Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management

November 27, 2025
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22 2014 at Unit 4 and February 28 2021 at Unit 3.
Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced from September 10 2024 and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap "Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit" was achieved.
Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident with nearby metal materials etc.

<Milestones in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>

Units 1-6	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026



Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.

Flow of discharge of ALPS-treated water into the sea



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

① "Removing" the contamination source ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

- For stagnant water in buildings (contaminated water), first, cesium and strontium are reduced by the cesium absorption apparatuses (SARRY and KURION). Then, stagnant water in buildings is treated by the multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m^3/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m^3/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m^3/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025," which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce and supress the amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 50-70 m^3/day by FY2028.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment will proceed.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- Measures are being implemented for the reduction of radiation dose and stabilization of zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



Progress Status and Future Challenges of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Outline)

Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable.
There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.

Unit 1 Progress of work towards fuel removal

Among work towards installation of the Unit 1 large cover, in the on-site work, erection of the box-ring was completed on October 12, 2025 and erection of one of six blocks of the moving roof was completed on November 7.

Rubble removal is planned after the large cover is completed. However, considering the fact that the upper framework and the box- ring were completed, thus reducing the risk of dust scattering on the operating floor, a floor investigation to place a work platform and heavy machinery to handle rubble on the north side of the operating floor will be conducted after December as preparation for rubble removal as soon as possible. To prepare for the floor investigation, rubble removal and other work will be conducted. To prevent dust scattering, collection, cutting and accumulation will be limited within the large cover wall. The large cover wall will increase the height (25m) of the existing windproof fence (4m) and the wind inside the operating floor will be suppressed. In the event of a dust monitor alarm on the operating floor going off during the investigation, work will be immediately suspended and water sprinkled. Once the moving roof of the large cover is installed, the moving roof will be closed in addition to water sprinkling.

When the moving roof is loaded

Image showing the installation of a work platform and others

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation (non-submerged area) using micro-drones

Unit 3 will be investigated using micro-drones (130×120×40mm) deployed through the X-53 penetration. Preparatory work to lower the water level inside the PCV was completed on October 17, 2025, and equipment installation for deploying micro-drones into the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was finished on November 27.

The investigation aims to gather information near the X-6 penetration and inside the pedestal—data critical for planning lateral access routes for deposit investigations and fuel debris retrieval. Cameras mounted on the micro-drones will examine the condition of the X-6 and other PCV penetrations, as well as the pedestal interior. Additionally, comprehensive imagery will be captured to generate point cloud data for 3D modeling of areas both inside and outside the pedestal. Based on findings from this investigation, follow-up surveys will be conducted as warranted.

The investigation will commence in early December and conclude within the month.



Analytical results of the fuel debris sample (first) (update)

Regarding the analysis of the first fuel debris sample acquired in the trial retrieval of Unit 2 fuel debris, this is mainly the updated assumption on the sample generation process from the TEM analysis of Nippon Nuclear Fuel Development Co., Ltd. (NFD).

Composition analysis (detailed in the previous report) showed that the Fe+Cr+Ni content in the main elements closely matched the average composition including the lower core structural materials. This suggests the debris sample formed primarily after structural materials and fuel within the Reactor Pressure Vessel had melted and mixed together. Additionally, the uranium concentration was similar to the core average, indicating that concentrations likely equalized during the melting and mixing process (previous report). Knowledge obtained from future analyses can be applied to safety measures and criticality prevention protocols during retrieval operations, as well as to determining appropriate storage methods.

The generation process of this fuel debris was inferred from the crystal structure and composition revealed by TEM analysis. The fuel appears to have initially melted at temperatures of at least 1900°C, then passed through a solid-liquid mixing phase before solidifying at approximately 1350°C as it descended toward the lower pedestal. Given that the fuel transitioned through this liquid-solid mixing state, similar fuel debris likely exists near the sampling area.

By combining these results with prior examinations, the reconstruction of the accident sequence will advance, enabling clearer determination of conditions inside the reactor, including fuel debris distribution. The information acquired will be utilized when examining fuel debris retrieval methods, internal investigations, and related efforts.



Outline of assumed transition process of the 1st sample

Units 1 and 3 Investigation using drones inside the Reactor Building

High radiation levels caused by the accident have prevented thorough investigation of certain areas inside the Reactor Buildings. To address this, small drones (199×194×58mm) will be deployed to survey the inside of the Units 1 and 3 Reactor Buildings.

