactive Waste Incinerator


It was confirmed that the pin holes and cracks identified at the Radioactive Waste Incinerator in August were attributable to stress corrosion cracking and other corrosion due to generation of condensed corrosive water. The parts will be replaced with resistant materials, and necessary measures, such as installation of insulation materials to the similar parts, will be implemented.

Work is underway to resume operation in November.

Measures for drainage channels

Regarding the C drainage channel which drained rainwater in the tank area, appropriate measurement was unavailable due to insufficient water flow during clear weather, which meant the radiation monitor repeatedly measured the same water. The drainage destination of the power station west side area was switched to C drainage channel from October 11 to ensure sufficient drainage volume.

Besides, Work will start from November to switch the destination of A drainage channel, which drained rainwater of the multi-nuclide removal equipment.



Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)

Data (10-minute value) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring airborne radiation rate around site boundaries show 0.581 – 2,219 µSv/h (September 28 – October 25, 2016).

We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 for precise measurement of air dose rate. Construction works such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012.


Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.


The radiation shielding panel around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose of the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since the surrounding radiation dose has largely fallen down due to further cutting down of the forests, etc.

I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase have been maintained within the range of approx. 25 to 35°C for the past month, though they vary depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.






2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of September 2016, the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 in the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 4.4×10⁻¹² Bg/cm³ for Cs-134 and 2.0×10⁻¹¹ Bg/cm³ for Cs-137 respectively. The radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials was less than 0.00037 mSv/year at the boundary.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



- (Reference)
- * The density limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area: [Cs-134]: 2 x 10-5 Bg/cm3
- [Cs-137]: 3 x 10-5 Bg/cm3
- ¹ Dust density around the site boundaries of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (actual measured values)
- [Cs-134]: ND (Detection limit: approx. 1 x 10-7 Bq/cm3)
- [Cs-137]: ND (Detection limit: approx. 2 x 10-7 Bg/cm3)
- Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).

Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around the site boundary showed 0.581 - 2.219 µSv/h (September 28 - October 25, 2016).

To measure the variation in the airborne radiation rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, environmental improvement (tree trimming, removal of surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any abnormality in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water countermeasures

To tackle the increase in accumulated water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water

- > Operation of groundwater bypass
- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up

groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until October 25, 2016, 227,156 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its guality met operational targets.

- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as necessary based on their operational status.
- \geq Water treatment facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains
- To reduce the groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015. Up until October 25, 2016, a total of 211,122 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- September 22 October 19, 2016).
- The effect of ground water inflow control by subdrains is evaluated by both correlations: the "subdrain water levels"; and the "difference between water levels in subdrains and buildings", for the time being.
- · However, given insufficient data on the effect of rainfall after the subdrains went into operation, the method used to evaluate the inflow into buildings will be reviewed as necessary based on data to be accumulated.
- Inflow into buildings declined to approx. 150 200 m³/day when the subdrain water level decreased to approx. T.P. operation.
- Measures are planned to enhance the water treatment facility special for subdrains and groundwater drains, plan was submitted on October 21 regarding expansion of the purification facility to two systems.




Figure 1: Evaluation of inflow into buildings after the subdrains went into operation

- Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls
- · As for the land-side impermeable walls (on the sea side), the underground temperature declined below 0°C throughout the scope requiring freezing except for unfrozen parts under the seawater pipe trenches and areas above groundwater level (as of the end of October). The disparity in groundwater levels between the inside and outside of the land-side impermeable walls had been expanding until early August. Since then, after the groundwater levels increased on both sides during rainfall, the disparity has been fluctuating because the subdrains going into operation only impacted on the inside groundwater level. The impermeability of the frozen walls meant no influence of the variation in groundwater levels inside the land-side impermeable walls was registered on those outside.
- As for the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side), a supplementary method is being implemented for portions where the temperature currently exceeds 0° C and is expected to remain at 0° C or more in order of priority.
- The operation of the subdrains has been reduced on the mountain side of the buildings because the volume of pumped-up water increased on the sea side of the buildings due to background water since the closure of the

Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising since the sea-side impermeable walls were closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until October 25, 2016, a total of approx. 103,100 m³ had been pumped up. Approx. 250 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period

3.5 m or when the difference in water levels with buildings decreased to approx. 2 m after the subdrains went into

targeting an increased treatment capacity. As part of this enhancement, an application to change the implementation

As of October 20, 2016

land-side impermeable walls (on the sea side). Consequently, the groundwater level around the buildings, particularly on the mountain side, has remained high with significant inflow into buildings.

