WATER MANAGEMENT AT FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI

Ten Years of Continuous Progress While Facing Challenges in the Aftermath of the March 2011 Accident.
Introduction

OUR PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF WATER MANAGEMENT

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, and the accident that resulted at Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F), the management of contaminated water on the site immediately emerged as a major challenge.

For the management, maintaining control of the complex flow of water at Fukushima Daiichi was understood to be of vital importance. Of paramount importance were the public health and safety impacts, as well as the emotional and psychological impact of public anxiety.

Three objectives were great concerns: (1) contribute to reduction of the effective dose at the site boundary to 1mSv/year or less, (2) contribute to reduction of the radiation exposure of workers at 1F, and (3) limit the amount of contaminated water flowing into the Pacific Ocean.

More important than these three objectives, there was psychological and economic importance in restoring public confidence in fish and other products from Japan and from the Fukushima area. In particular, it was important to give confidence to farmers and fishermen that they would continue to have a livelihood, and to assure other countries that the Pacific Ocean and its marine life would be protected.

To do so, TEPCO needed to demonstrate its capability and determination to undertake the complex long-term decommissioning of the site.

During the immediate post-accident phase, many steps were taken to capture and contain contaminated water. The urgency required innovation and TEPCO engineers had to improvise. Building basements were converted into holding tanks, waterproofing was carried out in many places, silt fences were installed, temporary tanks quickly constructed, and hundreds of other engineering projects were performed under tremendous stress and terrible working conditions. As time went by, and as working conditions improved, these early efforts evolved into more elaborate, durable and sophisticated solutions, including such water treatment projects as Cesium removal to reduce radiation levels; the development of a sophisticated ALPS (advanced liquid processing system) to remove most nuclides from the water; and the frozen-soil wall to limit the flow of groundwater into contamination zones. As a result, most contaminated water was successfully contained and is now in the process of being further treated in preparation for its eventual disposal.

The purpose of this report is to present a comprehensive overall picture of this many faceted water-management effort, with a sufficient degree of detail yet informative to the non-technical person.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Developing an overall approach to water management required addressing the different ways in which water enters the site, moves through it, and drains from it. As it moves through the site, it can contact a variety of sources of contamination, including among the most significant: resolidified fuel debris in reactors, 1, 2, and 3; contaminated standing water inside the buildings and elsewhere on the site; contaminated surfaces (including roofs); and contaminated soil.

Among the most significant challenges in addressing this problem were:

• In the effort to cool the reactors during the loss of electricity at 1F at the time of the accident, cooling water was poured into the reactor buildings. This created contaminated water outside the closed loop usually used for reactor cooling. Most of it remained in the reactor building basements, but there was concern it would escape through penetration points at the basement of the buildings and eventually reach the sea.

• So it is important to prevent contaminated water from flowing out of the buildings. The level of the contaminated water inside the buildings is controlled to be lower than that of groundwater outside (water level difference between inside and outside) to prevent a leakage out of the buildings. However, this measure causes groundwater outside to flow into the buildings with the lower water level, which generates contaminated water.

• In addition, the explosions at Units 1, 3, and 4 left the building roofs open to the elements, allowing rainwater to directly enter the buildings and mix with the contaminated water already inside. This inflow water results in larger volumes of contaminated water which has to be stored, processed, and eventually disposed of.

Three-Pronged Strategy to Address the Challenge

Although different words have been used to describe each of these elements over time, they have been described as:

1. **REMOVE**, where possible, the sources of contamination.
2. **REDIRECT** water away from contacting sources of contamination.
3. **RETAIN** water safely on the site to prevent leakage into the environment that could have an adverse impact.
Eventually, as the result of thousands of hours of planning, innovation, and hard work, water management at 1F achieved important goals.

Early on, TEPCO adopted a three-pronged strategy to address the challenge (see sidebar on page 2). Each strategy faced significant technological and logistical hurdles. Removing nuclides required the development of multi-staged innovative systems to remove radioactive contaminants on a prioritized risk basis. First, gamma-producing Cesium had to be removed, and for that the Kurion and SARRY systems were developed. Then the water was sent to desalination process to recycle back for the water’s reinjection into the reactors for cooling purposes, and the other excess water was stored and then the Strontium and other nuclides needed removal. For those purposes ALPS was created.

Keeping water away from sources of contamination has also required multiple approaches, including pumping groundwater from wells to divert it from entering 1F buildings.

As TEPCO and its contractors worked to make progress in each of these areas, there were successes and challenges. Working conditions were difficult, and workers were in many instances attempting to do things that had never been done before, such as construct a frozen soil wall (often referred to as an “ice wall,” and officially referred to as the “landside impermeable wall” to distinguish it from the steel “seaside impermeable wall” constructed adjacent to the port) to form a waterproof underground perimeter around the Units 1 through 4.

Eventually, as the result of thousands of hours of planning, innovation, and hard work, water management at 1F achieved important goals: reduction of the dose, mainly direct and skyshine radiation coming from water storage tanks, at the site boundary (for which water management was a contributing, but not the sole, factor), and reduction of the volume of newly contaminated water. This helped create a safer environment for decommissioning work.

Now, the greatest challenge to the sustainability of the water management program is the finite amount of space in which to store the ALPS treated water, etc. In April 2021, after many months of working with, and receiving input from, all interested parties, the government announced its plan for the ultimate disposition of stored ALPS treated water through a controlled and monitored discharge into the sea. This review incorporates that decision in its review of the entire arc of water management efforts from 2011 to the present day.
Overview

WATER MANAGEMENT TODAY AT FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI

A VISUAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE WATER MANAGEMENT SITE

The following two schematics present an overall view of the water management approach at Fukushima Daiichi today.

