Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March
11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have
been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and
inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on
April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the
accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose
is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment
of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control
and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term
Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will
implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to
their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in
Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's major facilities.

* Updates since the previous press release underlined.

[Nuclear Power Station] 
·Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: Unit 1 to 3: shut down
 due to the earthquake
  (Units 4 to 6: outage due to regular inspections)

- At 9:05 am on January 21, we started filling water to the condensate
  storage tank of Unit 3. At 5:40 pm on the same day, we finished filling 
  water.

- At 3:23 pm on January 20, we started transferring accumulated water from
  the basement of T/B, Unit 2 to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment
  Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building
  [High Temperature Incinerator Building]). 
  At 7:02 am on January 21, a worker from the cooperating company found
  water leakage from the transfer piping at the large equipment hatch, T/B,
  Unit 4.
  We checked the work site and observed water leakage from a flange of the
  piping to a valve unit. Part of water dripped to the floor outside of
  the valve unit. At 7:48 am on the same date, we stopped the transfer
  pump for the accumulated water. At 7:55 am, we confirmed that the
  dripping of water stopped. The water was within the T/B and there was no
  leakage to outdoor, no leakage to the sea. The volume of water dripped
  to the floor of T/B was approx 2 liters. The surface dose rate was
  0.1mSv/h. We believe that this was not high density contaminated water.
  The location of the leak was at a flange of newly installed piping.
  After installation of the piping, we checked leakage using water at the
  vertical pit, Unit 1*. We estimate that that water was pushed out and
  dripped to the floor. After that, from 1:58 pm to 2:49 pm, we conducted
  flushing of the transfer piping and confirmed that there was no leakage.
  We will change the hose hereafter. Regarding the cause of the leakage, 
  we estimate that shielding material over the hose became load to the 
  connection part and it lost the sealing characteristics, and then it 
  reached leakage. The shielding material over the hose was removed. 
* water at the vertical pit, Unit 1: we estimate that this was a mixture
  of seawater and rainwater. The measurement result on January 14 was as
  below:
   (I-131: below detectable limit [1.7x10-2Bq/cm3], Cs-134: 1.8x10-1 
    Bq/cm3, Cs-137: 2x10-1Bq/cm3)
- At 3:17 pm on January 20, we started transferring accumulated water from
  the basement of T/B, Unit 3 to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment
  Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building
  [High Temperature Incinerator Building]). At 2:18 pm on January 21, we
  stopped the transfer. As water leakage occurred on the piping for
  transferring accumulated water from the basement of T/B, Unit 2 to the
  Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste
  Volume Reduction Treatment Building [High Temperature Incinerator
  Building]), we started checking similar flanges to confirm leakage. At
  2:30 pm, we found seepage at one location (without water dripping). We 
  will change the hose after flushing of the transfer piping. Regarding 
  the cause of the seepage, we estimate that shielding material over the 
  hose became load to the connection part and it lost the sealing 
  characteristics, and then it reached seepage. The shielding material 
  over the hose was removed.

·Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station:
  (Units 1 to 4: shutdown due to the earthquake)

·Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station: Units 5, 6: under normal
  operation
  (Units 1 to 4 and 7: outage due to regular inspections)

[Thermal Power Station] 
·Power supply has returned to normal and facilities damaged by the
 earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner.

[Hydro Power Station] 
·Power supply has returned to normal and facilities damaged by the
 earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner.

[Impacts on Transmission Facilities] 
·Power supply has returned to normal and facilities damaged by the
 earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner.

[Impacts on Power Supply and Demand Balance] 
This winter, there will be some minus factors such as the regular
inspection of Unit 5 at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station. On the
other hand, there will be several plus factors such as the recovery of the
common thermal power stations which suffered the earthquake. As a result,
we expect to secure 54.6 GW (at the end of January), 53.7 GW (at the end
of February) supply power. 
Compared to the maximum demand in the last winter, which is 51.5 GW, we
will have 2.2 - 3.1 GW generation reserve margin.

We expect to maintain stable power supply this winter, however, as there
remains possibilities of unplanned shutdowns at our power stations and
growth in the demand according to the rapid change in the temperature, we
would like to ask your reasonable effort to save electricity.

We will continue to make our efforts to maintain stable operation and
maintenance of the power facilities in order to "prevent in principle" the
planned blackouts and secure power supply.

 

Appendix: Past Progress (As of 10:00 am, January 22, 2012) (PDF 620KB) 
Appendix: Past Progress (From March 11, 2011 to July 31, 2011) (PDF 225KB) 

* Revised past progress