In response, an application to change the implementation plan was submitted on October 17 to reduce the groundwater inflow from the mountain side into the buildings by closing some unfrozen parts (two or so sections) of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side) in the scope where subdrain operation continues. The change included closing part of two sections: "West (1)" and "West (5)".




Figure 2: Closure of part of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)

- > Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment
- October 18, 2014).
- As of October 20, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 314,000, 303,000 and 103,000 m³ respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until October 20, approx. 269,000 m³ had been treated.
- countermeasures implemented.




Figure 3: Status of accumulated water storage

Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing, additional and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water have been underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; for additional equipment, System A: from September 17, 2014, System B: from September 27, 2014, System C: from October 9, 2014; for high-performance equipment, from

• To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27,

 On October 15 and 17, water drippage from the multi-nuclide removal equipment was identified. The dripped water remained within the building and no leakage outside was identified. The causes will be investigated and

As of October 20, 2016

- *1: Water amount with which water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
- *2: Since September 10, 2015, the data collection method has been changed

(Evaluation based on increased in storage: in buildings and tanks \rightarrow Evaluation based on increase/decrease in storage in buildings)

- "Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings" = "Increase/decrease of water held in buildings"
- + "Transfer from buildings to tanks"
- "Transfer into buildings (water injection into reactors and transfer from well points, etc.)"
- *3: Since April 23, 2015, the data collection method has been changed (Increase in storage $(1)+(2) \rightarrow (1)+(2)+^*$)
- *4: On February 4, 2016, corrected by reviewing the water amount of remaining concentrated salt water
- *5: "Increase/decrease of water held in buildings" used to evaluate "Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings" and "Storage increase" is calculated based on the data from the water-level gauge. During the following evaluation periods, when the gauge was calibrated, these two values were evaluated lower than anticipated.
- (March 10-17, 2016: Main Process Building; March 17-24, 2016: High-Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI); September 22-29, 2016: Unit 3 Turbine Building)
- *6: For rainfall, data of Namie (from data published by the Japan Meteorological Agency) is used. However, due to missing values, data of Tomioka (from data published by the Japan Meteorological Agency) is used alternatively (April 14-21, 2016)

- Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium absorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium absorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. As of October 20, approx. 309,000 m³ had been treated.
- Measures in Tank Areas \triangleright
- Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated inside the fences in the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of October 24, 2016, a total of 69,346 m³).
- Progress of accumulated water treatment in the Unit 1 T/B
- As part of efforts to reduce the risks of accumulated water in buildings leaking, accumulated water in the Unit 1 Turbine Building (T/B) will be treated to reduce the water level to the surface of the bottom floor within FY2016.
- Based on the on-site investigative results and other information, consideration has been made to date of methods to install and build the transfer equipment needed to reduce the accumulated water level to the T/B bottom floor surface. At present, work is underway to remove obstacles before installing the transfer equipment, which will start from around November 2016.
- To reduce the dose in the area where the transfer equipment will be installed, work is underway from October 5 to remove and dilute water in the Unit 1 condenser, in which high-density contaminated water immediately after the disaster has been accumulated and flush the high-dose pipes (heater drain pipes) around the installation area.
- > Water drippage from E area flange tank
- On October 6, drippage from a T-shaped flange connection part was identified at a flange tank in E area. The estimated leakage volume peaked at approx. 32 liters. On October 6 and 7, it was confirmed that the water level had declined below the drippage height and that the drippage had ceased. The T-shaped flange connection parts (28) points) of the tank will be repaired.
- > Decline in G area flange tank water levels
- On October 13, it was confirmed that the water levels of flange tanks in G6 area had declined by approx. 6 cm over one month from mid-September, based on long-term trend data of those water levels. As an investigation identified a continuous increase (of approx. 5 cm) in the water levels of both tanks coupled via a connection valve, the increase was considered attributable to a seat leakage of the valve, which subsequently created an inflow of strontium-treated water from the higher water-level tank to the other lower water-level tank. An on-site inspection of the pipes linking these two tanks identified no abnormality such as leakage. In addition, a dose measurement over the side surface of these two tanks also confirmed that the dose was at a level similar to the background. Based on these results, no strontium-treated water was deemed to have leaked.

