



## (5) Contaminated Water Leakage from a Tank / Measures for Risk Reduction

<b>Measures for Risk Reduction</b>	<b>Measures implemented and started to be implemented (in August)</b>	<p>[Measure 1] Inspection of all of the bolted tanks (Already conducted on August 22)                      (About 300 tanks of a total of 930 tanks in use for contaminated water storage for Units 1 to 4 are bolted tanks.)</p> <p>[Measure 2] Water transfer from tanks “relocated after installation” as in the case of Tank No.5 from which water leaked                      (Contaminated water transfer from Tank No.5 and Tank No.10 was completed on August 21 and 27, respectively. Contaminated water transfer from Tank No.3 was started on August 29.)</p> <p>[Measure 3] Contaminated soil recovery (started on August 23)</p> <p>[Measure 4] Inspection and reinforcement of dikes around the bolted tanks (Land embankment and leak isolation sheets over the sandbags outside the dikes of H4 area where the leakage occurred were added).</p> <p>[Measure 5] Intensification of monitoring (The possibility of outflow into the ocean is under investigation)</p>
	<b>Emergency measures</b> * Recurrence prevention measures	<p>[Emergency measure 1] Patrol reinforcement (The number of patrol personnel was increased from 10 to 90, and the number of patrols per day will be increased from 2 to 4 times/day. Manner of recording will be improved also.)</p> <p>[Emergency measure 2] Adoption of “normally closed” operation for dike drain valves around the contaminated water tanks</p> <p>[Emergency measure 3] Improvement in control of water levels in the contaminated water tanks (Adoption of control using thermography)</p>
	<b>Fundamental measures</b> * Under consideration as extra measures	<p>[Fundamental measure 1] Installation of water gauges in all of the bolted tanks and introduction of a centralized control system</p> <p>[Fundamental measure 2] Increase of the number of welded tanks and replacement of bolted tanks</p>

[Measure 5] Intensification of monitoring (Investigation as to outflow to the ocean)

Positional relations with groundwater bypass and pump wells



	Pump well	Sampling date	All $\beta$	Tritium*
System A	No. 1	Sep. 10	Below detection limit value (15)	8.9
	No. 2		Below detection limit value (15)	1.1
	No. 3		Below detection limit value (15)	Below detection limit value (6.1)
	No. 4		Below detection limit value (15)	47
System C	No. 5	Sep. 17	Below detection limit value (15)	11
	No. 6		Below detection limit value (15)	110
	No. 7		Below detection limit value (15)	450
	No. 8		Below detection limit value (15)	56
	No. 9		Below detection limit value (15)	49
	No. 10		Below detection limit value (15)	260
System C	No. 11	Sep. 17	Below detection limit value (15)	270
	No. 12		Below detection limit value (15)	740

Units: Bq/L

\* Density limit by the announcement of reactor regulation: 60,000

[Values obtained in monitoring (excerpts)] (Units: Bq/L)

- Seawater near the Fukushima Daiichi south water outlet (sampled on September 24)
  - Cesium-137: 2.1
  - All  $\beta$ : Below detection limit value (20)
- Water at the junction of the drainage channels B and C (sampled on September 24)
  - Cesium-137: Below detection limit value (26)
  - All  $\beta$ : Below detection limit value (13)