

Statements by Official Residence Staff

Excerpts from major statements made by personnel of the Official Residence regarding the withdrawal issue that are publicly available are provided below as reference.

<i>Statement Excerpt 1</i>	METI Minister Kaieda: Diet, Accident Investigation Committee ¹	May 17, 2012
<i>Statement Excerpt 2</i>	Prime Minister Kan: House of Councilors Budget Committee	May 27, 2012
<i>Statement Excerpt 3</i>	Prime Minister Kan: House of Councilors Budget Committee	April 18, 2011
<i>Statement Excerpt 4</i>	Prime Minister Kan: House of Councilors Budget Committee	April 15, 2011
<i>Statement Excerpt 5</i>	Prime Minister Kan: House of Councilors Budget Committee	May 2, 2011
<i>Statement Excerpt 6</i>	Prime Minister Kan: Asahi Shimbun interview	September 5, 2011
<i>Statement Excerpt 7</i>	Prime Minister Kan: Diet Accident Investigation Committee	May 28, 2012
<i>Statement Excerpt 8</i>	METI Min. Edano: House of Councilors Budget Committee	February 7, 2012

¹ National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) : An organization established within the Diet to investigate the chronology and causes leading to Fukushima NPS accident.

Excerpt from Diet Accident Investigation Committee Response on May 17, 2012

(Min. Kaieda)

○: Question, ●: Answer

Q&A on phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- Regarding the withdrawal issue, at that time where did communications to the Minister come from, and how?
- ... I was told there was phone call from President Shimizu, and he had called my secretary's line. ... What I remember clearly are three words. **He used the word "evacuate" and did not use the word "withdraw" from Daiichi NPS to Daini NPS.** I remember these three words very clearly. Other than that, I recall that **there was absolutely no talk of** keeping some people behind and **some leaving**
- To ask the question differently, was there an explanation that it would be all personnel?
- **I do not remember the word "all personnel," but, of course, in my mind I recognized that it was all personnel** so...
- Was it you, Minister Kaieda, who directly spoke on the phone to President Shimizu?
- I took the phone, then said it will be heard later, and I heard later that a phone call was also made to Mr. Edano. I was not there at that place or directly heard or saw it, so I did not see the phone ringing nor was I there nearby listening, but **I heard later from others that a call was also made to Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano.**
- Ultimately, what conclusion did the executive staff at the Official Residence reach regarding this issue?
- ... It was that, though we felt sorry for the field workers, we needed them to stay and do their utmost. **This was agreed upon by everyone. Our intent was the same.**
- TEPCO has explained that they never considered that all personnel would leave from Daiichi NPS, in other words, regardless of whether it was "evacuate" or "withdraw," and that they did not communicate this to the Official Residence. How do you feel about that?
- When considering that Mr. Shimizu called as well, I think that it was an important conclusion (they reached). ... **I thought that there was a grave decision behind the fact that he went so far as to expressly called me.**

Q&A regarding verifying President Shimizu's intentions at the Prime Minister's Office

- As a result, what actions did you take afterwards?
- We decided to have TEPCO's **President Shimizu come**. At the same time, because such information was not being shared and our intentions and their intentions were not

being communicated at the same time, so, as a result, we decided to go to TEPCO and **establish a joint headquarters** there.

- President Shimizu quite simply said that they will not withdraw. How did you feel about that?
- At that time, I felt slightly drained. This was, of course, a very grave decision, and when you especially think about what will happen if you stay and about the possibility of acute exposure; **this was different from what was said on the phone, so I was surprised.**

Excerpt from Diet Accident Investigation Committee Response on May 17, 2012

(Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano)

○: Question, ●: Answer

Q&A on phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- How did you learn of TEPCO's intentions?
- I have a clear recollection of being called somewhere on that day between the late afternoon and evening. ... **I received a report that TEPCO's president had said that they want to completely withdraw, that that was not possible, and that they were telling him no.**

- Who reported that to you?
- The possible people I think would be Mr. Kaieda, Mr. Fukuyama, or Mr. Hosono; one of them.