2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed on December 22, 2014

- Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 1
- On July 28, 2015, work started to dismantle the roof panels of the building cover and by October 5, 2015, all six roof panels had been dismantled. Anti-scattering agents were sprayed from the side during the period between August 4 and September 3, 2016 and the dismantling of wall panels started from September 13, 2016 (13 panels had been dismantled up until October 26). No significant variation attributable to the work was identified at the monitoring posts and dust monitors. The building cover is being dismantled, with anti-scattering measures steadily implemented and safety first.
- As well as dismantling the building cover wall panels, the status of rubble under the fallen roof is being investigated to collect data, which will then be used when considering rubble removal methods (from September 13).

- Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 2
- To help remove the spent fuel from the pool of the Unit 2 Reactor Building, roadbeds have been constructed on the west and south sides (excluding the transformer area) to clear a work area, within which large heavy-duty machines and other instruments will be installed. Up until October 24, 94% and 50% of construction had been completed on the west and south sides respectively. (The work will be completed in mid-December).
- 2017)
- On October 19, a hydraulic-oil leak was identified in the lower part of the operating room of a 450 t crawler crane, and operation resumed on October 26.
- Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 3
- On the operating floor of the Reactor Building, the installation of shields has been underway (A zone: April 12-22, October 28; G zone: September 9-20; shields between the supplementary and gantry: from August 24).
- of September compared to pre-installation.

3. Removal of fuel debris

Promoting the development of technology and collection of data required to prepare fuel debris removal, such as investigations and repair of PCV's leakage parts as well as decontamination and shielding to improve PCV accessibility.

- Dose reduction on the Unit 1-3 Reactor Building 1st floors
- contaminated water inside the DHC facilities.
- On the Unit 2 Reactor Building 1st floor, a high dose rate was confirmed at ducts in the middle and elevated parts. Dose-reduction measures were implemented and the average dose in the area declined to approx. 5 mSv/h.
- On the Unit 3 Reactor Building 1st floor, dose-reduction measures were implemented and the average dose declined such as small rubble in narrow parts on the floor.

4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adeguate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

- Management status of rubble and trimmed trees
- As of the end of September 2016, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 195,400 m³ (+2,600 m³ compared to at the end of August, with an area-occupation rate of 70%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 89,800 m³ (+100 m³ compared to at the end of August, with an area-occupation rate of 84%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 68,300 m³ (+1,200 m³ compared to at the end of August, with an area-occupation rate of 96%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction The increase in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to acceptance of used clothing.

Construction started from September 28 on the west side of the Reactor Building to install a gantry accessing the operating floor. Up until October 24, 9% of installation had been completed. (The work will be completed in late April

which was used in the west-side yard of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The damaged hydraulic-oil hose was replaced

July 29 – September 7; B zone: July 13-25; C zone: July 11 – August 4; D zone: July 27 – August 11; F zone: from

The installation of shields reduced the average dose rate on the Reactor Building operation floor by approx. 86% as

On the Unit 1 Reactor Building 1st floor, dose-reduction measures have been implemented. The average airborne radiation has been reduced to approx. 2 mSv/h in the northwest and west areas (approx. 50% compared to before the measures started). In the south side area, the high-dose AC pipes and DHC facilities account for the majority of the total dose. Methods are being examined to eliminate the dose source inside the AC pipes and remove residual

to approx. 9 mSv/h in the northwest and west areas and approx. 7 mSv/h in the southeast area (approx. 50% reduction compared to before measures started). Though the airborne radiation in the southwest area has been reduced by approx. 40%, the average remains high at approx. 19 mSv/h. Removal of the dose source continues,

to install tanks. The increase in trimmed trees was mainly attributable to construction related to site preparation work.