In Unit 1, the IC(A) MO valve (3A) and the primary instrumentation line valve—both at risk of hydrogen accumulation—will be investigated. Visual inspection will assess valve status to consider the method for hydrogen purging.

In Unit 3, PCV boundaries and pipe closures must be examined before instrumentation racks can be removed in preparation for fuel debris retrieval. The primary valve of the line connecting to the instrumentation racks, along with related components, will be visually inspected.

On-site investigation will begin in early December, with additional surveys scheduled as needed.

Major initiatives – Locations on site



Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.

I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



RPV bottom temperatures (recent quarter)



PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.



* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, November 26, 2025



* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, November 26, 2025

(*1) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
(*2) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
(*3) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)

Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of October 2025, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 5.8×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 1.2×10^{-11} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00003 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
[Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
[Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³

* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.182–0.946 μSv/h (October 29 – November 25, 2025).
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).

Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➢ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025,” which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.



*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.

*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➢ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015, and up until November 16, 2025, 2818 release operations had been conducted.
  The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.



Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

➢ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphalting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of October 2025, 97% (1,410,000 m2) of the planned area (1,450,000 m2) on site had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, facing is proceeded after appropriate yard coordination from the zones in which facing can be implemented without affecting the decommissioning work. As of the end of October 2025, 55% (30,000 m2) of the planned area (60,000 m2) had been completed.

➢ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- Regarding the groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, the pumping amount varied depending on precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➢ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, an inspection prior-to-use certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire inspection prior to use was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. In March 2, 2023, an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire inspection prior to use was completed.
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until November 13, 2025, approx. 803,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using the existing, additional, and high-performance multi-nuclide removal systems is underway. Up until November 13, 2025, approx. 969,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks

- The volume of ALPS treated water, etc. was approx. 1,261,675 m³ as of November 13, 2025.
- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since the discharge commenced on August 24, 2023, was approx. 125,488 m³ as of the completion of the fifth discharge in FY2025.

As of November 13, 2025



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)
(2): Units 1-4 tank storage {[(2)-a RO-treated water (fresh water)] + [(2)-b Concentrated salt water] + [(2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.] + [(2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)]
*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)
*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)], amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.
*3: Amount of Sr-reduced water and others increased and decreased depending on the operation status of facilities due to clog of the cross-flow filter for the multi-nuclide removal system.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➢ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of November 25, 2025

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 10 points within 3 km of the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on November 24) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.1 – 9.9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on November 24) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 9.9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 8 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and 1 point off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on November 11 and 13) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder and others)	-	(Sampled on November 18) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.4 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on November 14) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 5.0 – 5.8 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From October 30 to November 17, 2025, the fifth discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2025 was conducted.
- Regarding the status of sea-area monitoring on handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of November 26, 2025, no significant variation had been detected.
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 10 points within 3 km of the power station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on November 24 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 8.1 – 9.9 Bq/L) at all points, which were below the TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on November 24 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 9.9 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The rapid measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:

  Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via rapid measurements) for seawater sampled on November 11 and 13 at 8 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and 1 point off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

  Fisheries Agency: Rapid analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on November 18 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 7.4 Bq/kg) in all samples.

  Fukushima Prefecture: On November 14, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture below the lower detection limit were recorded (less than 5.0 – 5.8 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Activities ahead of spent fuel removal from the pool are progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➢ Progress of work towards fuel removal at Unit 1

- Ahead of installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, ground assembly and on-site installation are both underway.
- In the off-site yard, ground assembly of the Temporary work platform, the upper and lower frameworks, the box-ring, the overhead crane for rubble removal, and the moving roof was completed.
- On site, the installation of the moving roof, the exhaust equipment for the large cover, and other facilities is underway.
- For Unit 1, rubble inside the large cover will be cleared before fuel removal begins. To mitigate the consequences if the fuel-handling machine's auxiliary hoist falls during rubble clearance, an additional cover was installed over the spent fuel pool (SFP) gate on June 27, 2025.
- As a result of the mock-up test, it was confirmed that the SFP gate would remain unaffected even if the auxiliary hoist were to fall onto the additional cover.
- The installation of the large cover makes it difficult to directly inject water from outside, such as by using a concrete pump truck. Therefore, to diversify water injection methods in addition to the existing SFP cooling system, an alternative injection line was installed.
- With waste reduction in mind, the fuel-handling machine that was installed in Unit 4 in 2013 will be sent back to the manufacturer for modification and will be reused for Unit 1.
- For reuse, parts that cannot be reused as they are, or those expected to be discontinued or to deteriorate over time will be newly manufactured.
- Disassembly of the fuel-handling machine commenced on November 4, 2025. After removal of the trolley and decontamination, the fuel-handling machine was transported to off-site temporary storage on November 26, 2025.
- Disassembly and transportation will be completed by the end of FY2025.
- Installing a large cover required the process to be extended. Considering the fact that the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, shielding needs to be added as an additional means of reducing radiation exposure, and the work time needs to be reviewed. Work stoppages have become increasingly common due to bad weather, issues with the large cranes used on site, and other factors.
- Installation of a large cover is expected to be completed by the end of FY2025.
- For starting fuel removal (FY2027-2028), future timelines can be shortened by revising work procedures and other aspects after rubble removal is completed. Accordingly, the start date currently remains unchanged.
- To remove rubble effectively, all rubble conditions need to be fully assessed, considering ongoing uncertainties in the process. The decision on whether to revise the entire timeline will be considered after the mid-stage of rubble retrieval.
- Rubble removal is planned after a large cover is completed. However, considering the fact that the upper framework and the box-ring were completed, and consequently the risk of dust scattering on the operating floor was reduced, investigation contributing to the rubble removal plan will commence as preparation for rubble removal as soon as it is ready.
- Work platform and heavy machinery for rubble handling need to be placed on the north side of the operating floor. Accordingly, floor investigation will be conducted.
- As preparation for the floor investigation, rubble within the investigation scope will be transferred to the accumulation area inside the large cover wall.
- Transfer of rubble will be limited inside the large cover wall, not to the outside of the cover.
- Method of minimum duct scattering will be used and existing dust scattering prevention measures will be followed.
- The large cover wall will increase the height (25m) of the existing windproof fence (4m). Consequently, wind inside the operating floor will be suppressed.
- In the case that an operating floor dust monitor alarm is issued during the investigation, work will be immediately suspended, and water will be sprinkled. After the moving roof of the large cover is installed, the moving roof will be closed in addition to water sprinkling.

➢ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 2

- Work to install runway girders, which support the rails to be used when the fuel-handling system moves between the Reactor Building and the front chamber, was completed.
- To ensure visibility during fuel removal, a purification system was installed in the spent fuel pool.
- The fuel-handling system was transported from the factory on May 21, 2025, carried into the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 24, and hoisted within the work platform for fuel removal on May 30.
- At present, unit operation tests for each component of the fuel-handling system and cleaning of the cask pit bottom are underway as part of work to install the fuel-handling system.
- Completion inspection of the crane and the jib crane was undergone on October 30, 2025, and the process will transition to unit operation tests inside the Reactor Building from November.
- Once cask pit bottom cleaning is complete, sheet pieces will be removed.
- Progress towards work for fuel removal to commence in FY2026 remains steady at present and work prioritizing safety will proceed.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➢ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of October 2025, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 413,000 m³ (-300 m³ compared to the end of September with an area-occupation rate of 68%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 68,700 m³ (-200 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 9,900 m³ (-200 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,500 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The decrease in rubble was due to move for site preparation, and transfer to eliminate outdoor temporary storage, etc.

➢ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of November 6, 2025, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 516 m³ (area-occupation rate: 74%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,449 m³ (area-occupation rate: 92%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 5,949 (area-occupation rate: 86%).

Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➢ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant across the area overall, but has been increasing or declining at observation holes with low concentrations, and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including to ascertain the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started to pass.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.

- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the assumed range based on the oceanic dispersion simulation results.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side



Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

➢ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from July – September 2025 was approx. 9,000 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 7,800). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in December 2025 (approx. 4,900 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,600 to 4,900.
- The number of workers from within Fukushima Prefecture slightly increased, and as did those from outside the prefecture increased. As of October 2025, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.16, 2.18 and 2.08 mSv/person-year during FY2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)



Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker (monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➢ Status of countermeasures for heat stroke in FY2025

- In FY2025, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to October to cope with the hottest season.
- FY2025, nine workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until November 24 (in FY2024, eight workers up until the end of November), one worker increase compared to FY2024. Continued measures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.
- This fiscal year, in addition to the FY2024 measures, efforts were enhanced including "immediately going to the ER if you are not feeling well", "setting the first rest earlier (approximately 1 hour after work begins)", and "understanding the situation when heat stroke/dehydration occurs and prompt information sharing".
- In FY2026, as well as ongoing measures from this fiscal year, the effective prevention measures will be reviewed based on the factors and characteristics of heat stroke occurrence in FY2025 to further improve the work environment.