- Did you hear this from somebody directly from TEPCO?
- ... **The President talked about complete withdrawal.**
- ... **I do not remember the exact exchange of words** regarding this. But I did point out that if they did do such a thing, they wouldn't be able to control it and the situation would deteriorate more and more. He faltered in his response, so **it was clear that the intent was not to keep some people behind.**

Q&A on verifying intent of site superintendent Yoshida

- Did someone directly confirm with site superintendent Yoshida?
- ... I asked if there is something that he can still do, and **site superintendent Yoshida responded saying that 'there is still more we can do, we'll do our best.'**

<Response at Diet> April 18, 2011 Response at House of Councillors Budget Meeting

(PM Kan)

— Questions pertaining to chronology of establishing joint headquarters at TEPCO —

Phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- This is something that needs to be clearly communicated to the people, so to mention the chronology, early on the 15th, TEPCO personnel, and from a minister to me, communicated something along the lines of them evacuating from the field...

Verifying President Shimizu's intentions at the Official Residence

- Because this is a very important issue, we had President Shimizu, the President come to hear this explanation. **Then the President said something like, no, no, we do not mean withdrawal.**
- Then, since up to that time, the government headquarters was at the Official Residence, and conditions, for example the hydrogen explosion were not immediately communicated even when it occurred between government headquarters and TEPCO headquarters and between TEPCO headquarters and the power station, so to resolve such situation, I believed it was important to have a unified response headquarters between the Administration and TEPCO. So, I informed President Shimizu of such to which President Shimizu agreed, and so we established it.

The Prime Minister at TEPCO headquarters

- And then, the first meeting was going to be held at TEPCO headquarters, so I went there and that was the first time I attended.

<Response at Diet> April 25, 2011 Response at House of Councillors Budget Meeting

(PM Kan)

— Questions pertaining to chronology of establishing joint headquarters at TEPCO —

Phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- It is difficult to gain understanding on this issue without explaining it clearly. In other words, what was reported to me at least at the point of the 15th was there was talk that TEPCO wanted to withdraw because of various radiation issues.

Verifying President Shimizu's intentions at the Official Residence

- We first had the President come and I said, what is your intention? We would be completely troubled if you tried to pull out, right? And he said, **no, no that is not the case.**
- So then I said that there is the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters at the Official Residence and the TEPCO headquarters, and then the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, so it is three-fold, and so I said we wanted to make an integrated response headquarters with at least TEPCO and the Cabinet, what do you think? Then, the President consented...

The Prime Minister at TEPCO headquarters

- When we thought of establishing this response headquarters and about where to have the first meeting, all the information was being collected at TEPCO headquarters and members such as the Chairman and President are in attendance, so the unified response headquarters was established at TEPCO and I went to attend the first meeting.

<Response at Diet> May 2, 2011 Response at House of Councillors Budget Meeting

(PM Kan)

— Questions pertaining to the Prime Minister barging into TEPCO —

Phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- It is said that my going to TEPCO is some kind of problem, but the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters itself was established on the day of the disaster. I served as the chief and TEPCO personnel, NISA or NSC major members were in attendance for this. However, at some point in time, the Minister of METI communicated to me that TEPCO seems to be considering withdrawal due to various conditions, so...

Verifying President Shimizu's intentions at the Official Residence

- We invited the President and asked what his intentions were, and the story was, **no, no, we aren't considering that.**

The President at TEPCO headquarters

- There are ten reactors at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini alone and if you include the spent fuel pool, it is eleven. Given such situation, we must stand firm. That's what I thought, so we established the unified response headquarters, it is the head office or headquarters of TEPCO that has the most information from the field and it's connected fully online, so the unified response headquarters was set up there and I attended the first meeting. I believe that that led to the subsequent resolution that withdrawal is completely out of the question. There may be much criticism, but I think that this was something that had to be done and I am glad that I did it even now.

Asahi Shimbun September 6, 2011 Morning Edition (excerpt from page 3)

Asahi Shimbun Interview September 5, 2011 (PM Kan)

— Questions pertaining whether it was true that TEPCO talked about withdrawal —

Phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- At around 3AM, the METI Minister said that TEPCO wanted to withdraw. What would happen if it is left alone, everything would melt down and it wouldn't be even near the magnitude of Chernobyl. The idea of "withdrawal" was not possible in my mind. It was about how to keep it under control with our lives at stake.

Verifying President Shimizu's intentions at the Official Residence

- Then I summoned President Shimizu of TEPCO. **He was unclear about whether there was going to be a withdrawal or not.**
- I thought that this was dangerous and that grip was necessary. I suggested to President Shimizu to setup an accident response headquarters jointly between the Administration and TEPCO, and it was said "understood."

National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Minutes
No. 16, May 28, 2012 (excerpt from page 5, 6, 13, 15)

Excerpt from May 28, 2012 Diet Accident Investigation Committee Response

(PM Kan)

○ Question, ● Response

Q&A regarding phone call from President Shimizu to the Official Residence

- Who reported that what request was made from TEPCO?
- I think it was around 3AM on the 15th. ... the Minister of METI said he wanted to discuss an issue, and I was awoken by my secretary or was rather informed. Then, **METI Minister Kaieda came and said that TEPCO has said they want to withdraw and what we should do about it. That is how I heard about the withdrawal issue.**
- What did you think about it and how did you understand this?
- ... When I heard this from the METI Minister, I heard the word “withdrawal” **and I first thought, no, that it’s absurd.**

Q&A related to verification of site superintendent Yoshida’s intentions

- What did you think about TEPCO, with the field being commanded by site superintendent Yoshida, saying that they will withdraw all workers or something to that extent?
- ... At that time, **the story was that the site superintendent Yoshida said there is more than can be done.** ...

Q&A regarding verifying intention of President Shimizu at the Official Residence

- When you summoned President Shimizu, what did he say in response to the so-called withdraw issue?
- I said to President Shimizu, withdraw is out of the question. **In response, he said, yes, I understand.**
- When you heard that, at that time, what did you think as Prime Minister?
- First, in regards to this response, it is said that Chairman Katsumata and President Shimizu said that there was no withdraw, but they never said that voluntarily, at least not in front of me. When I said, withdrawing is out of the question, they just said, yes, I understand.
- This is being questioned in the Diet as well, but basically, when I said withdrawing is out of the question, he **did not say anything in objection such as “I did not say that,” or, “I have no intention of having said something like that” and just accepted it,** and so I said to the Diet that he just accepted it, but it seems that the story has change slightly so it seems that President Shimizu himself said that there was no withdrawal, but that is not the case.
- For me, **it was a relief that President Shimizu said he understood. But I thought it was not enough.** So, I also said that I want to establish a unified response headquarters and place it at the TEPCO headquarters, to have Special Advisor Hosono reside there or have Minister Kaieda be there as much as possible. To take that form where I would be the chief, and Minister Kaieda, and, at that time I think I said Chairman Katsumata, so the

Chairman or the President and Minister Kaieda be the deputy chiefs, and Special Advisor Hosono be the secretary-general. I said that is the structure I want to see, and President Shimizu said, I understand and gave his consent.

- So is it correct to understand that when President Shimizu came, and you said, there's no withdrawing, he said, yes, I understand and you were relieved?
- When I say relieved, as I mentioned before, if, at least, he said no, that's not the case, then I would have to be stronger, and say, it may be difficult, but, something like what I said at TEPCO might have been necessary to say, but **he was in some sense very yielding or immediately said that, so I felt a little discouraged, or just a little relieved.**

Q&A regarding the Prime Minister's statements at TEPCO headquarters

- On the morning of the 15th, Prime Minister, you went to TEPCO headquarters and, according to many people's statements, you reprimanded them ... ?
- ... immediately before this, the withdraw issue came up, and **it was right after President Shimizu said that there was no withdraw, so I did not know whether there was a common intention among the people,** but I did strongly say something to the extent that they had best understand on how serious the situation is and that I wanted them to put their lives on the line to do their utmost ...

180th Diet Session House of Councillors Budget Committee Meeting Minutes No.4

February 7, 2012 (excerpt from page 28)

Response at Diet February 7, 2012

Response at House of Councillors Budget Committee

(METI Min. Edano (at that time))

Question: It has been reported that he told TEPCO and the civilian nuclear plant workers to not withdraw, and he has commented as such in interviews and other places himself. Is there a legal basis for this?

Verifying President Shimizu' intentions

- At that time, PM Kan summoned TEPCO's President Shimizu to the Official Residence, and **when he asked whether they intend to withdraw, I understand that President Shimizu clearly denied this saying he was thinking of such.**

The Prime Minister at TEPCO headquarters

- Afterwards, I think that Mr. Kan, Prime Minister at that time, went to TEPCO to speak. This was not some order or instruction, but request from the Administration to TEPCO or TEPCO workers and, therefore, does not require any legal basis.