- Management status of secondary waste from water treatment
- As of October 20, 2016, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m³ (area-occupation rate: 85%) and that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,267 m³ (area-occupation rate: 87%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc. was 3,361 (area-occupation rate: 54%).

Status of Radioactive Waste Incinerator \geq

- Operation of the Radioactive Waste Incinerator was suspended because pin holes were identified at the bellows (System B) between the secondary incinerator and the exhaust gas cooler of the facility during operation on August 9 and cracks were identified at the bellows (Systems A and B) between the waste gas coolers and bag filters on August 10 (since the pressure inside the facility and its building was kept negative, no radioactive materials was deemed to have impacted the outside of the building). Following an investigation, the pin holes and cracks were considered attributable to pitting corrosion and stress corrosion cracking respectively.
- Investigation of similar parts identified stress corrosion cracking in other bellows, small-caliber pipes and equipment nozzles, as well as paint peeling and corrosion inside the flue (see Figure 4).
- As the corrosion was mainly attributable to an environment in which condensed water containing chloride ions was generated, the use of materials sensitive to stress corrosion cracking and residual stress during production, etc., countermeasures are being taken, including installing heaters and insulation materials in parts prone to condensation, changing corrosion-resistant materials and repainting the flue, to resume operation the incinerator within November.




Figure 4: Overview of Radioactive Waste Incinerator

5. Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue

- Progress of work to install the common facility for the Unit 1-3 spent fuel pool circulating cooling facility secondary system
- Regarding the Unit 1 spent fuel pool circulating cooling facility, not all air could be completely eliminated from the primary system pump bearing cooling water pipe when water was filled for the test operation of the new facility from August 23-25, 2016. As air accumulation could not be removed and passing water through the cooling water pipe could not be confirmed, work resumed to cool the spent fuel pool by the existing facility. Valves for air removal are being installed as required as well as reviewing the routing of the water-cooling pipes.
- The Unit 3 spent fuel pool circulating cooling facility secondary system was switched to a new system, which started cooling the spent fuel pool from October 25.
- Progress of construction to minimize the circulation loop \geq
- · A reverse osmosis (RO) device was installed in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the

transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors and operation started from October 7. Following the operation training for approx. two weeks, normal (24-hour) operation started from October 20.

- accumulated-water transfer line).
- Nitrogen injection from the Unit 1 jet pump instrumentation line
- As for Unit 1, nitrogen has currently been injected from the reactor head spray line to the RPV. To enhance reliability, work is underway to install a new line for nitrogen injection through the jet pump instrumentation line.
- On May 30, the implementation plan was authorized. On completion of work to install the line in September, it this work through the jet pump instrumentation line to the RPV.
- Based on the pre-operation test results, a line will be selected for regular use and air blow will be verified.

6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

- Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1 to 4 \geq
- stands at around 40,000 Bg/L.
- from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14 23, 2015).
- December 18, 2013 October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015)
- intakes: April 1 September 16, 2015; at the repaired well: from September 17, 2015).

(carbon steel)

The risk of leakage from the outdoor transfer pipe was reduced by shortening the circulation loop. The work shortened the circulation loop (outdoor transfer pipe) from approx. 3 to 0.8 km (approx. 2.1 km, including the

underwent a pre-operation test in October, which involved injecting nitrogen from the lines additionally installed in


Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank on the north side of the Unit 1 intake, the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 0-3-2 has been gradually increasing since January 2016 and currently

