Summary of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management

February 1, 2018

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment

Main decommissioning works and steps

All fuel has been removed from Unit 4 SFP and preparatory work to fuel removal from Unit 1-3 SFP and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval is ongoing.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident.

Fuel Removal from SFP

Units 1 & 2 → Rubble removal & dose reduction → (Unit 3) Installing a Fuel removal handling Machine → Fuel removal → (Unit 4) Storage and handling

Unit 1: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2023
Unit 2: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2023
Unit 3: Fuel removal scheduled to start around mid-FY2018
Unit 4: Fuel removal completed in 2014

Fuel Debris Retrieval

(Unit 1-3) Capturing the status inside the PCV/ examining the fuel debris retrieval method, etc. (Note 2) → Fuel debris retrieval → Storage and handling

(Note 2)
The method employed to *retrieve* fuel debris for the first unit will be confirmed in FY2019.

Dismantling Facilities

Scenario development & technology consideration → Design and manufacturing of devices / equipment → Dismantling

Toward fuel removal from spent fuel pool

Toward fuel removal from Unit 3 SFP, works to install the fuel removal cover are underway.

As measures to reduce the dose on the Reactor Building operating floor, the decontamination and installation of shields were completed in June and December 2016 respectively. Installation of a fuel removal cover started from January 2017.

Installation of the fuel-handling machine on the girder (November 12, 2017)

Three principles behind contaminated water countermeasures:

Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

1 Eliminate contamination sources

① Multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.
② Remove contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)

(Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

2. Isolate water from contamination

③ Pump up groundwater for bypassing
④ Pump up groundwater near buildings
⑤ Land-side impermeable walls
⑥ Waterproof pavement

3. Prevent leakage of contaminated water

⑦ Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
⑧ Sea-side impermeable walls
⑨ Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks



Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.

- This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.
- Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 via multi-nuclide removal equipment, additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a subsidy project of the Japanese Government (operation commenced in October 2014).
- Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being re-treated in ALPS.

(High-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment)

Land-side impermeable walls

- Land-side impermeable walls surround the buildings and reduce groundwater inflow into the same.
- Freezing started on the sea side and part of the mountain side from March 2016 and on 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.
- On the sea side, the underground temperature declined below 0°C throughout the scope requiring freezing, except for the unfrozen parts under the seawater pipe trenches and the areas above groundwater level in October 2016.

(Opening/closure of frozen pipes)

Sea-side impermeable walls

- Impermeable walls are being installed on the sea side of Units 1-4, to prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the sea.
- The installation of steel pipe sheet piles was completed in September 2015 and they were connected in October 2015. These works completed the closure of the sea-side impermeable walls.

(Sea-side impermeable wall)

Progress Status and Future Challenges of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of TEPCO Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4 (Outline)

Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 15-35°C*1 over the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings in the air*2. It was evaluated that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

* 1 The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.
* 2 In December 2017, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated as less than 0.00035 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).

Start of rubble removal from the Unit 1 operating floor

Prior to fuel removal from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, rubble removal from the operating floor started from January 22. The rubble is being removed from the north side, where the investigation of the fallen roof was completed.

Previously, small rubble, which may have hindered investigations on the operating floor, was removed. In future work, rubble such as fallen roof will be removed. No significant variation was identified thus far around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors. Work will continue with safety first while implementing measures to prevent dust scattering and monitoring radioactive materials.



Rubble removal (January 22)



Status of the operating floor

Investigation inside the Unit 2 PCV

On January 19, the inside of the Unit 2 primary containment vessel (PCV) was investigated.

During this investigation, the status under the platform was inspected using an investigative device which was improved utilizing experience gained in the previous investigation (January – February 2017), such as improving the visibility and adding a hanging mechanism. From the investigative results, part of the fuel assemblies having fallen to the bottom of the pedestal were found. Deposits identified around the fuel assemblies were considered to be fuel debris.

The images acquired in this investigation will be analyzed.