The first graphic (Schematic 1) represents a cross-section of the site, showing how it slopes down to the sea and how water is intercepted, confined, treated, and stored in various ways.

The many different strategies illustrated demonstrate the major progress that has been made. It is the result of innovation, research, and the work of many thousands of individuals both at the site and at many other locations in Japan and in other countries.

The second graphic (Schematic 2) presents a view of 1F from above, and color-codes various approaches to water management: orange indicates “Remove,” blue represents “Redirect,” and green represents “Retain.”
OVERVIEW OF WATER MANAGEMENT TODAY

SCHEMATIC 1 • Cross-Section of the Water Management Site

SCHEMATIC 2 • Aerial View of the Water Management Site
WATER MILESTONES

2011–2012

• Construction of flanged tank farm to hold excess processed water (from groundwater and other leakages) · March 2011–March 2013
• Removal of vegetation begins · March 2011
• Blockage of direct turbine building (T/B) overflow into the sea completed for Unit 2 · April 2011 and Unit 3 · March 2011
• Addition of Cs retention silt screens installed in the port · August 2011
• Control of basement water levels to ensure ground water in leakage · June 2011
• Kurion Cs removal starts · June 2011
• SARRY Cs removal starts · August 2011

2013

• ALPS begins operation · March 2013
• Start of shotcrete covering of site soil areas to minimize general rainwater infiltration into ground water · Summer 2013

2014

• Groundwater bypass wells begin operation · April 2014
• Reroute of the drainage channels, “B” and “C” into the port · July 2014
• Construction of secondary catch basins around tank farms to retain possible tank leakage completed · August 2014
• Additional ALPS begins operation · September 2014
• High Performance ALPS begins operation · October 2014
• Kurion and SARRY systems modified to remove Sr in addition to Cs · December 2014

2015

• Welded tank replacement program accelerates
  • Removal of trench water by pumping and filling with special concrete completed for Unit 2 (June 2015) for Unit 3 (July 2015) and for Unit 4 (December 2015)
• Closure of the seaside impermeable wall · August 2015
• Refurbished subdrain system begins operation, with ground water sampling and drain system at 2.5m level and ground water processing system to remove Cs and Sr · September 2015
• Impermeable seaside wall completed · October 2015

2016–2018

• Radiation dose at the site boundary reduced below 1mSv per year · March 2016
• Reroute of the drainage channels, “K” into the port · March 2016
• Lowering of reactor building (R/B) and T/B basement water levels to reduce leakage and flooding begins with Unit 1 T/B · March 2017
• Landside impermeable wall (ice wall) fully activates · September 2018

2019–2020

• Repair to water proof rooftops of the T/B to minimize rainwater infiltration into highly contaminated surface and adding to water inventories completed · August 2020
• Secondary treatment performance confirmation tests for the treated water to be re-purified begins · September 2020
One way to think about the various aspects of water management is this: we try to keep water from becoming contaminated at all. If it does become contaminated, and we remove nuclides to the extent possible and store it safely.

DIVERSION OF RUNOFF AND GROUNDWATER

Groundwater Bypass Wells, Pumping Up Water

To divert some groundwater away from areas where it could become contaminated, groundwater bypass wells were dug on the high ground to the west (the mountain side) of Fukushima Daiichi buildings. This enables some groundwater to be pumped up and redirected to the sea before it approaches the buildings. The pumped-up groundwater is stored for a predetermined time and water quality analysis is regularly conducted by TEPCO and third party organizations. The TEPCO’s upper limits of radioactive concentrations are more stringent than the ones set by the Reactor Regulation and the WHO guideline for drinking-water quality. TEPCO discharges the pumped up groundwater into the sea only after confirming that the radioactive concentrations of the water do not surpass the upper limits.
**Subdrains**

Additionally, subdrain wells that were installed when the buildings were constructed, and whose original purpose was to pump up groundwater to protect the buildings’ foundations, have now become part of the water management system. Prior to the accident, the groundwater was safe to simply discharge into the sea without checking. Now, the groundwater pumped up from the subdrains may have some extremely low levels of contamination caused by rainwater contacting surface soils that may contain low levels of contamination remaining from the accident. Therefore, it is now processed to remove radionuclides (other than tritium) to very low agreed-upon standards. TEPCO and third party organizations will make sure that the water meets the stringent water quality standards equivalent to the ones set for the groundwater bypass operations.

This process controls and reduces the level of the natural groundwater table so that the water levels in the building basements can always be maintained at a lower level (to ensure no out-leakage of contaminated water). Thus the amount of groundwater flowing into the buildings can be carefully reduced to minimize the amount of contaminated water to be processed, stored, and disposed of.

**Paving of Surfaces**

Prior to the March 2011 accident, much of the surface area of the 1F site was in a natural state — indeed, much of it was forest. Since that time, most of the trees had to be cut down because they had become contaminated, and also to make room for storage tanks and other decommissioning activities. It was also important to harden the surface so that rainwater would neither penetrate into the ground nor become contaminated. Therefore, an extensive project to pave the surfaces at 1F has been undertaken to keep rainwater separate from contaminated surfaces to allow direct discharge to the sea.

While this led to an increase runoff of storm water, this water was directed into drainage channels where it can be appropriately managed. In addition, some older drainage channels were redirected within the port so that water would not run directly into the open sea. Now, all drainage channels lead to the area within the port, and their radiation levels are monitored continuously.