Regarding the groundwater near the bank between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes, though the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-9 has been increasing to approx. 800 Bg/L since December 2015, it declined and currently stands at around 200 Bg/L. Though the density of gross β radioactive materials at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-16 had remained constant at around 90,000 Bq/L, after declining to 6,000 Bq/L, it has been increasing since August 2016 and currently stands at around 60,000 Bg/L. Though the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-17 had remained constant at around 50,000 Bg/L, it has been increasing and declining since March 2016 and currently stands at around 1,000 Bg/L. Though the density of gross ß radioactive materials at the same groundwater Observation Hole had remained constant at around 7,000 Bg/L, it has been increasing since March 2016 and currently stands at around 200,000 Bg/L. Since August 15, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and


Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes, though the density of gross β radioactive materials at groundwater Observation Hole No. 2-5 had remained constant at around 10,000 Bg/L, it had increased to 500,000 Bg/L since November 2015 and currently stands at around 10,000 Bg/L. Since December 18, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes:

Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes, though the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 3-2 had remained constant at around 800 Bg/L, it has been increasing since September 2016 and currently stands at around 3,000 Bq/L. As for the density of gross β radioactive materials, though having remained constant at around 1,000 Bg/L, it has also been increasing since September 2016 and currently stands at around 3,000 Bg/L. At groundwater Observation Hole No. 3-3, though the tritium density had remained constant at around 800 Bg/L, it has been increasing since September 2016 and currently stands at around 1,000 Bq/L. As for the density of gross β radioactive materials, though having remained constant at around 4,000 Bg/L, it has also been increasing since September 2016 and currently stands at around 5,000 Bq/L. Since April 1, 2015, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 3 and 4

- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater outside the sea-side impermeable walls and within the open channels of Units 1 - 4, as well as those inside the port, the density was declining due to the effect of the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater outside the port, the densities of radioactive materials remained within the same range previously recorded. The location of the sampling point "Near south release outlet" shifted from a point "approx. 1.3 km away" to another point "approx. 330 m away" from the Unit 1-4 south release outlet, because of the difficulty in gaining access due to the breakdown of the bank.
- Response to the Unit 1 and 2 exhaust stack drain sump pit \succ
- For the exhaust stack drain sump pit, which was evaluated as "requiring investigation" in the comprehensive risk review, the water level and quality were investigated and countermeasures will be taken using a remote-controlled robot and other equipment given the high dose around the pit.
- On-site preparation has been conducted since July 25 and work to open a portion of the pit cover started from August 26. A portion of the inspection aperture inside the pit was also opened and the inspection on September 9 identified the internal water level at approx. 60 cm. On September 12, accumulated water was sampled for analysis. (Gross β: approx. 6.0 × 10⁷ Bg/L; Cs134: approx. 8.3 ×10⁶ Bg/L; Cs137: approx. 5.2 × 10⁷ Bg/L)
- · Accumulated water inside the pit, which could contaminate surrounding facilities and other buildings, has been transferred to an underground area of the Unit 2 waste treatment building since September 14.
- On October 3, the installation of a water-level gauge and a temporary drain facility was completed. At present, the water level is being monitored and water is being transferred as necessary.
- Measures for drainage channels
- Regarding C drainage channel, which drained rainwater in the tank area, appropriate measurement by the radiation monitor was unavailable due to insufficient water flow of the channel. The drainage destination of the power station west-side area was switched to C drainage channel from October 11 to ensure sufficient drainage volume.
- · Work to switch the destination of A drainage channel, which drains rainwater of the multi-nuclide removal equipment, to inside the port, will start from November.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>




Figure 6: Seawater density around the port






Figure 7: Layout of drainage channels

7. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers' exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers' on-site needs

- Staff management
- The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past guarter from June to August 2016 was approx. 12,700 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 9,700). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in November 2016 (approx. 5,730 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers)* would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day for each month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,500 to 7,500 since FY2014 (see Figure 8). Some works for which contractual procedures have vet to be completed were excluded from the estimate for November 2016.
- The total number of workers has increased, from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of September has remained at around 55%.
- The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 1 mSv/month during FY2013, FY2014 and FY2015. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year = 1.7 mSv/month)
- · For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.