➢ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic countermeasures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the "Three Cs", frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker. TEPCO proceeds with decommissioning while prioritizing safety.
- As in previous years, to prevent the spread of influenza infections and serious infections, a vaccination program of influenza has been implemented since October 2025 for TEPCO HD employees and cooperating company workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station who wish to be vaccinated.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during November 10 - 24)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Summary of TEPCO data as of November 25, 2025

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

Cesium-134	:	ND(0.29)		
Cesium-137	:	ND(0.33)		
Total β	:	ND(14)		
Tritium	:	ND(2.2)	*1	

Cesium-134	:	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.36)	Below 1/9
Cesium-137	:	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.38)	Below 1/10
Total β	:	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium	:	68 (H25/8/19)	→	0.62	Below 1/100

Cesium-134	:	3.3 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.36)	Below 1/9
Cesium-137	:	9 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	74 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(15)	Below 1/4
Tritium	:	67 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.8)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134	:	3.5 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.28)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	7.8 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.24)	Below 1/30
Total β	:	79 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(15)	Below 1/5
Tritium	:	60 (H25/8/19)	→	2.1	Below 1/20

Cesium-134	:	4.4 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.31)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	10 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.27)	Below 1/30
Total β	:	60 (H25/7/4)	→	ND(15)	Below 1/4
Tritium	:	59 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.9)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134	:	32 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.26)	Below 1/100
Cesium-137	:	73 (H25/10/11)	→	0.35	Below 1/200
Total β	:	320 (H25/8/12)	→	17	Below 1/10
Tritium	:	510 (H25/9/2)	→	ND(2.0)	Below 1/200

Cesium-134	:	5 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.25)	Below 1/20
Cesium-137	:	8.4 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.29)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	69 (H25/8/19)	→	16	Below 1/4
Tritium	:	52 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.7)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134	:	ND(0.31)		
Cesium-137	:	4.3		
Total β	:	ND(13)		
Tritium	:	19	*1	



Sea side impermeable wall
Silt fence
Silt fence for construction

Cesium-134	:	2.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.31)	Below 1/9
Cesium-137	:	5.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.28)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	46 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(13)	Below 1/3
Tritium	:	24 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(2.0)	Below 1/10

Cesium-134	:	5.3 (H25/8/5)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	8.6 (H25/8/5)	→	ND(0.27)	Below 1/30
Total β	:	40 (H25/7/3)	→	ND(13)	Below 1/3
Tritium	:	340 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(2.2)	Below 1/100

*1: Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

*2: For the point, monitoring was finished from December 12, 2018 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*3: For the point, monitoring point was moved from February 6, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float. The point was further moved to the outside of the silt fence from January 20, 2023, to install the silt fence to the Drainage Channel K outlet as a measure for fish in the port. (The sampling point was moved to approx.. 3m east side)

*4: For the point, monitoring was finished from April 3, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*5: For the point, monitoring point was moved to the land side from May 25, 2023 along with work in the surrounding area.

*6: For the point, with the completion of work to install ALPS related facilities and others, monitoring point was moved from "In front of Unit 6 intake" to "In front of Unit 5 intake" from July 3, 2023.

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port
(comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during October 20 - November 24)

Summary of TEPCO data as of November 25, 2025

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

【Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.25)	
Cesium-137	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.27)	
Total β	:	ND (H25)	→	16	
Tritium	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.32)	

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.27)	
Cesium-137	:	1.6 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/2
Total β	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	:	6.4 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/20

【Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.28)	
Cesium-137	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	
Total β	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.32)	

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.35)	
Cesium-137	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.28)	
Total β	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	:	4.7 (H25/8/18)	→	ND(0.35)	Below 1/20

【North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	:	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.36)	Below 1/9
Cesium-137	:	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.38)	Below 1/10
Total β	:	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium	:	68 (H25/8/19)	→	0.62	Below 1/100

【Port entrance】

【South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.31)	
Cesium-137	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.30)	
Total β	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.32)	

Cesium-134	:	1.8 (H25/6/21)	→	ND(0.75)	Below 1/2
Cesium-137	:	4.5 (H25/3/17)	→	ND(0.68)	Below 1/6
Total β	:	12 (H25/12/23)	→	13	
Tritium	:	8.6 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/20

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134	:	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.75)	
Cesium-137	:	3 (H25/7/15)	→	ND(0.63)	Below 1/4
Total β	:	15 (H25/12/23)	→	11	
Tritium	:	1.9 (H25/11/25)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/2

【Near south release outlet (*)】



Sea side impermeable wall

Silt fence

Silt fence for construction

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

Appendix 2
November 27, 2025

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout

Area G
Area i
Area AA
Area P1
Area P2
Area E2
Area E1
Area L
Area C
Area A1, A2
Area B
Area D
Area F
Area CC
Area o
Area a
Area j
Area e
Area I
Area d
Area k
Area b
Area f
Area M
Area X
Area W
Area V
Area V
Area N
Area O
Area U
Area J
Area T
Area BB
Area H
Area DD
Area EE1
Area EE2
MP-1
MP-2
MP-3
MP-4
MP-5
MP-6
MP-7
MP-8
Downstream Pool
Upstream Pool
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6
Mega float
Sea-side impermeable walls
Land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil
Water desalinations (RO)
Decontamination instruments (Process Main Building)
Spent Cesium Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Waste Sludge Storage Facility
Waste Sludge Temporary Storage Facility
Cesium absorption apparatus (Incineration Workshop Building)
Common pool
2nd Cesium adsorption apparatus (HTI Building)
3rd Cesium adsorption apparatus (Onsite Bunker Building)
Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
1st and 2nd Solid Waste Storage Facilities
Radioactive Waste Incinerator
Main Anti-Earthquake Building
Periodical Inspection Material Storage (cutting of flanged-tanks)
1st Large Waste Storage Facility
3rd-8th Solid Waste Storage Facilities
High-performance multi-nuclide removal system
Large equipment decontamination facility
Groundwater bypass temporary storage tank
Underground reservoir
Water desalinations (evaporative concentration)
Water desalinations (RO)
10th Solid Waste Storage
Volume Reduction Facility
9th Solid Waste Storage Facility
K3
K4
Measurement/ Confirmation Tank
Temporary Cask Custody Area
Additional multi-nuclide removal system
Spent Cesium Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage
Underground reservoir
Concentrated waste liquid storage tank (completed)
Water treatment facility for Subdrain
Vehicles maintenance site
K1 North
K1 South
K2
Multi-nuclide removal system
Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator
Tank installation status
Large rest house
New Administration Office Building
Access Control Building
Partner Companies' Building
Vehicle screening and decontamination site
JAEA Analytical Facility Laboratory-1
JAEA Analytical Facility Management Building
Heliport
Futaba Town
Town boundary
Okuma Town
G1
G1 South
G3-G4-G5
G6
G7
B
C
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
D
E

Treatment facility
Rubble storage area
Trimmed trees storage area
Used protective clothing storage area
"Rubble and others"
Spent Cs Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Waste sludge storage facility and concentrated waste liquid storage tank (completed)
"Water treatment secondary waste"

Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corporation, photo taken on April 8, 2021
Product(C)[2021]DigitalGlobe, Inc., a Maxar company.


1st Large Waste Storage Facility


Radioactive Waste Incinerator


Volume Reduction Facility

10th Solid Waste Storage Facility


Solid Waste Storage Facility


Waste Sludge Temporary Storage Facility


Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility

Storage status of rubble and water treatment secondary waste is quoted from "Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Solid Waste Storage Management Plan ~FY2024 Revision~" published in December 2024

1 Contaminated water management

- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:
  ① "Removing" the contamination source ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
  ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Contaminated water management [Remove]

Contaminated water treatment facility
- ▽Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building
- ▽Decontamination equipment (AREVA)
- ▽Evaporative concentration equipment
- ▽Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
- ▽2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)
- Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
- ▽Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete
- ▽Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.1.6)
- ▽Reduction of strontium by 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) (from 2014.12.26)
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water complete
- ▽Reduction of strontium by 3rd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY II) (from 2019.7.12)
- ▽Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (additional ALPS)
- ▽Start of full-scale operation (from 2017.10.16)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted)
- ▽Inspection prior to use granted (2023.3.2)

Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)

Multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS)

Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench
- ▽Trench Purification by mobile equipment
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of shaft filling
- Unit 2
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D)
- Unit 3
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Filling of openings II and III complete
- ▽Transfer stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel
- Unit 4

[Removal of contaminated water in seawater pipe trench]

Unit 2 seawater pipe trench Shaft D filling work



Contaminated water management [Redirect]

Groundwater bypass
- ▽Installation start of groundwater bypass
- ▽Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21)
- Suppressing the average amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 80 m³/day ▽

Pumping well

Subdrain
- ▽Recovery of existing subdrain pit and start of new installation
- ▽Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains
- ▽Operation start of subdrain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) (Treatment capacity: 1000 m³/day)
- ▽Enhancement of treatment capacity (2000m³/day)

Subdrain purification system

Land-side impermeable wall
- ▽Start of maintenance operation on north and south sides
- ▽Freezing completion
- In some temperature measurement tubes near the K drainage channel cross, temperature exceeded 0℃ locally ▽
- ▽Start of maintenance operation in all sections
- Although no influence was detected on the impermeable function of the land-side impermeable walls but test investigation is underway for the stoppage effect
- ▽Installation start of land-side impermeable walls
- ▽Freezing start Start of maintenance operation in east side ▽
- ▽Freezing completion (except for some parts)

Land-side impermeable wall brine (refrigerant) circulation pipe

Facing
- ▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for areas of 2.5 and 6.5m above sea level and around Units 1-4)
- ▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Units 1-4)

Placement of seaside impermeable walls complete

Contaminated water management [Retain]

Bank groundwater measures
- High concentration of radioactive materials detected from observation well of bank
- ▽Area 2.5m above sea level – Start of ground improvement by water glass
- ▽Completion
- ▽Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point)
- ▽Installation start of seaside impermeable walls
- ▽Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete
- ▽Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5)

Storage facility
- ▽Completion of purification treatment of RO concentrated salt water
- ▽Storage in steel square tanks
- ▽Completion of replacement of steel square tanks
- ▽Removal of steel horizontal tanks complete (except for condensed waste liquid storage tank)
- ▽Water leakage (300L) from flanged tank
- ▽Water leakage (100t) from flanged tank
- ▽Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks
- ▽Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding
- ▽Water leakage (10L) from flanged tank
- ▽Work to raise fence height complete
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
- ▽Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks
- ▽Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks
- ▽Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete
- ▽Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water complete
- ▽SprinKling start of rainwater within tank fences by rainwater treatment facility (from 2014.5.21)

Construction of welded-joint tanks

Flanged and welded-joint tanks

Commencement of dismantling of J9 area tanks ▽

Treatment of stagnant water
- ▽Start to maintain water-level difference with subdrain water level
- ▽Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start
- ▽Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes)
- ▽Transfer start from each building to Central Rw Building
- ▽Treatment of stagnant water in buildings complete
- ▽Reduction of stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 T/B
- ▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 Rw/B
- ▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 3 and 4
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 2 T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 3 T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 4 R/B, T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 R/B
- ▽Completed lowering to target water level of Units 1, 3 R/B

Countermeasures to tsunami risks

Closure of openings
- ▽Examination start of measures to close building openings
- ▽Work for Units 1 and 2 T/B complete
- ▽Work for common pool complete
- ▽Work for HTI building complete
- ▽Work for Process Main Building complete
- ▽Work for Unit 3 T/B complete
- ▽Work for Units 1-3 R/B complete
- ▽Measures to close openings were completed
- ▽Work for Units 1-4 Rw/B was completed

Seawall
- ▽Installation of outer-rise tsunami seawall complete
- ▽Construction start of Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall
- Japan Trench tsunami seawall ▽Completion of installation ▽On-site start
- Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall Completion of main wall construction ▽

Mega float
- ▽Start of marine construction
- ▽Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks)
- Temporary grounding of mega float▽


Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete

Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall

2 Handling of ALPS treated water

In “the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues” held on April 13, 2021, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.





Information provision and communication to foster understanding

■ Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.



■ On the dedicated website “Treated Water Portal Site” (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.


Dialogue meeting

■ Visit and dialogue meetings of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since FY2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages in the Hamadori region. From FY2021 onward, these activities have been expanded to include the entire Fukushima Prefecture.

■ Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

● Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.

During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2025>

Tank group discharged	Tank Group A	Tank Group C	Tank Group A	Tank Group B
Tritium concentration	370,000 Bq/L	250,000 Bq/L	380,000 Bq/L	210,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	April 10, 2025	July 14, 2025	August 7, 2025	September 11, 2025
Discharge termination	April 28, 2025	August 3, 2025	August 25, 2025	September 29, 2025
Discharge amount	7,853 m^3	7,873 m^3	7,908 m^3	7,872 m^3
Total tritium amount	Approx. 2.9 trillion Bq	Approx. 2.0 trillion Bq	Approx. 3.0 trillion Bq	Approx. 1.7 trillion Bq

Tank group discharged	Tank Group C
Tritium concentration	250,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	October 30, 2025
Discharge termination	November 17, 2025
Discharge amount	7,838 m^3
Total tritium amount	Approx. 2.0 trillion Bq

● Rearing test of marine organisms

All planned marine organisms rearing tests have been completed. The results confirmed by the rearing tests were as follows:

・Marine organisms rearing tests were conducted both in “normal seawater” and in “ALPS treated water diluted with seawater”. The marine organisms in these two environments were compared via rearing data to confirm the absence of any significant differences between the two populations.

・TEPCO confirmed that “tritium is not concentrated in the living bodies and that the concentration of tritium in living bodies does not exceed that of the rearing environment” as demonstrated in previous knowledge.

・Flounders and abalones that were being raised in normal seawater were put in “water discharged into the environment” and TEPCO confirmed that there was no remarkable change in the growth of the flounders or abalones around this time. Flounder and abalone were reared in water discharged into the environment for approximately six months and we confirmed that there is no change in the growth of them.

● Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)


Tank area viewed from the Large Rest House (2015.10.29)

2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce

Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 – 2020.1, 17 meetings)

2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions

2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water

Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 – 2020.10, 7 meetings)

2021.4.13 The basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water was set
2021.4.16 The response of TEPCO was announced

2021.12.21 The “Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility” regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
2021.12.28 “The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water” was formulated

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (2021.7 - 2022.4, 15 meetings)

2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15 Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted

2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved

2022.8.4 Work has commenced

2023.2.14, 20 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.5.10 Approval

2023.8.24 Commencement of discharge

2022/8/30 The "Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was summarized

2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.6.26 Completion of installation

2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Inspection Prior to Use

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)

Legend: Rubble removal, etc. | Installing a fuel removal machine | Fuel removal | Storage and handling of fuel

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025～

Unit 1

For Unit 1, a large cover will be installed over the whole building, within which rubble will be removed.

<Reference> Progress to date
Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned, was investigated, followed in August and September by the conditions of the overhead crane. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: Installing a cover after rubble removal, initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble inside the cover.



Rubble removal (image)



Fuel removal (image)

▼2017.12 Completion of building cover dismantling and windbreak fence installation
▼2018.1-2020.12 Rubble removal on the north side of Reactor Building
▼2018.9-12 Removal of X-braces
▼2020.3-6 Installation of spent fuel pool cover
▼2020.9-11 Measures to prevent and alleviate rubble falling
▼2020.11-2021.6 Dismantling of remaining cover
▼2021.8 Start of large cover pre-work
▼2022.4 Start of large cover installation work



In order to install a large cover at the Unit 1 Reactor Building, high-dose locations were detected on the south side exterior wall, and as a measure to reduce radiation exposure, shielding was installed over the high-dose locations.
The target to complete the installation of the Unit 1 large cover had been around the summer of FY2025, based on the impact of hot spots detected on the south side (announced in December 2023).
The process needs to be extended, because as the lower structure was installed and the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, radiation exposure reduction measures need to be implemented to ensure safer work. In addition, days when work was forced to be suspended due to bad weather increased, and trouble occurred with the crane used for the work.
Based on the possibility of future process extension for similar reasons, and the necessity to assume shortened work time due to intense heat and others, expected completion of installation of a large cover will be changed from around the summer in FY2025 to within FY2025.
Among the milestones of the Mid-and-Long-term Roadmap, the start of fuel removal from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, which is set from FY2027 to FY2028, is not reviewed at present, because future process can be shortened by reviewing the work procedures and others in work after rubble removal.

Unit 2

For Unit 2, with the removal of spent fuel in mind, a “gantry for fuel removal” (gantry and front room) will be constructed on the south side of the building.

<Reference> Progress to date
Previously, scope to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel-handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side was examined.

▼2018.8-2020.12 Moving and containment of remaining objects
▼2020.6 Investigation inside the spent fuel pool
▼2021.6-2022.1 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (1)
▼2021.9-2022.5 Shielding installation in R/B operating floor (1)
▼2022.5-2022.6 Transfer of FHM
▼2022.7-2023.1 Removal and clean-up of FHM operation room
▼2022.12-2023.3 Removal of existing facilities in operating floor
▼2023.4-2023.11 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2023.11- Shielding of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2024.4 Start of preparation for installing an opening
▼2024.6- Completion of installation of gantry for fuel removal
▼2024.9 Start of trial operation of ventilation equipment
▼2024.10 Start of installation of runway girder
▼2025.3 Completion of installation of runway girder
▼2025.5 Completion of hanging of fuel-handling machine

<Installation of the runway girder>
(2025.3.19)

As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on the south side and use a boom crane. Examination continues to initiate fuel removal from FY2024 to FY2026.

▼2015.3-2016.11 Yard construction
▼2016.9-2017.4 West-side gantry installation work
▼2017.5 Opening a hole in the west-side external wall
▼2021.10-2022.4 Ground improvement work
▼2023.1 Start of steel erection
▼2023.2 Start of south-side existing facilities dismantling

Unit 3

All fuel assemblies from Unit 3 had been removed by February 2021.

Overview of the fuel-handling facility inside the cover



Before installing a cover for fuel removal, the process of removing large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training via remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine to be installed on site (February – December 2015). Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.
With fuel removal in mind, rubble retrieval training inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15, 2019 and fuel removal started from April 15, 2019. Fuel removal was completed on February 28, 2021.

▼2013.10 Completion of removal of large rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2015.8 Completion of removal of the fuel-handling machine B within the spent fuel pool
▼2016.12 Completion of shielding on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2017.1 Installation start of a cover for fuel removal
▼2019.4.15 Start of fuel removal
▼2021.2.28 Fuel removal completed (566 assemblies)

<Unit 3 Cover for fuel removal (dome roof) 2019.2.21>

Unit 4

All fuel assemblies from Unit 4 had been removed by December 2014.


<Unit 4 Cover for fuel removal>


Fuel removal

In the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap, the Phase 1 target involved starting to remove fuel from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completing Step 2 (by December 2013).
On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, namely the first Unit, got underway and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.
On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing fuel removal work, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (two of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)
This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building.

▼2011.11-2012.7 Removal of rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2012.4-2013.3 Ground improvement and foundation work
▼2013.4-2013.7 Installation of external walls and roof panels
▼2013.6-2013.10 Installation of overhead crane and fuel-handling machine
▼2013.8-2013.10 Removal of rubble inside the reactor well and pool
▼2013.11.18 Start of fuel removal
▼2014.12.22 Fuel removal was completed (1533 assemblies)

* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection.

4 Work toward fuel debris retrieval

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)

Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

・In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.

・In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



<Image of investigation>

・In February 2022, "the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.



<Status inside the PCV (February 9)> <Bar arrangement on the left side of the pedestal opening>

Unit 2 Investigation overview

・In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.

・In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.

・In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.


Bottom of the pedestal (after being processed in panoramic image visualization)



・In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.

<Conditions of deposits before and after contact>


<Work in front of the penetration>

・From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.

Gripping fuel debris with the end tool



Collecting gripped fuel debris in the transportation box

Unit 3 Investigation overview

・In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.

・In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.

・In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.

・Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

<Conditions inside the pedestal>



Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)		

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)		

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)		

Images are provided by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



● Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in December 2024)



Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024～

▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.

External view of Access Control Facility

▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.

▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment on and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.

Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)

Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)

▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time.

▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.

▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.

Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)

Facing (2017.4.13)

▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building.

▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relaying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.

▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Units 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.



Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)

Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)

Visit by Prime Minister Ishiba to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2024.12.14)
(Left) Observation of the decommissioning state at high ground from which whole view of Units 1-4 can be seen
(Right) Encouragement from Prime Minister Ishiba

<Travel survey results of major roads within the site>
Compared with the last fiscal year, the dose rate was reduced on roads on the east side of Units 1-4 (area of black dot in the figure). In the area, the dose rate reduction is considered attributable to the construction of sea walls and others.

<FY2023 4th Quarter> (Measured in February 2024)

<FY2024 4th Quarter> (Measured in March 2025)

▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas.

▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site.

▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Units 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.



▼ In March 2017, the G-zone area was expanded (to cover 95% of the whole site).

▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.



▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).