**Seaside Impermeable Wall**

In an area at the edge of the port — that is, to the sea side of the reactor buildings — a wall was constructed to block the flow of potentially contaminated groundwater into the sea. The wall, with a length of approximately 780 meters, was completed and put into service in October 2015. The wall consists of approximately 600 steel pipes embedded approximately 30 meters into the earth. Water that builds up behind the wall is pumped up from underground drains, analyzed, treated if necessary and, provided it meets the established standards, discharged into the port area.
Landside Impermeable Wall

A great deal of attention was given to the development and construction of the frozen soil wall, often referred to as the “ice wall,” which forms a perimeter around the four crippled reactor units, intended to work in conjunction with the subdrain system to control the groundwater levels adjacent to the highly contaminated building basements. This allows reduction of groundwater from intruding into the buildings where it could become significantly more contaminated, and to prevent that contaminated water from flowing out of the buildings toward the sea.

Construction of the wall received the attention because of its innovative application. The concept, which uses frozen soil as a substitute for a physical wall, was chosen as a way to overcome the difficulty of building a watertight barrier around the many pipes and other subterranean fixtures that surround the four reactor buildings. The technology involved had been used in other contexts, such as a temporary way to stabilize the ground for tunnel construction and to prevent water intrusion, but never for a project intended to last as long or on so large a scale. Despite its complexities it has been a success in controlling water levels.

Schematic 3, below, offers an illustration of the frozen-soil wall, officially referred to as the “landside impermeable wall” in contradistinction to the seaside impermeable wall adjacent to the port.

SCHEMATIC 3 • Frozen-soil Wall (Landside Impermeable Wall)
After being constructed and activated in phases, the frozen-soil wall was fully activated in September 2018. It has so far been shown to be effective in redirecting groundwater flow- ing from the mountain side around the contaminated buildings so it can flow to the sea.

Since the wall’s completion in September 2018, it has reduced inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings by 100 cubic meters (from 190 to 90 cubic meters) per day when compared with the period before the wall was in place. Its existence will allow the flooded building basements to eventually be drained and dried, removing that potential for con- tamination of additional water that enters the basements.

For more information on the development of the frozen-soil wall, go to https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/planaction/landwardwall/index-e.html

Repair of Damaged Roofs of Buildings

In order to prevent rainwater from flowing into the buildings, damaged roofs, caused by explosions and by debris falling back down on them during the accident, are being repaired to minimize additional generation of contaminated water.

Along with the ice wall and subdrain systems, the aim is to reduce contaminated water generation to about 150 and 100 or less cubic meters per day by the end of 2020 and 2025, respectively. Contaminated water left in the buildings is being processed according to plan. All the contaminated water left in the buildings, other than reactor buildings where fuel debris is being cooled (along with the process main building and the high-temperature incineration building), was treated by the end of 2020.

REMOVAL AND TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED WATER

For water that could not be diverted, the strategy is to remove as many sources of contam- ination as possible, and to treat and safely store (or contain) the water that did become contaminated. That included water that was standing in the site immediately after the accident (such as in the trenches near the port and in the basements of buildings) as well as water that would enter the site afterward via rainwater or groundwater. This section of the report addresses the removal and treatment of the water, and the following section addresses its safe storage.

Cesium and Strontium filtering equipment (Kurion and SARRY)

Prior to the development of ALPS (see below), the Kurion (named for its manufacturer) and SARRY (Simplified Active Water Retrieve and Recovery System, manufactured by Toshiba) systems were developed. The two systems were originally designed to remove significant levels of Cesium, and began operation in June and August of 2011, respectively. Then, in order to meet the goal of reducing the radiation dose at the site boundary, the systems were adapted to also remove Strontium. This was accomplished by adding other adsorbents to the treatment process.
SCHEMATIC 4 • Reactor Cooling Status: Cooling by Recirculating Cooling Water

Reactors are maintained in a low temperature stable state through continuous cooling which recirculates cooling water and injects it into the reactors...
A key element to the success of water management at Fukushima Daiichi has been the development of the Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS), which can remove 62 different types of nuclides from water to trace levels.

The two systems continue to operate as a pretreatment to ALPS to remove most of the highly radioactive Cesium isotope. Water is first treated in the Kurion/SARRY systems, then salt is removed in reverse osmosis units, to create water pure enough to recycle back into the reactors for cooling purposes. The excess water is then transferred to ALPS to remove most of the other nuclides except tritium. The need to remove salt stems largely from the saltwater left behind in the buildings by the tsunami, and chloride in the groundwater.

Removal of Water from the Trenches

Highly contaminated stagnant water in the sea-side trenches (Units 2 to 4), which are tunnels connecting seaside facilities and turbine buildings containing seawater pipes and cables, had been removed to prevent them from leaking and the trenches were filled and sealed with a special concrete by the end of 2015.

ALPS

A key element to the success of water management at Fukushima Daiichi has been the development of the Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS), which can remove 62 different types of nuclides from water to meet the legally required standards, the main exception being tritium. Development of the system was accomplished in partnership with Toshiba, Hitachi-GE, and the U.S.-based company Energy Solutions.

The objective in developing ALPS was to remove nuclides from the water that had accumulated in storage tanks since the accident (all of which had already been through the Kurion/SARRY process to remove gross Cesium, and was being stored in tanks).