- Status of heat stroke cases \geq
 - In FY2016, four workers had suffered heat stroke due to work and three workers had suffered light heat stroke (with October.)
 - Compared to the previous fiscal year, the number of heat stroke cases significantly decreased (from 12 to 4) and on-site controlled areas.
 - poor physical condition at an early stage.
 - The following fiscal year, the unified rules will continue to be implemented and thoroughly enforced while implementing measures to further improve the environment, etc. to prevent heat stroke.

8. Other

- Dose investigation of the Unit 1 and 2 exhaust stacks
- based on the dose investigative results obtained to date.

no medical treatment required) up until October 26. Continued measures will be taken to prevent heat stroke. (In FY2015, 12 workers had heat stroke due to work and three workers had light heat stroke up until the end of


there were no heat stroke cases necessitating an absence from work. These results were deemed attributable to measures including: the continuous implementation of unified rules and other frameworks to prevent heat stroke; the introduction of dedicated breathable clothing on site and the reduced usage rate of full-face masks by reviewing

This fiscal year, ongoing measures (unified rules to prevent heat stroke) continued to be implemented, including: the use of WBGT*; prohibiting outdoor work from 14:00 to 17:00; wearing cool vests; and prohibiting work at WBGT 30°C or higher in principle. In addition, new measures were also introduced and promoted, including: newly installing WBGT measuring instruments, indicators and clocks on site; particularly enhancing heat acclimatization measures; checking health conditions using check sheets; and strengthening the framework to detect workers in

* WBGT (heat index): Index using three perspectives of humidity, radiation heat and temperature, which significantly impact on the heat balance of human bodies

Dose rates were investigated at the exhaust stacks to pinpoint the conditions that will be used to estimate the required manpower, evaluate the exposure dose and assess the feasibility of construction, while considering methods to dismantle the exhaust stacks. The investigation into the exterior of the exhaust stacks was completed on October 7. An investigation performed using a camera from the upper part of the exhaust stacks following an incident where a dosimeter fell inside the shaft detected an obstacle inside the same. Henceforth, no dose investigation will be conducted inside the shaft. Instead, methods to dismantle the exhaust stacks will be considered,

Appendix 1



Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Cesium-134: ND (2013) \rightarrow ND (0.51)

Cesium-137: ND (2013) \rightarrow ND (0.50)

ND (2013) \rightarrow ND (17)

ND (2013) \rightarrow ND (1.9)

 \rightarrow ND (0.66)

 \rightarrow ND (0.68)

Gross β:

Tritium:

Cesium-134: ND (2013)

Cesium-137: ND (2013)

Unit (Bg/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

Northeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)] 🖉 [East side of port entrance (offshore 1km)]

Gross β:

Tritium:


Cesium-134: ND (2013)

(The latest values sampled during October 17-25)

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

[Southeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)]

Ces	sium-134:	ND (2013) →	ND (0.55)
Ces	sium-137:	ND (2013) → ND (2013) →	ND (0.67)
Gro	ss β:	ND (2013) →	ND (17)
Triti	um:	ND (2013) →	ND (1.9)



Cesium-137: 1.6 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.73) Below 1/2

ND (2013)


 \rightarrow ND (0.70)

 \rightarrow ND (17)