Bottom of the pedestal



Progress of stagnant water treatment in buildings

For the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings, the lowest floor intermediate part surface was exposed in December as planned. By this exposure, the connection between Units 3 and 4 was separated.

Stagnant water levels in buildings will be reduced sequentially toward separation of the connection between Units 1 and 2, and completion of stagnant water treatment inside buildings within 2020.

Operation start of the 9th solid waste storage facility

The 9th solid waste storage facility, with a storage capacity* about 40% as large as those of the existing facilities (1st – 8th), went into operation from February 1. The facility can accommodate high-dose rubble, etc. generated during rubble removal from the Unit 1 operating floor and dismantling of the Unit 2 Reactor Building roof. By stably storing high-dose rubble, etc. in this facility with shielding capability, exposure of workers and the public, etc. will continue to decline.

* Storage capacity: Equivalent to approx. 110,000 drums




Inside the storage facility

Status of the land-side impermeable walls

For the land-side impermeable walls, in which freezing of the last closing section started in August 2017, the underground temperature declined below 0℃ in almost all areas, except for a portion of the depths. Monitoring of the underground temperature, water levels and pumped-up groundwater volume will continue.

Regarding the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side), where the average difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4m and groundwater from the mountain side was bypassed, groundwater supply to the area inside the land-side impermeable walls has been suppressed. The effect of the impermeable walls as part of multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including on subdrains, inflow into buildings, etc. continued to decline. Various data such as water balance and contaminated water volume generated in a drought season will be analyzed and the results are scheduled to be evaluated in March.



Change of the formula used to evaluate the Unit 1-3 SFP water temperature

More than six years after the earthquake, the decay heat of the spent fuel has declined significantly. An inspection following suspension of pool cooling confirmed that the water temperature remained below the level of the limiting condition for operation (LCO) by natural heat release.*. The existing method of evaluating the water temperature evaluation that includes excessive maintenance reviewed. Prior to the review, an inspection confirmed that the new one could simulate a water temperature similar to the actual temperature.

* A cooling suspension test was conducted in Unit 2, which was subject to the most significant decay heat among Unit 1-3, for one month under severe conditions in summer. The results confirmed that the current water temperature attained was below the level of the limiting condition for operation (LCO) (65°C).

Major initiatives – Locations on site



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* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)

Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries show 0.418 – 1.794 μSv/h (December 20, 2017 – January 30, 2018).

We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction works, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012.

Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.

The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. has caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 15 to 35°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



RPV bottom temperatures (recent quarter)



PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

* The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.

2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of December 2017, the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 in the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 3.4×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and 2.0×10^{-11} Bq/cm³ for Cs-137, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00035 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The density limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
[Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
[Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³

* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around the site boundary showed 0.418 – 1.794 μSv/h (December 20, 2017 – January 30, 2018)
To measure the variation in the airborne radiation rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, environmental improvement (tree trimming, removal of surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any abnormality in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water countermeasures

To tackle the increase in stagnant water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water

➢ Operation of the groundwater bypass

- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until January 31, 2018, 348,772 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

➢ Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains

- To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015 onwards. Up until January 30, 2018, a total of 487,762 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until January 30, 2018, a total of approx. 170,500 m³ had been pumped up and a volume of approx. less than 10 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period December 14, 2017 – January 24, 2018).
- As an enhancement measure, the treatment facility for subdrains and groundwater drains is being upgraded. Additional water collection tanks and temporary water storage tanks were installed and the installation of fences, pipes and ancillary facilities is also underway. The treatment capacity is being enhanced incrementally to accommodate the increasing volume of pumped-up groundwater during the high rainfall season (before measures: approx. 800 m³/day, from August 22: approx. 900 m³/day, after temporary water storage tanks put into operation: approx. 1,200 m³/day and after water collection tanks put into operation: approx. 1,500m³/day).
- To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover existing subdrain pits is underway. They will go into operation sequentially from a pit for which work is completed (the number of pits which went into operation: 11 of 15 additional pits, 0 of 4 recovered pits).
- To eliminate the suspension of water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facility is underway.
- Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to less than 150 m³/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m, while the inflow increased during rainfall.



Figure 1: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Unit 1-4 subdrains

➢ Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls

- In the land-side impermeable walls, a maintenance operation to control the frozen soil from getting any thicker continues from May 22 on the north and south sides and started from November 13 on the east side, where frozen soil of sufficient thickness was identified.
- For the land-side impermeable walls, in which freezing of the last closing section started in August 2017, an inspection confirmed that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, except for a portion of the depths.
- Regarding the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side), where the average difference between the inside and the outside increased to approx. 4m and groundwater from the mountain side was bypassed, groundwater supply to the area inside the land-side impermeable walls was suppressed.
- The effect of the impermeable walls as part of multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including on subdrains, inflow into buildings, etc. continued to decline.
- Various data such as water balance and contaminated water volume generated in a drought season will be analyzed and the results are scheduled to be evaluated in March.



Figure 2: Closure of part of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)

➢ Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16.



As of January 25, 2018

*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more

*2: On January 19, 2017, the water volume was reviewed by reevaluating the remaining volume of concentrated salt water and the data was corrected.

*3: Including the effect of variation in water volume stored in tanks with the change in temperature.

*4: The increase is considered attributable to the uncertain cross-sectional area (evaluated value) for the water level needed to calculate the water volume stored in the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility.
Since the calculation of June 1, 2017, the cross-sectional area (evaluated value) has been reviewed.

*5: To eliminate the effect of the tank storage amount varying according to the air temperature, the calculation method for storage increase was reviewed as follows from January 25, 2018: [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)]

*6: Including rainwater volume which could not be treated in the rainwater treatment facilities, transferred to Sr-treated water tanks (May 25 – June 1, 2017: 700m³/week).

*7: Corrected based on the result of an investigation conducted on July 5, 2017 revealing a lower water volume in the uninvestigated areas in Unit 1 T/B than assumed.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

- As of January 25, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 370,000, 410,000 and 102,000 m³ respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until January 25, 424,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks

- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-absorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium-absorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. Up until January 25, approx. 430,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Measures in the Tank Area

- Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fences in the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of January 29, 2018, a total of 97,377 m³).

➢ Water leakage in association with treatment of the remaining water in the G3 north area tank transfer pipe

- On December 26, 2017, while cleaning up a remaining water transfer hose used to remove water from pipes that connected a tank within the G4 north area, leakage of remaining water inside the hose onto asphalt was detected. The leakage, amounting to approx. 7L, was terminated and no inflow to side ditches and drainage channels was detected.

➢ Leakage from a tank inside the desalination equipment building

- On January 19, 2018, leakage from a RO membrane cleaning tank for the desalination equipment was detected. The leakage, amounting to approx. 150L, from the tank was terminated by closing the valve connecting the tank. The leaked water remained within the fences installed inside the desalination equipment building and the water collection was completed.

➢ Leakage from the RO facility hypochlorous pump (B) outlet pump connection inside the building

- On January 25, 2018, leakage of system water from the RO facility hypochlorous pump (B) outlet pump connection (union) inside the building was detected. The leakage, amounting to approx. 7L, was terminated. The leaked water remained within the reception pan for the RO facility hypochlorous injection equipment inside the Unit 4 Turbine Building and the water collection was completed. No external leakage was detected.

➢ Exposure of the Unit 2-4 Turbine Building intermediate basement

- For the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings, exposure of the lowest floor intermediate part surface in December as planned was confirmed. By this exposure, separation of the connection between Units 3 and 4 was identified.
- Stagnant water levels in buildings will be reduced sequentially toward separation of the connection between Units 1 and 2, and completion of stagnant water treatment inside buildings within 2020.

2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014

➢ Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1

- The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
- Rubble removal from the operating floor started from January 22, 2018. The rubble is being removed from the north side where the investigation of the fallen roof was completed.
- Previously, small rubble, which may have hindered investigations on the operating floor, was removed. In future work, rubble such as fallen roof will be removed.
- No significant variation was identified around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.

➢ Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2

- To help spent fuel removal from the pool of the Unit 2 Reactor Building, preparatory work to form an opening, which would allow access to the operating floor, was completed in the external wall on the west side of the building.
- To remove contaminants on the Reactor Building roof, etc., rubble on the roof and outer peripheral coping, etc. was removed by December 25, 2017. Dust monitors to measure dust during work using remote-controlled heavy machines were installed by January 19, 2018. Removal of the roof protection layer (roof blocks, etc.) using remote-controlled heavy machines started from January 22, 2018.

➢ Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 3

- Installation of the dome roof, comprising a total of eight units, started on July 22. Installation of Dome Roofs 1-5 and 8 (Dome Roof 1: August 29, Dome Roof 2: September 15, Dome Roof 3: October 17, Dome Roof 4: October 28, Dome Roof 5: November 4, Dome Roof 8: December 12) and the fuel-handling machine (November 12) and crane (November 20) on the girder was completed. Dome Roofs 6 and 7 will be installed in February.

3. Retrieval of fuel debris

➢ Investigation inside the Unit 2 PCV

- On January 19, 2018, the inside of the Unit 2 PCV was investigated.
- During this investigation, the status under the platform was inspected using an investigative device which was improved utilizing experience gained in the previous investigation (January – February 2017), such as improving the visibility and adding a hanging mechanism.
- From the investigative results, part of the fuel assemblies having fallen to the bottom of the pedestal were found. Deposits identified around the fuel assemblies were considered to be fuel debris.
- The images acquired in this investigation will be analyzed.

4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➢ Management status of the rubble and trimmed tree

- As of the end of December 2017, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 224,200 m³ (+3,600 m³ compared to at the end of November, with an area-occupation rate of 69%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 133,700 m³ (- m³, with an area-occupation rate of 72%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 59,900 m³ (-2,300 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 84%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction to install tanks, work related to rubble removal around Unit 1-4 buildings and acceptance of rubble from the temporary storage area V. The decrease in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to incineration operation.

➢ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of January 4, 2018, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m³ (area-occupation rate: 85%) and that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,319 m³ (area-occupation rate: 87%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 3,865 (area-occupation rate: 61%).

➢ Operation start of the 9th solid waste storage facility

- The 9th solid waste storage facility, with a storage capacity about 40% as large as those of existing facilities (1st – 8th), went into operation from February 1, 2018. The facility can accommodate high-dose rubble, etc. generated during rubble removal from the Unit 1 operating floor and dismantling of the Unit 2 Reactor Building roof.

- By stably storing high-dose rubble, etc. in this facility with shielding capability, the exposure to workers and the public will continue to decline.

5. Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue

➢ Installation of PE pipes to the Unit 1-3 core spray (CS) system lines

- In the Unit 1-3 reactor water injection equipment, SUS flexible tubes within and outside the Turbine Building of the core spray (CS) system lines are being replaced with PE pipes to improve reliability.
- Replacement for Unit 1 was completed on October 18. Pipe replacement within the Unit 2 Turbine Building started on October 30. The CS system has been suspended since December 18 to replace the CS system connection pipes. Following water injection solely by the feed water (FDW) system, water injection by both CS and FDW systems will be recovered on December 25. No abnormality attributable to the injection solely by the FDW system was identified in the cooling status of the reactor. Pipes within the Unit 3 Turbine Building will be replaced from March.
- Pipes outside Units 2 and 3 will be replaced from the next fiscal year.

➢ Change of the formula used to evaluate the spent fuel pool water temperature

- More than six years after the earthquake, the decay heat of the spent fuel has declined significantly.
- An inspection following suspension of pool cooling confirmed that the water temperature remained below the level of the limiting condition for operation (LCO) by natural heat release.* The existing method of evaluating the water temperature evaluation that includes excessive maintenance reviewed.
- Prior to the review, an inspection confirmed that the new one could simulate a water temperature similar to the actual temperature.

* A cooling suspension test was conducted in Unit 2, which was subject to the most significant decay heat among Unit 1-3, for one month under severe conditions in summer. The results confirmed that the current water temperature attained was below the level of the limiting condition for operation (LCO) (65°C).

➢ Extraction of risks during onsite work near safety facilities, etc. and consideration of responses

- Based on the instruction document “Extraction of Risks during Onsite Work near Safety Facilities, etc. and Consideration of Responses” issued by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Regulation Office on December 13, preventive measures were reexamined. In addition, risks which may have caused suspension, etc. of safety facilities, etc. were identified and responses considered for onsite works scheduled near the safety facilities, etc.
- The reexamination results of preventive measures identified for many risks which would affect the facilities during onsite work were attributable to weakness of “risk extraction before the work” and “communication among related parties.”
- To address these issues, the system will be reviewed to a mechanism where risks are fully extracted before the work, and the shift supervisor for work permission is responsible for deciding on the work implementation using the work risk assessment results from the risk extraction results and the work effect risk assessment results according to the system operation status. Furthermore, physical measures and display to draw attention will be introduced to parts of facilities at risk related to the social effect.
- Improvement items were also extracted regarding nonconforming management processes to reduce the recurrence of nonconformity.
- For onsite works scheduled near the safety facilities, risks which may cause suspension of these safety facilities, etc. were determined and responses considered.
- The consideration results confirmed that an onsite check using a risk map, etc. was effective. Measures to prevent recurrence will be fully implemented to improve work management and prevent similar incidents.

6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➢ Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank on the north side of the Unit 1 intake, the tritium density at groundwater in Observation Hole No. 0-1-2 has been gradually increasing from 10,000Bq/L since October 2017 and currently stands at around 20,000 Bq/L.
- Regarding the groundwater near the bank between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-6 had been increasing from around 2,000Bq/L since November 2017 and currently stands at around 12,000 Bq/L. Though the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-9 had been increasing to 1,500 Bq/L since October 2017 and then declining, it currently stands at around 800 Bq/L. Though the density of gross β radioactive materials at the same groundwater Observation Hole had been increasing to 140 Bq/L since October 2017 and then declining, it currently stands at around 40 Bq/L. Though the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 1-16 had been increasing from around 2,000 Bq/L since October 2017 to 5,000 Bq/L, then declining, it currently stands at around 3,000 Bq/L. Since August 15, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Units 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14 - 23, 2015).
- Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 2-3 had been increasing from around 1,000 Bq/L since November 2017 and currently stands at around 1,600 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same groundwater Observation Hole had been increasing from around 600 Bq/L since December 2017 and currently stands at around 1,400 Bq/L. The tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 2-5 had been increasing from 700 Bq/L since November 2017 and currently stands at around 1,600 Bq/L. Since December 18, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Units 2 and 3 intakes: December 18, 2013 - October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015).
- Regarding radioactive materials in the groundwater near the bank between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the tritium density at groundwater Observation Hole No. 3-4 had been increasing from 1,000 Bq/L since October 2017 and currently stands at around 2,000 Bq/L. Since April 1, 2015, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Units 3 and 4 intakes: April 1 – September 16, 2015; at the repaired well: from September 17, 2015).
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in cesium 137 and strontium 90 during heavy rain. They have been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The density of cesium 137 has been increasing since January 25, 2017, when a new silt fence was installed to accommodate the relocation.
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area within the port, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in densities of cesium 137 and strontium 90 during heavy rain. They have been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area outside the port, densities of cesium 137 and strontium 90 have been declining and remained below the legal discharge limit following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater density on the Turbine Building east side



Figure 5: Seawater density around the port

7. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers' exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers' on-site needs

➢ Staff management

- The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from September to November 2017 was approx. 11,300 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 8,700). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in February 2018 (approx. 4,910 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 5,000 to 7,000 since FY2015 (see Figure 6).
- The number of workers from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture has decreased. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of December has remained constant at around 60%.
- The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.81 mSv/month during FY2014, approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015 and approx. 0.39 mSv/month during FY2016. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year ≒ 1.7 mSv/month)
- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



* Calculated based on the number of workers from August 3-7, 24-28 and 31 (due to overhaul of heavy machines)

Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers per weekday for each month since FY2015 (actual values)



Figure 7: Changes in monthly individual worker exposure dose
(monthly average exposure dose since March 2011)

- Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus
  - Since November, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from October 25 to November 24, 2017) and medical clinics around the site (from November 1, 2017 to January 31, 2018) for partner company workers. As of January 26, 2018, a total of 6,842 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swiftly taking potential patients off site and entry controls, mandatory wearing of masks in working spaces, etc.).
- Status of influenza and norovirus cases
  - Until the 4th week of 2018 (January 22-28, 2018), 108 influenza infections and 6 norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed 257 cases of influenza and 14 norovirus infections.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during January 22-30)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html

Sea side impermeable wall

Silt fence

Cesium-134:	3.3	(2013/10/17) →	ND(0.26)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137:	9.0	(2013/10/17) →	ND(0.24)	Below 1/30
Gross β:	74	(2013/ 8/19) →	ND(18)	Below 1/4
Tritium:	67	(2013/ 8/19) →	2.1	Below 1/30

Cesium-134:	4.4	(2013/12/24) →	ND(0.28)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137:	10	(2013/12/24) →	0.41	Below 1/20
Gross β:	60	(2013/ 7/ 4) →	ND(18)	Below 1/3
Tritium:	59	(2013/ 8/19) →	1.8	Below 1/30

Cesium-134:	5.0	(2013/12/2) →	ND(0.33)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137:	8.4	(2013/12/2) →	0.41	Below 1/20
Gross β:	69	(2013/8/19) →	ND(18)	Below 1/3
Tritium:	52	(2013/8/19) →	ND(1.8)	Below 1/20

Cesium-134:	2.8	(2013/12/2) →	ND(0.56)	Below 1/5
Cesium-137:	5.8	(2013/12/2) →	0.46	Below 1/10
Gross β:	46	(2013/8/19) →	ND(17)	Below 1/2
Tritium:	24	(2013/8/19) →	ND(2.3)	Below 1/10

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

Cesium-134:	ND(0.59)
Cesium-137:	ND(0.56)
Gross β:	ND(16)
Tritium:	ND(1.7) *

Cesium-134:	3.3	(2013/12/24) →	ND(0.43)	Below 1/7
Cesium-137:	7.3	(2013/10/11) →	ND(0.57)	Below 1/10
Gross β:	69	(2013/ 8/19) →	ND(16)	Below 1/4
Tritium:	68	(2013/ 8/19) →	3.2	Below 1/20

Cesium-134:	3.5	(2013/10/17) →	ND(0.23)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137:	7.8	(2013/10/17) →	ND(0.26)	Below 1/30
Gross β:	79	(2013/ 8/19) →	ND(18)	Below 1/4
Tritium:	60	(2013/ 8/19) →	ND(1.8)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134:	32	(2013/10/11) →	ND(0.38)	Below 1/80
Cesium-137:	73	(2013/10/11) →	2.8	Below 1/20
Gross β:	320	(2013/ 8/12) →	ND(17)	Below 1/10
Tritium:	510	(2013/ 9/ 2) →	13	Below 1/30

From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Cesium-134:	ND (0.46)
Cesium-137:	2.6
Gross β:	ND (17)
Tritium:	13 *

Cesium-134:	ND (0.67)
Cesium-137:	2.7
Gross β:	ND (17)
Tritium:	15 *

Cesium-134:	ND (0.63)
Cesium-137:	2.9
Gross β:	ND (17)
Tritium:	17 *



Cesium-134:	5.3	(2013/8/ 5) →	ND(0.40)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137:	8.6	(2013/8/ 5) →	0.46	Below 1/10
Gross β:	40	(2013/7/ 3) →	20	Below 1/2
Tritium:	340	(2013/6/26) →	ND(1.7)	Below 1/200

* Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014.
Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

Summary of TEPCO data as of January 31, 2018

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port
(comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

(The latest values sampled during January 22-30)

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

【Northeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.83)
Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.50)
Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (16)
Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (1.7)

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.75)
Cesium-137: 1.6 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.53) Below 1/3
Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (16)
Tritium: 6.4 (2013/10/18) → ND (1.7) Below 1/3

【Southeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.73)
Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.68)
Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (16)
Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (1.7)

【North side of north breakwater(offshore 0.5km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.62)
Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.63)
Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (16)
Tritium: 4.7 (2013/ 8/18) → ND (1.7) Below 1/2

【Port entrance】

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) →ND (0.43) Below 1/7
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) →ND (0.57) Below 1/10
Gross β: 69 (2013/ 8/19) →ND (16) Below 1/4
Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → 3.2 Below 1/20

【South side of south breakwater(offshore 0.5km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.60)
Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.69)
Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (16)
Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (1.7)

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134: 1.8 (2013/ 6/21) → ND (0.73) Below 1/2
Cesium-137: 4.5 (2013/ 3/17) → ND (0.59) Below 1/7
Gross β: 12 (2013/12/23) → 11
Tritium: 8.6 (2013/ 6/26) → ND (1.7) Below 1/5

【Near south release outlet】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.62)
Cesium-137: 3.0 (2013/ 7/15) → ND (0.71) Below 1/4
Gross β: 15 (2013/12/23) → 11
Tritium: 1.9 (2013/11/25) → ND (1.5)



Sea side impermeable wall

Silt fence

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Note: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet. From January 27, 2017, the location of the sampling point was also shifted approx. 280 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet.

Summary of TEPCO data as of January 31, 2018

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html

Appendix 2
February 1, 2018

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site



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Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Immediate target	Commence fuel removal from the Unit 1-3 Spent Fuel Pools

Unit 1

Regarding fuel removal from Unit 1 spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor).

All roof panels and wall panels of the building cover were dismantled by November 10, 2016.

Removal of pillars and beams of the building was completed on May 11. Modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of building cover were completed by December 19. Rubble removal from the operating floor started from January 22, 2018. Thorough monitoring of radioactive materials will continue.

<Installation status (January 22)>

Flow of building cover dismantling (the latest status)

Unit 2

To facilitate removal of fuel assemblies and retrieval of debris in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the scope of dismantling and modification of the existing Reactor Building rooftop was examined. From the perspective of ensuring safety during the work, controlling impacts on the outside of the power station, and removing fuel rapidly to reduce risks, we decided to dismantle the whole rooftop above the highest floor of the Reactor Building.

Examination of the following two plans continues: Plan 1 to share a container for removing fuel assemblies from the pool and retrieving fuel debris; and Plan 2 to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal from the pool.



Image of Plan 1



Image of Plan 2

Unit 3

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015).

Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016.

Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017.

Installation of dome roof (December 19)



Image of entire fuel handling facility inside the cover

Image of the cover for fuel removal

Unit 4

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1st Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)

This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building.

Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

Fuel removal status

* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.

Common pool



An open space will be maintained in the common pool (Transfer to the temporary cask custody area)

Progress to date

- The common pool has been restored to a condition allowing it to re-accommodate fuel to be handled (November 2012)
- Loading of spent fuel stored in the common pool to dry casks commenced (June 2013)
- Fuel removal from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool began to be received (November 2013 - November 2014)

Temporary cask (*2) custody area



Spent fuel is accepted from the common pool

Operation commenced on April 12, 2013; from the cask-storage building, transfer of 9 existing dry casks completed (May 21, 2013); fuel stored in the common pool sequentially transferred.

<Glossary>

(*1) Operating floor: During regular inspection, the roof over the reactor is opened while on the operating floor, fuel inside the core is replaced and the core internals are inspected.

(*2) Cask: Transportation container for samples and equipment, including radioactive materials.

Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target	Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room(*1). (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations(*2) (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C(*3))

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.



Leak point

Image of the S/C upper part investigation

Unit 1



* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, January 31, 2018

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Oct 2012)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (Apr 2015)	Confirming the status of PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (Mar 2017)	Confirming the status of PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring and dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
Leakage points from PCV		- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in May 2014) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in November 2013)

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore: ϕ 100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.



<Image of investigation inside the PCV>



Image of hanging of dosimeter and camera

Image near the bottom

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
Feb - May 2015	Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.

<Glossary>
(*1) TIP (Traversing In-core Probe)
(*2) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
(*3) S/C (Suppression Chamber): Suppression pool, used as the water source for the emergent core cooling system.
(*4) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool):
(*5) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
(*6) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)

Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target	Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation

(1) Replacement of the RPV thermometer
- As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
- On April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed on January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled on March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.

(2) Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
- Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed on May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled on June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
- The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

Investigative results on torus chamber walls

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), "the status" and "existence of flow" were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer (*5) by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)



Penetrations investigated



Image of the torus chamber east-side cross-sectional investigation

Unit 2



* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, January 31, 2018

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Jan 2012)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature
	2nd (Mar 2012)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate
	3rd (Feb 2013 – Jun 2014)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (Jan – Feb 2017)	- Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature
Leakage points from PCV		- No leakage from torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- A robot, injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration(*1), will access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

[Progress status]
- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the inside of the Unit 2 PCV was investigated. During this investigation, the status under the platform was inspected by the improved telescopic-type investigative device which was used in the previous investigation (January – February 2017). From the investigative results, part of the fuel assemblies having fallen to the bottom of the pedestal was found. Deposits identified around the fuel assemblies were considered to be fuel debris. The images acquired in this investigation will be analyzed.



Inside of the pedestal

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
Mar – Jul 2016	Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.

<Glossary> (*1) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV (*2) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (*3) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (*4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (*5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target	Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve* room

On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected.

This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

Unit 3



* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, January 31, 2018

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Oct – Dec 2015)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (December 2015)
	2nd (Jul 2017)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (August 2017)
Leakage points from PCV		- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in May 2014)

Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.
- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.
  Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

Investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- The status of X-53 penetration(*4), which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.



Status inside the pedestal

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
May – Sep 2017	The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.

<Glossary>
(*1) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (*2) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (*3) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (*4) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV

Progress toward decommissioning: Work related to circulation cooling and stagnant water treatment line

Immediate target	Stably continue reactor cooling and stagnant water treatment, and improve reliability

Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer stagnant water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.





* The entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3km)

Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016 and in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017 and in H3 B area (31 tanks) in September 2017. Dismantling of flange tanks in H5 and H6 areas is underway.


Start of dismantling in H1 east area


After dismantling in H1 east area

Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)

Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks.

The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.





Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings



Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water

To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping-up of groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets.



Via a groundwater bypass, reduce the groundwater level around the Building and groundwater inflow into the Building

Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented.

The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets.

Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately.

At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked.

The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned.

Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. On the sea side, the underground temperature declined 0°C or less throughout the scope requiring freezing except for the unfrozen parts under the sea-water pipe trenches and the areas above groundwater level in October 2016.

Freezing started for two of seven unfrozen sections on the mountain side from December 2016, and four of the remaining five unfrozen sections from March 2017. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen section started in August 2017.

Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site

Immediate targets	・Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries. ・Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

Optimization of radioactive protective equipment

Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work.

From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.



*1 For works in buildings including water treatment facilities (multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.) (excluding site visits), wear a full-face mask.
*2 For works in tank areas containing concentrated salt water or Sr-treated water (excluding works not handling concentrated salt water, etc., patrol, on-site investigation for work planning, and site visits) and works related to tank transfer lines, wear a full-face mask.
*3 Specified light works (patrol, monitoring, delivery of goods brought from outside, etc.)



Installation of dose-rate monitors

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016.

These monitors allow workers to confirm real time on-site dose rates at their workplaces.

Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.

Installation of Dose-rate monitor

Installation of sea-side impermeable walls

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed.

Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.

Installation of steel pipe sheet piles for sea-side impermeable wall

Status of the large rest house

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015.

Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.