As it was a completely new technology that required a significant amount of testing, the introduction of ALPS took place in stages and was not without its challenges. High-integrity containers (HIC) had to be used to store the waste products generated from the filtration system, early filters and other components had to be modified to withstand the high levels of radiation to which they were subjected, and corrosion was an early problem that had to be overcome.
But through perseverance, the system became operational in 2013, and has gone through three evolutionary stages: Initial ALPS, Additional ALPS, and High-Performance ALPS, the last of which was developed with about $150 million in funding from the Japanese government and was constructed primarily by Hitachi-GE. The storage of water before treatment by ALPS, some of which only had Cesium removed, had contributed to an increase in the effective dose at the site boundary to 9.76 mSv/year, greatly exceeding the goal of 1 mSv/year (as of the end of FY 2013).  

The purification of contaminated water through the combination of the ALPS, Kurion, and SARRY systems have been a major contribution to achieving the goal of reducing the effective dose at the site boundary to below 1 mSv/year by the end of FY 2015.

Although the dose goal had been met, the specific goals for reducing concentrations of each nuclide were not met in every case due to the faster ALPS processing rates. Radiation dose reduction for site personnel and the site boundary was a higher risk reduction priority. Thus ALPS was operated at a less replacement frequency of adsorbents to reduce radiation doses as quickly as practicable in a safe manner.

By November 2018, all the Cesium-Strontium removed water that was being stored in flanged tanks (which were somewhat leak-prone — see the section on storage, below) had been treated, with a high priority both because of that water’s level of contamination and also because of the problems associated with the flanged (as opposed to welded) tanks.

About 70% of the ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks contains radionuclides other than tritium at the concentration which exceeds legally required standards. Secondary treatment will be carried out to satisfy the legally required standards for discharge other than tritium, and the amount of radioactive materials including carbon-14 will be reduced as much as possible.

For more information on stored water, go to TEPCO Treated Water Portal https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html

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1 On April 13, 2021, the Government of Japan announced its decision regarding the disposition of treated water being stored at Fukushima Daiichi NPS. Because the policy of discharge into the sea will require some of the treated water to undergo further treatment before it can be discharged, the Government and TEPCO have agreed that the phrase “ALPS treated water” will henceforth be used only to refer to water that has been treated by ALPS and meets the stringent standards for discharge. Because this report is primarily concerned with events and activities that took place prior to the adoption of that definition, and because it refers to government and other documents that were issued prior to the adoption of the new definition and which use the phrase “ALPS treated water” more broadly, this report uses the phrase “ALPS treated water” in the same manner as those documents: to mean water that has been treated at least once by the ALPS system, regardless of whether it may require secondary treatment prior to discharge into the sea.
Removal of Stagnant Water from the Basements of the Buildings

In the reactor building and turbine buildings, stagnant water is a source of contamination. To remove this potential source of contamination, removal of stagnant water from the buildings will be carried out step by step in order to prevent it from leaking. It is also important to ensure that water levels in the basements remain below groundwater levels outside the foundations, so that water from inside the buildings does not flow out as groundwater levels are lowered by the effects of the subdrain, the landside impermeable wall, and paving of the site’s surfaces.

Through those efforts, removal and treatment of stagnant water from the buildings (excluding the reactor buildings of Units 1-3, the process main building (PMB) and the high temperature incinerator building (HTI)), was completed by the end of 2020. For the PMB and HTI, the completion of stagnant water removal and treatment is being preceded by dose mitigation for high-dose zeolite sandbags, which had been placed in the basement floor to absorb Cesium from the water. (The process main building was used in connection with solid radioactive waste management prior to the accident.) The amount of stagnant water in the reactor buildings will be reduced to around half of current levels by FY2022–2024.

STORAGE AND CONTAINMENT

ALPS treated water, etc. is being stored in tanks on site. Initially after the accident, tanks had to be built quickly and they were assembled from prefabricated sections fastened together. These “flanged” tanks proved problematic and have now been almost entirely replaced with more durable welded tanks, significantly reducing leakage risks. A very limited number of flanged tanks remain in use for storage of water with very low levels of radioactivity, such as ground water pumped up from the bypass wells.

In line with a tank construction plan, total tank capacity for ALPS treated water, etc. and strontium removed water was increased to approximately 1.37 million cubic meters by the end of 2020. However, the amount stored in tanks is expected to reach the capacity around November 2022.
SCHEMATIC 5 • Onsite Storage Tank Water Capacity

As of June 17, 2021

SCHEMATIC 6 • Limitations on Storage Capacity

The illustration shows how the limits of the site’s capacity are being reached, and how space is allocated for future storage of not only water but also solid waste, spent fuel and fuel debris.
Storage and Disposition

LONG-TERM CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

CHALLENGES

As we can see from the preceding sections of this report, the water management challenge since the accident in 2011 has required a wide spectrum of approaches, along with the development of innovative technologies. It is not finished, and indeed the challenge will remain for decades until decontamination and decommissioning of the site is fully completed.

Perhaps ironically, a measure of the success of the effort to contain, treat, and safely store water at 1F is the number of tanks that now occupy so much of the facility. But, the amount of space available for storage is finite.

This section of our report summarizes the discussion surrounding the disposal of stored ALPS treated water, starting with a brief description of tritium, discussing the alternatives that were considered for disposal, all disposition options considered including the one selected, and summarizing the steps that TEPCO will take — regardless of which method is used — to safeguard the environment, solicit input from interested individuals and groups, communicate with the public, and help maintain public acceptance of agricultural and marine products from the Fukushima area.
SCHEMATIC 7 • Simplified Water Flow Diagram at 1F

1. Contaminated water is sent to purification equipment such as ALPS.
2. ALPS: Most of the nuclides except tritium are removed in this process.
3. Treated water is stored in tanks.
Tritium

The essence of the issue is this: the ALPS treated water contains some tritiated water — that is $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ with an isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one proton and two neutrons, contrasted with ordinary hydrogen’s sole proton. This triple nucleus is what gives it the name “tritium.” Most of the naturally created tritium on Earth comes from cosmic ray interactions high in the Earth’s atmosphere. Anything that contains water will also contain tritium, including the human body and everything we eat. Tritium is also a common feature of nuclear power plant effluent, and there is a long history of handling and disposing of it safely. However, TEPCO recognizes that there is public concern about introducing additional tritium into the environment from the ALPS treated water at Fukushima Daiichi, as well as possible trace amounts of other nuclides.

SCHEMATIC 8 • Tritium is a Relative of Hydrogen
Facts About Tritium

What is tritium?
As noted above, tritium is a variant of hydrogen, which in turn is one of the two elements of water. This water is referred to as “tritiated water.”

Does tritium exist naturally?
Yes. It is produced mainly due to reactions in the upper atmosphere between atmospheric nitrogen and oxygen atoms and high-energy cosmic rays. Almost all of it becomes tritiated water and falls to earth as precipitation.

Is tritium ever useful?
Tritium has been used in industrial and commercial applications for many decades to enable such devices as watches and exit signs to be seen in the dark.

Why can’t it be removed like all the other nuclides?
Tritium is not a substance that has been added to or dissolved in water. Rather, it is simply a type of hydrogen that is part of the water molecule itself. Although recently, researchers have made progress in treating small amounts of tritiated water to remove some amounts of tritium, the Subcommittee report noted that “no technologies have been judged as being close to practical use at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.”

Is tritium harmful to humans or to the environment?
Tritium contained in water molecules has relatively low impacts on health, compared to other radioactive materials. The impact of the tritium per Becquerel is less than three hundredth of that of potassium 40, which is a natural nuclide and exists in the human body. As reflected in international and Japanese standards, tritium’s impact on human health is about 1/700th of that of Cesium 137, and experiments with mice showed that even when they drink highly concentrated tritium water — far higher concentrations than would ever be discharged into the sea — they did not show elevated levels of cancer.

Is tritium already in the environment?
Yes. The amount of tritium in precipitated water (rain and snow) in Japan is estimated to be about 223 TBq per year. In addition, tritium is generated in nuclear power plants and nuclear facilities in and outside Japan as a result of their operations. Most of the tritium produced in these plants is confined to the nuclear reactors, while some is removed from the reactors during maintenance activities such as fuel replacement, and is discharged into the sea, river, lake, and atmosphere in accordance with their country’s regulations. The five-year average discharge (before March 2011) from all nuclear power plants in Japan total was 380 TBq/y. Other nuclear facilities, often release more amounts of tritium.

Remaining Nuclides Other Than Tritium

As of December 31, 2020, about 70 percent of the ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks contains radionuclides other than tritium at the concentration that exceeds the legally required standards for discharge. The reasons for this go back to the limitations of early water purification system operations.

For this reason, the subcommittee decided, and TEPCO has agreed, that this water should undergo secondary purification to remove these nuclides, thereby enabling the remaining treated water to satisfy the legally required standards for discharge. In its March 2020 response to the Subcommittee, TEPCO said the following.

- After the ALPS treatment of the Strontium-removed water, which has a higher risk as compared to other treated water to be re-purified stored, the adsorbents will be replaced, and a secondary treatment using ALPS will be conducted on a trial basis (in FY2020).
  - About 2,000 m$^3$ of water with high-concentration (sum of ratios of legally required concentrations of 100 times or above) will be treated, and the secondary treatment performance will be verified.
  - Thereafter, further secondary treatment will be continued while preparing for regular contaminated water treatment and installing receiving tanks.
- Further secondary treatment prior to the start of discharge requires careful study of securing empty tanks, making arrangements for laying pipes and worker exposure and leakage risks involved in decontamination of receiving tanks for re-use.\(^3\)

Both the Subcommittee and TEPCO recognized the importance of this extra step not only to environmental protection but also to preserving public confidence in, and the reputation of, the safety of the Fukushima region and the products it produces.

The secondary treatment performance confirmation tests was carried out in September and October of 2020. The results showed that removal of radionuclides other than tritium satisfy the legally required standards. Although carbon-14 is excluded from the targeted radionuclides and has a sufficiently low concentration, it is conservatively included among the legally required standards.

LONG-TERM CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

TABLE 1 • Results of Re-purification Performance Test Sum of ratios of legally required concentrations for nuclides targeted for removal (62 nuclides) + Carbon-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J1-C group</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J1-G group</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the results of the tests on water treated with multi-nuclide removal equipment, go to https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html

Limitations on Storage

Why, some have asked, given the impracticability of removing tritium, can the water not be stored indefinitely? The need to dispose of the water is intrinsically connected to the limitations on continued storage. The short answer is that space for on-site storage is running out, off-site storage is extremely problematic, and long-term storage poses risks of its own. This section of our report explores those issues.

As noted earlier in this report, tank construction was increased to a total capacity of about 1.37 million cubic meters by the end of 2020. The tanks are expected to be full around November 2022, and additional space for installing more tanks than currently planned is constrained by the need to use that space for other decommissioning activities.

Transfer to offsite storage was also found impractical, as it would require legally compliant transfer facilities and the approval of municipalities on transfer routes, as well as approval for the new storage site itself. Pipelines to additional sites pose their own complications, as would the use of vehicles or ships to transfer the water for offsite storage. Moreover, the need to dilute the water for shipment would dramatically increase the volume to be transferred and (unless the water were re-concentrated) to be stored, thereby further increasing the need for storage facilities.

In light of these constraints, the only option to continue storage in tanks is to store the ALPS treated water, etc. and strontium removed water on-site using standard tanks in a more efficient arrangement on the ground. Opportunities to do so are extremely limited given the already dense arrangement of the tanks, the need to use other parts of the site for other purposes, and the need to continue various decontamination and decommissioning operations.
OPPORTUNITIES

Various Methods Considered for Disposal

Over the past several years, virtually all possible options have been studied by a special independent subcommittee of experts. Basically, five different methods were considered for disposal of the stored ALPS treated water:

- Geosphere injection
- Discharge into the sea
- Vapor release
- Hydrogen release
- Underground burial

Three of these methods were called “unprecedented” by the subcommittee. For geosphere injection, appropriate ground would need to be sought and no monitoring methods have been established. For hydrogen release, new technologies would be needed for pretreatment and other complications include the potential for a hydrogen explosion. And for underground burial, the problems of vapor release associated with heating and solidification, together with the challenge of finding an appropriate place for disposal, were considered too daunting.

Thus, the Subcommittee narrowed the options down to the two for which there is practical precedent: evaporation release and discharge into the sea. It acknowledged that both pose challenges of their own, including social concern. Both were studied further, and details on the pros and cons of each approach were discussed in detail in Report of the Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS treated Water (February 2020), and TEPCO Draft Study Responding to the Subcommittee Report on Handling ALPS Treated Water (March 2020).

Controlled and Monitored Discharge Into the Sea

As noted earlier, tritium is commonly found in nuclear reactors and is disposed of in a carefully regulated and controlled manner. Each nuclear power site worldwide and in Japan discharges effluent containing tritium of tens of billions Becquerels to one hundred trillion Becquerels in a year into the world’s oceans, lakes and rivers.

The amount of tritium discharged globally from fuel processing facilities alone is 10,000 TBq or more a year — far more than the entire amount stored at Fukushima Daiichi, which would be discharged in diluted form over a span of many years.
### TABLE 2 • Results of Assessment of Tritiated Water Task Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>METHOD OF DISPOSAL</strong></th>
<th><strong>Technical Feasibility</strong></th>
<th><strong>Regulatory Feasibility</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example of Geosphere Injection</strong></td>
<td>• If proper stratum is not found, commencement of handling will be delayed. • There is no monitoring method established</td>
<td>It is necessary to formulate new regulations and standards related to disposal concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example of Discharge to the Sea</strong></td>
<td>(Examples) • Existing Nuclear facilities' liquid radioactive waste discharge to the sea</td>
<td>Feasible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example of Vapor Release</strong></td>
<td>(Example) TMI-2 • Water volume: 8,700 m³ • Tritium volume: 24 tri. Bq. • Tritium conc.: 2.8mil. Bq/L • Total period: 2.8 years</td>
<td>Feasible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example of Hydrogen Release</strong></td>
<td>To handle the ALPS treated water, R&amp;D for pre-treatment and scale expansion might be needed.</td>
<td>Feasible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example of Underground Burial</strong></td>
<td>(Examples) • Concrete pit disposal site • Shut-off disposal site</td>
<td>New standards might be needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TEPCO has provided assurance that disposal would be halted immediately if any abnormality is detected.**

For Japan, the three year average of the tritium emission records before March 2011 is about 18 to 83 TBq/year for a power station with pressurized-water reactors; about 0.0316 to 1.9 TBq/year for a power station with boiling-water reactors; and about 360 TBq/year for all nuclear power stations in Japan. As a result, the concentration in the surrounding sea area ranges between below the detectable limit and 1,100 Bq/L. The processing facility in Japan is licensed to discharge a maximum of 18,000 TBq a year, and the actual discharge in FY2007 was 1,300 TBq, while changes in the concentration in the surrounding sea area range between below the detectable limit and 1.3 Bq/L.

Groundwater pumped up from the subdrains and groundwater drain also contains a combination of background and plant-related tritium at a level sufficiently below legally required standards for discharge. The operational target concentration for this release is less than 1,500 Bq/L for tritium, which is one-fortieth the legally required standard for discharge. In March 2020, TEPCO said it would observe the same standard for discharge of diluted ALPS treated water into the sea. This standard is significantly more stringent than the World Health Organization’s guideline for drinking water, which permits 10,000 Bq/L.

TEPCO has provided assurance that discharge would be halted immediately if any abnormality is detected, and independent monitoring of water quality — already being undertaken both inside and outside the 1F port area, is expected to be enhanced by an increase in frequency and the number of sampling points, with results published promptly. In addition, Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority has said it will be providing careful oversight to ensure safety and environmental protection.

According to the Subcommittee, discharge into the sea has both advantages and disadvantages when compared with vapor release:

- **Advantages**
  - As noted earlier, there is considerable experience with this method, and it can be done within the range of preceding practices in Japan and elsewhere.
  - Reliable implementation based on experience.
  - Available monitoring methods.
  - Known and simpler facility configuration, with institutional knowledge.
  - Easier to forecast effects of dilution and diffusion in the sea than in the atmosphere.

- **Disadvantage**
  - Its potential to cause reputational damage to fishery and tourism in Fukushima prefecture and surrounding regions.
Control and Monitored Vapor Release

This method would dispose of the water into the atmosphere as vapor. Following secondary treatment, the water would be boiled and the resulting vapor diluted with air before being released. As with discharge into the sea, the process would be halted for any abnormalities, and it would be carefully monitored. The tritium contained in vapor evaporates naturally from the spent fuel pools and others are discharged to the atmosphere through ventilation.

The advantages to this approach include its use in the normal functioning reactors at time of ventilation, and the fact that some precipitated salts and nuclides would remain behind as dried residue. However, that residue would be radioactive waste for which disposal would be required. Vapor release was used after the Three Mile Island accident, though on a smaller scale than would be required at Fukushima Daiichi NPS. It has never been used at a similar scale in Japan.

Disadvantages of vapor release include:

- It is difficult to forecast the vapor’s diffusion in the atmosphere, making monitoring more challenging.
- Variation caused by wind direction and velocity, and by precipitation, are expected to be greater than with discharge into the sea.
- The diffusion of the vapor over land is expected to influence a wider range of industries than discharge into the sea.

Of course, a combination of both methods could be used, but it would result in the expense and management challenges of two different types of disposal facilities, in addition to combining both the advantages and disadvantages of each method.

THE SELECTED APPROACH: CONTROLLED AND MONITORED DISCHARGE INTO THE SEA

After an extensive process of weighing the merits of each method, and extensive consultation with scientific experts, affected parties, local communities, the general public, and other governments, on April 13, 2021 Japan’s government announced it had selected discharge into the sea as the preferred method for ultimate disposition of the ALPS treated water.

The government of Japan announced on April 13 its basic policy decision regarding the disposition of the ALPS treated water that is currently being stored at Fukushima Daiichi. The announcement was followed shortly by an official statement from TEPCO. On April 16, TEPCO provided more detailed information on how it plans to move forward.
Government Basic Policy

The decision was the culmination of six years of discussion among the Tritiated Water Task Force and the Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS Treated Water, which included input from affected communities, experts, and others. During that time, various approaches were considered. The construction of more and/or larger tanks would not solve the long-term problem of accumulating amounts of water, and there is inadequate space for additional tanks at the site. Offsite storage also posed logistical and regulatory issues, many of them relating to the transportation of the water over distances.

After those alternatives were considered, two methods remained under consideration: discharge into the sea and vapor release (evaporation). But vapor release ultimately was also found to have too many disadvantages:

- Forecasting diffusion and monitoring impact in the atmosphere would be far more difficult than discharge into the sea
- Variation caused by wind direction and velocity, and precipitation, is far greater than with discharge into the sea.
- Diffusion of the vapor over land would likely affect a wider range of industries, activities than would discharge into the sea.

Ultimately, discharge of the stored water, after further treatment (where needed) and dilution was found to be the optimal alternative based on considerable experience and having been done within the range of preceding practices, available monitoring methods, and simpler facility configuration and institutional knowledge. The government’s policy quoted the International Atomic Energy Agency in noting that controlled discharges into the sea are “routinely used by operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities in Japan and worldwide.”

The government emphasized that before the overall policy can be implemented, TEPCO must obtain the necessary regulatory approval and conduct the discharge operations subject to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s regulations as well as with the provisions of the Reactors Regulation Act.

The policy anticipates that TEPCO will start discharging water into the sea in approximately two years. The water to be discharged will be treated in the ALPS system and “purified until the level of radioactive materials other than tritium satisfies the legally required standards for safety.” Because tritium itself (a form of hydrogen) cannot be removed from the water, the water will be diluted more than 100x so that tritium concentrations are the same as the operational targets for the water currently being pumped from the 1F subdrains and discharged into the sea. The scientific consensus is that when diluted, tritium poses very low risks to human health or the environment. This dilution, the policy notes, will also further dilute any trace amounts of other nuclides remaining in the water.
The policy obligates TEPCO to monitor developments in technology to separate tritium prior to discharge, and it requires TEPCO to conduct the entire process in accordance with the principle of keeping radioactivity “as low as reasonably achievable,” known as ALARA.

Open call for “Technology to separate Tritium from Water Treated with Multi-Nuclide Removal Equipment (ALPS),” go to https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html

Reputational and Economic Protections for Fukushima

The plan includes extensive economic protections for Fukushima. Those steps include stringent standards for the discharged water, requirements for reporting and transparency of data, and independent monitoring and advisory groups. Extended and enhanced monitoring of water quality, specifically for tritium, will be carried out at fishing grounds, swimming beaches, and other locations.

The policy also provides for significant economic and reputational initiatives for the Fukushima region, fishermen, agricultural products, as well as an effort to enhance the public’s understanding, control the spread of false rumors, and reach out to other governments. Nevertheless, the policy states, “if reputational damage occurs, the Government will require TEPCO to provide rapid compensation in a form that functions as a safety net.”

In a statement issued the same day as the Government’s policy, TEPCO said it takes the matter “very seriously” and “will strictly comply with all laws and regulations . . . while also thoroughly implementing measures to minimize the adverse impacts on reputation.” The company promised prompt and transparent communication both within Japan and internationally.

TEPCO’s statement concluded: “As the party responsible for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, TEPCO will strive to regain trust in our business endeavors, and in accordance with our fundamental principle of ‘balancing recovery with decommissioning,’ move steadily forward with the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, contaminated water and treated water countermeasures, while prioritizing safety.”

TEPCO Action Document

On April 16, TEPCO issued its “Action in Response to the Government’s Policy on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water.” The action document provides additional detail on the design and operation of the facilities to be used in the discharge of ALPS treated water, including secondary treatment facilities to ensure the water has been adequately purified, emergency measures to stop the discharge if necessary for any reason, facilities to dilute the water to the required levels, and mechanisms for analyzing the water.
The document extensively addresses environmental monitoring, including the monitoring of not only water but also fish and seaweed. It also provides for objectivity and transparency of monitoring activities to be ensured by IAEA, local governments, and an expert committee.

The action document also addresses the component of the government’s policy concerning protection for the people of Fukushima from the economic and other impacts of potential reputational damage related to the discharge program. It aims to foster understanding through effective international and domestic communication; to promote the distribution and consumption of agricultural, marine, and forestry products of Fukushima; and, if necessary, to provide compensation for reputation-related damage.

Further Resources (in English) Regarding Disposition of the ALPS Treated Water:

Government of Japan Basic Policy April 13:
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/bp_alps.pdf; presentation deck,

TEPCO Statement April 13:

TEPCO Media Release April 16:

TEPCO April 16 Action Plan:

Fukushima Daiichi Treated Water Portal:
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html
Implications and Timetable

Implications

The radiation implications of the decision are believed to be minimal. Exposure impact has been studied for discharge into the sea, and if the total amount of the ALPS treated water stored in the tanks were disposed of every year, the impact would be no more than one-hundred thousandth of the exposure impact of natural radiation (2.1 mSv/year). These estimates are based on the results of a tritium dispersion simulation.

The area in which tritium exceeds the background level (1Bq/L) will be limited to 2km from Fukushima Daiichi, and even in that area, the concentration (1 to 10Bq/L) is a maximum one-thousandth of the WHO drinking water guideline (10,000 Bq/L). 4

TEPCO also plans to conduct fish-feeding tests to provide empirical evidence regarding the radioactivity within ALPS treated water as part of environmental monitoring. TEPCO will ask for the cooperation and support of experts and those involved in the fishery industry, and will report on the status and results of testing.

Timetable

Decisions remain to be made with respect to the timing and duration of the process. On the one hand, there is a desire to advance the process steadily, and a recognition that as time passes, the overall volume of water to be stored continues to grow. Delay also increases the risk of leaks caused by natural disaster or other problems. On the other hand, it is important to build public confidence by not appearing to rush the process, and by taking into account the views of all interested parties.

In its April 16 action document, TEPCO is committed to steadily completing the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi and to providing a concrete plan based on the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap. For the next two years, activities will be focused on preparation for the beginning of discharge, including obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals.

Preventing Reputational Damage

Mindful of the negative impact that the March 2011 accident has had on fisheries and agriculture, etc. in Fukushima Prefecture and surrounding regions, a great deal of attention is being paid to initiatives designed to prevent, or at least limit, similar reputational harm that might result from public anxiety or misunderstandings about the health and environmental effects of the discharge of stored water.

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These efforts are still in their developmental stage, and some will depend on the particular discharge method chosen. In general, they are expected to include the following:

- **Technical and Operational**
  - Effective public understanding about tritium
  - Recognizing, and emphasizing, the importance of secondary treatment for removal of nuclides other than tritium prior to discharge
  - Effective monitoring of the process including ability to stop operations if necessary (e.g., standards exceeded, operational malfunction, etc.)

- **Commercial**
  - Expanding purchases of Fukushima products by TEPCO itself
  - Supporting use of Fukushima products among members companies of “FukushimaOKnet,” which was established in November 2014 by 11 companies to promote Fukushima products, tourism, and public education. As of April 2021, it had grown to 159 companies.
  - Promoting Fukushima products in the restaurant industry, retail, and mass sales industries.
  - Examining ways to collaborate with people aiming to develop Fukushima’s agriculture and fisheries industry
  - Examining ways to add higher value to Fukushima products (branding)
  - Consumer confidence measures, such as Marine Eco-Label, rice inspection.

- **Communication with overseas**
  - IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited 1F in February 2020. In his statements, he expressed that two options, such as discharge into the sea and vapor release, for discharge of the treated water will be technically feasible and in line with the international practice and also IAEA would be ready to assist in its implementation, for example in radiation monitoring for helping provide reassurance to the public.
  - TEPCO jointly with METI have briefing and 1F site tour to foreign press proving information about progress of decommissioning, including water issues.
Conclusion

A CONTINUING COMMITMENT

As we have seen, the main near-term objectives of the water management effort have been achieved: reduction of the radiation dose, creation of safer and more pleasant working conditions, and protection of the environment. But the challenge of water management will remain with us until the goal of full decommissioning is attained. TEPCO is committed to working steadfastly and safely towards that goal, and to maintaining effective and environmentally sound water management practices throughout that time.

TEPCO is also committed to continuing the extensive efforts it has been making to reach out to the communities surrounding Fukushima Daiichi, as well as other groups and communities in Japan and elsewhere, to keep people informed about what is happening and to receive and carefully consider the viewpoints of many different people.

TEPCO wishes to express its appreciation to the thousands of workers and the many contractors and subcontractors who have worked diligently to meet the challenge, as well as the many researchers and innovators whose contributions have been invaluable. We continue to recognize our unique responsibilities after the March 2011 accident, and to remain committed to a safe and thorough decontamination and decommissioning, as well as to the revitalization of Fukushima.
RESOURCES

TEPCO Treated Water Portal
https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html

METI ALPS Portal

Development of the Frozen-Soil Wall
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/planaction/landwardwall/index-e.html

Stored Water
https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/index-e.html

Report of the Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS treated Water (February 2020)

TEPCO Draft Study Responding to the Subcommittee Report on Handling ALPS Treated Water (March 2020)

Government of Japan Basic Policy April 13
https://www.mti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/bp_alps.pdf; presentation deck,

TEPCO Statement April 13

TEPCO Media Release April 16

TEPCO April 16 Action Plan