 $6.4 (2013/10/18) \rightarrow ND (1.9)$ Below 1/3

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site





Reference

Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Immediate

October 27, 2016 Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment 1/6





Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris removal

October 27, 2016 Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Immediate Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris removal Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment target 3/6 Penegaton Penegaton Penegaton Penegato (3) (4) (5) Penetration (1) Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation Investigative results on torus room walls (Q.W-17) (MSC-14) (RCW-29) (FPC-41) • The torus room walls were investigated (on the north side (1) Replacement of the RPV thermometer of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed • As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded Φ for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling Ð 1 $\overline{\mathbf{O}}$ from the monitoring thermometers. robot). · On April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and North side At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), "the South side the broken thermometer was removed on January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled on March. The thermometer status" and "existence of flow" were checked. has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April. Penetrations investigate A demonstration using the above two types of underwater (2) Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge (Investigative equipmen R/B 1st floor wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment insert point) Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to Fast T/B could check the status of penetration. interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed on May 2014 and new instruments R/B torus room -side Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the wall Swimming were reinstalled on June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx, one month to evaluate its robot spraved tracer (*5) by camera showed no flow around the validity. Trace The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot) S/C bottom Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow Sona Floor traveling robot around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling Unit 2 robot) Air dose rate inside the Reactor Building: Max. 4.400mSv/h (1F southeast area. Image of the torus room east-side cross-sectional investigation upper penetration^(*1) surface) (measured on November 16, 2011) Reactor Building Status of equipment development toward investigating inside the PCV Nitrogen injection flow Prior to removing fuel debris, to check the conditions inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), including the location of the rate into the RPV(*3). fuel debris, investigations inside the PCV are scheduled. 14.62Nm3/h [Investigative outline] • Inserting the equipment from Unit 2 X-6 penetration(1) and accessing inside the pedestal using the CRD rail to conduct investigation. SFP^(*2) temperature: 17.8°C [Status of investigative equipment development] Based on issues confirmed by the CRD rail status investigation conducted in August 2013, the investigation method and 615 equipment design are currently being examined. Reactor feed water system: 2.0m3/h As a portion of shielding blocks installed in front of X-6 penetration could not be moved, a removal method using small heavy Core spray system: 2.4m3/h machines was planned. The work for removing these blocks resumed on September 28, 2015 and removal of interfering blocks for future investigations use also completed on October 1, 2015. • To start the investigation into the inside of PCV, dose on the floor surface in front of X-6 penetration needs to be reduced to approx. 100 mSv/h. However, the dose was not decreased to the target level through decontamination (removal of eluted Temperature inside the PCV: Temperature of the RPV materials. decontamination by steam, chemical decontamination, and surface grind). approx. 30°C bottom: approx. 29°C An examination on the extent to which the dose could be reduced by combining additional decontamination and shielding showed that the dose could be reduced without decontamination by using new shields installable through remote control. PCV hydrogen concentration System A: 0.02vol% Nitrogen injection flow rate System B: 0.01vol% into the PCV(*4): -Nm3/h Front camera & light Alternative shield Water level of the torus room: approx. OP3.270 Self-traveling equipment Pan & tit fu (draft plan) (measured on June 6, 2012) Air dose rate inside Isolation value is olation value the PCV: Max. approx. Air dose rate inside the torus room: Chamber X-6 penetr 73Sv/h 30-118mSv/h(measured on April 18, 2012) 7. Avoiding rail holding tool 6-134mSv/h(measured on April 11, 2013) Temperature inside the 7777 PCV: approx. 32°C Water level at the triangular corner: OP3,050-3,190 Issues before using X-6 penetration 5. Avoiding the (measured on June 28, 2012) . Removal of existin a shield in front of the foothold Measurement Platfor Water level inside the PCV: penetration Installation of alternative shield 6. Crossing ove Temperature at the triangular corner: 30.2-32.1°C 8. Crossing over the deposit on the Boring in the penetration hatch
Removal of inclusion of the penetration PCV bottom + approx. 300mm space betwee and platform (measured on June 28, 2012) 9 Travel on the grating This alan may be changed depending on the future examination status Water level of the Turbine Building: TP. 1,474 Investigative issues inside the PCV and equipment configuration (draft plan) * Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00. October 26, 2016 Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons 1st (Jan 2012) Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature Evaluation results Period Investigations 2nd (Mar 2012) Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom inside PCV 3rd (Feb 2013 - Jun 2014) Acquiring images - Sampling accumulated water Mar - Jul 2016 of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large

Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation

Leakage points

from PC


No leakage from torus room rooftop

No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C

<Glossary> (*1) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV (*2) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (*3) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (*4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (*5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles


part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.

Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris removal



Progress toward decommissioning: Work related to circulation cooling and accumulated water treatment line

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SLand-side impermeable wall

freezing except for the unfrozen parts under the seawater pipe trenches and the areas In October 2016.


(*1) CST (Condensate Tank for temporarily storing water used in the plant.

⁸ Sea-side impermeable wal SLand-side impermeable wall

Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site

Immediate targets

Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries. Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site



October 27, 2016 Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning