Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management

April 23, 2026
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22, 2014, at Unit 4 and on February 28, 2021, at Unit 3.
Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced on September 10, 2024, and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap "Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit" was achieved.
Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies that melted during the accident along with nearby metal materials, etc.

<Milestones in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>

Units 1-6	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026



Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and undergoing IAEA safety checks. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.

Flow of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

① "Removing" the contamination source ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

- For stagnant water in buildings (contaminated water), first, cesium and strontium are reduced by the cesium absorption apparatuses (SARRY and KURION). Then, stagnant water in buildings is treated by the multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized groundwater at a low level, and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the amount of contaminated water generated has been reduced from approx. 540 m^3/day (May 2014, before implementing measures) to approx. 60 m^3/day (in FY2025, 70 m^3/day even assuming average rainfall (approx. 1,470 mm)). It was confirmed that the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to around 50-70 m^3/day during average rainfall by FY2028" was achieved three years ahead of schedule in FY2025.
- Measures to suppress the amount of contaminated water generated, such as facing around the buildings and local water shutoff of building exterior walls, will continue to further suppress the amount of inflow into the buildings and transfer from the T.P.+2.5m area to the buildings.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment will proceed.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- Measures are being implemented for the reduction of radiation dose and stabilization of zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. Construction to transfer the Water-Collection Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains from the T.P.+2.5m area to the T.P.+33.5m area will continue.
- As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures are being implemented as planned.



Progress Status and Future Challenges of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Outline)

Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable.
There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.

Amount of contaminated water generated in FY2025

With the progress of multi-layered measures to address contaminated water, the amount of contaminated water generated has been decreasing year by year, reaching approx. 60 m³/day in FY2025.The annual rainfall in FY2025 was 1,132 mm, and even assuming average rainfall (approx. 1,470 mm), the estimated amount of contaminated water generated would be approx. 70 m³/day.

As a result, it was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to around 50-70 m3/day during average rainfall by FY2028” was achieved three years ahead of schedule in FY2025. It was also confirmed that the inflow into the Unit 3 building has decreased by approx. 10 m³/day due to progress in sealing the edges of the gaps between buildings.

Measures to suppress the amount of contaminated water generated, such as facing around the buildings and sealing the edges of gaps between buildings, will continue to further suppress the amount of inflow into the buildings and transfer from the T.P.+2.5m area to the buildings. At the same time, the impact of factors such as the amount transferred during decommissioning work, including the trial fuel debris retrieval, and the amount of chemical liquid injected during ALPS purification as part of the secondary treatment of ALPS treated water will be closely monitored.

Unit 2 Internal investigation of RPV using the existing water level instrumentation pipe

To date, no investigations have been conducted regarding the retrieval of fuel debris remaining inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). This time, to acquire dose rate data and images from inside the RPV, training was first conducted using a mock-up. Subsequently, a worker inserted a fiberscope through the reactor water level instrumentation pipe connected to the N16A nozzle, which is easily accessible, and lowered it approx. 6 meters toward the bottom of the Unit 2 RPV (outside the shroud).

As a result of the investigation, radiation levels were measured and video inside the RPV was captured. The radiation dose data, converted to Cs-137 equivalents, reached a maximum of approx. 4.7 Gy/h. The radiation level showed an upward trend up to about 4 m below the N16A nozzle, but then began to decline. The video revealed no significant deformation of the shroud or other structures.

Based on the above, although it is difficult to estimate the exact location of the fuel debris, the trends in the dose distribution (such as peak locations) suggest that it differs from the fuel loading positions in a conventional reactor.

The findings from this investigation will be utilized for further investigations and applications to other units.



Approx.1.5m below N16A nozzle



Structure inside the reactor and investigation scope



Unit 3 PCV internal investigation using drones

Due to high radiation levels caused by the accident and other factors, investigations have not been fully conducted in some areas inside the Reactor Building (R/B). Therefore, investigations were conducted using small drones (199 × 194 × 58 mm) inside the R/Bs of Units 1 and 3. The investigation of Unit 3 was conducted to confirm the status of valves and other components in order to evaluate shutdown measures, assuming that the removal of instrumentation racks might be necessary when installing fuel debris retrieval equipment.

As a result of the investigation, no significant abnormalities were found in the valves or pipes investigated on the first through third floors, indicating that it may be possible to establish a containment boundary through valve operation. However, challenges regarding accessibility for manual valve operation were identified due to existing shielding structures and scattered rubble.

Going forward, a more detailed study of methods for establishing PCV boundaries will proceed. The use of drones for tasks such as assessing conditions inside the building will continue to be examined.



Primary valves to be considered when establishing PCV boundaries



Unit 3 flight area and investigation subject



R/B inside first floor HPCIS instrumentation line

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation/status of fuel debris trial retrieval

As a condensation countermeasure inside the enclosure, caulking was applied to improve water resistance. Following the caulking, a verification test was performed to confirm the effectiveness of the water resistance countermeasure. This completed all performance verification tests at the JAEA Naraha Center for Remote Control Technology. The robotic arm was transported from the center to a storage facility within the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on April 7, 2026, and transfer into the Unit 2 Reactor Building began on April 21.

Installation of the equipment will take 3 to 4 months, and PCV internal investigation and debris sampling are scheduled to begin around summer 2026.


Transfer into the Unit 2 Reactor Building

Major initiatives – Locations on site



Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.

I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



RPV bottom temperatures (recent quarter)



PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.





(*1) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
(*2) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
(*3) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)

Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of March 2026, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 5.6 ×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 8.1 × 10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00003 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
  [Cs-134]: 2 x 10^{-5} Bq/cm³
  [Cs-137]: 3 x 10^{-5} Bq/cm³
* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
  Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.291 – 0.920 μSv/h (March 24 – April 21, 2026).
  To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).

Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➢ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized groundwater at a low level, and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs on-site. Through these measures, the amount of contaminated water generated has been reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (May 2014, before implementing measures) to approx. 60 m³/day (in FY2025, 70 m³/day even assuming average rainfall (approx. 1,470 mm)). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to around 50-70 m3/day during average rainfall by FY2028” was achieved three years ahead of schedule in FY2025.
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

*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➢ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, releases started from September 14, 2015, and as of April 14, 2026, a total of 2,901 releases had been completed.
  The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.



Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

➢ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphalting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground, and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of March 2026, 97% (1,410,000 m²) of the planned area (1,450,000 m²) on site had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, facing proceeds after appropriate yard coordination from the zones in which facing can be implemented without affecting the decommissioning work. As of the end of March 2026, 58% (30,000 m²) of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➢ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- For groundwater levels within the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, pumping volumes varied with precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➢ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests with radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire Pre-service inspection was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. On March 2, 2023, a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire Pre-service inspection was completed.
- Treatment operations comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until April 9, 2026, approx. 813,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To mitigate risks associated with strontium-reduced water, treatment using the existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal systems is underway. Up until April 9, 2026, approx. 975,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water stored in tanks

- The volume of ALPS treated water was approx. 1,246,886 m³ as of April 9, 2026.
- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since discharges commenced on August 24, 2023, was approx. 149,020 m³ as of the completion of the first discharge in FY2026.

As of April 9, 2026



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)
(2): Units 1-4 tank storage {[(2)-a RO-treated water (fresh water)] + [(2)-b Concentrated salt water] + [(2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.] + [(2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)]
*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)
*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)], amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.
*3: Amount of Sr-reduced water and others increased and decreased depending on the operation status of facilities due to clog of the cross-flow filter for the multi-nuclide removal system.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➢ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of April 21, 2026

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 10 points within 3 km of the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on April 20) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 5.7-8.2 Bq/L)	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on April 20) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.6 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 3 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 9) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 9-10 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder)	-	(Sampled on April 17) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 9.7 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater(at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 8) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 4.3 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From April 2 to 20, 2026, the first discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2026 was carried out.
- For sea-area monitoring related to handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and

fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 in seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of April 22, 2026, no significant variation had been detected.

- For sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 10 points within 3 km of the power station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on April 20 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 5.7–8.2 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which were below TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on April 20 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 7.6 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The rapid measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:
  Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via rapid measurements) for seawater sampled on April 9 at 3 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9-10 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
  Fisheries Agency: Rapid analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on April 17 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9.7 Bq/kg) in all samples.
  Fukushima Prefecture: On April 8, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station showed concentrations of below the lower detection limit (less than 4.3 Bq/L) at all 9 sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

➢ Results of the Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment Regarding the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (Operation Phase: FY2024)

- Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, the government's policy stipulates that, in addition to strictly complying with regulatory standards based on Japanese laws and regulations, measures must be taken to assess potential impacts on the marine environment in light of relevant international laws and practices.
- In accordance with the government's policy, TEPCO conducted a radiological environmental impact assessment based on IAEA safety standards documents. After preparing the Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment Report (Design Phase) in November 2021, the TEPCO prepared a revised version incorporating comments from the IAEA review and the Nuclear Regulation Authority's examination, and published the Construction Phase Revised Version (hereinafter referred to as the "Construction Phase Assessment") in February 2023.
- Subsequently, TEPCO began discharge into the sea in August 2023 (transitioning to the Operation Phase) and published the Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment (Operation Phase) covering the first year following the commencement of discharge into the sea in December 2024.
- From the perspective of long-term monitoring of factors such as differences in nuclide composition between discharges and fluctuations in meteorological and oceanographic conditions, TEPCO has been considering the implementation of future radiological environmental impact assessments. TEPCO has decided to conduct these assessments annually and has compiled the results of the radiological environmental impact assessment for FY2024.
- The assessment results for FY2024 remain at an extremely low level comparable to previous assessments, and the conclusion that the dose estimates are significantly below the dose limits and dose constraints for the general public, as well as the values established for each species by international organizations, remains unchanged.

➢ Progress status of handling of zeolite sandbags and others

- Regarding high-dose zeolite and activated carbon sandbags (hereinafter referred to as "zeolite sandbags and others") on the lowest floor (second basement floor) of the Process Main Building (PMB) and the High Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI), collection is planned to reduce risks. Examination of collection methods is underway, focusing on underwater collection, which is expected to provide a water shielding effect.
- Collection of zeolite sandbags and others on the lowest floor of PMB and HTI is divided into two steps ("accumulation" and "container enclosure") to conduct the work effectively.
- As sandbags are prone to degradation and cannot be moved as they are, basically the zeolite and other materials are transferred via pump together with stagnant water.
- On-site accumulation of zeolite sandbags commenced from March 2025 at HTI, and trial accumulation of about three rows was completed. Regarding the remaining zeolite sandbags, after removing obstructions and crushing sandbags, zeolite is transferred to the planned zeolite accumulation site.
- Sandbag crushing commenced on January 28, 2026 and was completed on February 4.
- Zeolite transfer has been underway since February 10, 2026.
- Current status (as of April 22, 2026): Transfer of approx. 128 m²/146 m² of zeolite (including transfer from the corners) has been completed (approx. 88%). While the bulk of the accumulation has been completed, the plan is to leave a portion of zeolite in place on the southeast side.
- This area contained obstructions such as scaffolding boards over the sandbags. Although these had been moved beforehand, some obstructions remain, making it difficult to perform the accumulation work using the ROV (there is a possibility that scaffolding boards are also present beneath the sandbags). The next plan is to recover zeolite using a container-sealing method that allows for detailed work.
- The insights gained from this HTI accumulation work will be incorporated into future zeolite sandbag recovery operations.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Activities ahead of spent fuel removal from the pool are progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➢ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 1

- Ahead of installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, ground assembly and on-site installation were conducted. The last block of the retractable roof was installed on January 13, 2026, and a function check of the retractable roof was performed on January 19, thereby marking the completion of large cover installation.
- The Unit 1 large cover passed its Pre-service inspection on March 4 and 5, 2026.
- For the overhead crane for rubble removal, a completion inspection certificate was granted on March 19, 2026.
- Ahead of rubble removal and other work following the installation of the large cover, ancillary facilities for the large cover consisting of the ventilation equipment, dust radiation monitors and other components are installed.
- Regarding the ventilation equipments, work related to the installation of foundation bolts began on July 22, 2025. The installation of foundation bolts, exhaust fans and filter units, as well as the installation of ducts, duct supports and cables, has been completed, and test operation adjustment was completed on March 10, 2026. The equipments are scheduled to be put into service following the Pre-service inspection and receipt of the certificate of Pre-service inspection.
- Regarding the dust radiation monitors, work to install the dust radiation monitor containers began on July 15, 2025. The installation of the dust radiation monitor container, the installation of the remote monitoring terminal, and the laying of the dust monitor pipe were completed, and test operation adjustment and system switchover were completed on March 13, 2026. The monitors are scheduled to be put into service following the Pre-service inspection and receipt of the certificate of Pre-service inspection.
- For Unit 1, rubble inside the large cover will be cleared before fuel removal begins. To mitigate the consequences if the fuel handling machine's auxiliary hoist falls during rubble clearance, additional protective covering was installed over the spent fuel pool (SFP) gate on June 27, 2025.
- Mock-up testing confirmed that the SFP gate would remain unaffected even if the auxiliary hoist were to fall onto the additional cover.
- The installation of the large cover makes it difficult to directly inject water from outside, such as by using a concrete pump truck. Therefore, to diversify water injection methods in addition to the existing SFP cooling system, an alternative injection line was installed.
- To reduce waste, the fuel handling machine that was installed in Unit 4 in 2013 will be sent back to the manufacturer for modification and will be reused for Unit 1.
- For reuse, parts that cannot be used in their current conditioose expected to be discontinued or to deteriorate over time will be newly manufactured.
- Disassembly and transport of the Unit 4 fuel handling machine commenced on November 4, 2025, and were completed on February 25, 2026.
- The items are currently being temporarily stored at off-site and are being prepared for transport to the factory.

Transport is scheduled to be completed by mid-April.

- Rubble removal is performed remotely using overhead cranes for rubble removal, a 1,250-ton crawler crane, and various removal devices and heavy machinery.
- Due to high radiation levels in the operating floor, rubble removal is generally performed remotely using remote-controlled removal equipment. However, for tasks such as slinging equipment or containers and maintenance work, personnel may be present within a restricted work area.
- As a general rule, rubble to be removed is placed in containers such as vessels on the operating floor and transported out through the north exit.
- Some large steel structures and similar items will be removed directly through the open retractable roof once the risk of dust dispersal has been confirmed as low.
- During rubble removal, dust concentration levels must be monitored. If an alarm is issued, work must be suspended; water must be sprayed as necessary; and if the retractable roof is open, it must be closed immediately.
- Installing a large cover required the process to be extended. Considering the fact that the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, shielding needs to be added as an additional means of reducing radiation exposure, and the work time needs to be reviewed. Extending the schedule has become increasingly common due to bad weather, issues with large cranes used on-site, and other factors.
- For starting fuel removal (FY2027-2028), future timelines can be shortened by revising work procedures and other aspects after rubble removal is completed. Accordingly, the start date currently remains unchanged.
- All rubble conditions need to be fully assessed, considering ongoing uncertainties in the process. The decision on whether to revise the entire timeline will be considered following the mid-stage of Rubble removal.

➢ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 2

- The fuel removal system was transported from the factory on May 21, 2025, carried into the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 24, 2025 and hoisted within the work platform for fuel removal on May 30, 2025.
- Regarding the progress of fuel removal system installation, the system was granted a Pre-service inspection certificate on March 18, 2026, marking the completion of installation.
- In preparation for the start of fuel removal work in the first quarter of FY2026, fuel removal training began on March 25, 2026.
- To ensure visibility during fuel removal, a purification system was installed in the spent fuel pool.
- On October 21, 2025, cleaning of the bottom of the cask pit began using submersible cleaning robots.
- There was much fine sediment, which was vacuumed up to the point where it should have no impact on cask installation. The task was completed on November 5.
- On November 10, 2025, removal of pieces of sheet-like pieces on fuel began using an underwater ROV.
- Removal of pieces of sheet-like pieces that may hinder fuel removal was completed on December 12, 2025.
- The sheet-like piece is thin and is presumably deteriorated urethane coating from handrails around the pool, as well as sealant fragments that have peeled off from the building roof.
- During the removal of fuel from Unit 2, the SFP circulated cooling system will be shut down. There is a risk that the resulting steam may impact fuel removal operations. (When the system was shut down for approximately three and a half months during FY2024, the difference in temperature between the water and the air generated steam)
- Therefore, in order to proceed continuously and smoothly with fuel removal, a device for adjusting the water temperature of the SFP has been prepared and stored. As this device can be installed quickly, at the current time, only preparatory tasks are being performed.
- Even when the Unit 2 SFP circulated cooling system is shut down, the operational limit temperature of 65°C noted in the implementation plan will not be exceeded and there will be no safety issues.
- Progress remains steady at present and work will continue with safety as the top priority.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➢ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of March 2026, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 413,200 m³ (-3,700 m^3 compared to the end of January with an area-occupation rate of 67%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 68,500 m³ (+200 m^3, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 12,700 m³ (+1,100 m^3, with an area-occupation rate of 50%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,600 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 61%). The decrease in rubble was due to work related to transfer to eliminate temporary outdoor storage, etc.

➢ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of April 2, 2026, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 516 m³ (area-occupation rate: 74%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,383 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 5,993 (area-occupation rate: 87%).

➢ Progress status towards restoration of the Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator

- The facility is currently suspended due to an incident that occurred in February 2024 in the waste storage pit of the Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator (hereinafter referred to as the Additional Incinerator). The incident involved the generation of steam and gas, as well as the activation of a fire alarm, resulting from the fermentation and heat generation of wood chips.
- After completing the recovery of wood chips and water from the pit in December 2024, restoration work began in March 2025 and was completed in April 2026.
- In addition, work to implement measures to prevent a recurrence of the steam and gas generation incident has been underway since the end of March 2026.
- Incineration operations are scheduled to resume in August 2026 following the completion of all construction work.
- Furthermore, based on an assessment of the impact of the revised resumption schedule on the storage management plan, the deadline for resuming operations of the expanded incinerator is October 2026, and it is expected that the elimination of temporary outdoor storage will be achieved within FY2028.

Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown state will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring continue

➢ Reduction of Unit 3 PCV water level

- As the water level in the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Unit 3 remains high, the plan to lower the water level has been implemented to reduce the inventory and improve seismic resistance, with the goal of reducing the level to the central portion of the Suppression Chamber (S/C) (T.P.464). However, since high concentrations of stagnant hydrogen gas were confirmed within the S/C, the plan was changed to conduct hydrogen concentration reduction work (gas purging) within the S/C prior to lowering the PCV water level.
- Gas purging has been conducted since December 2023 to reduce the hydrogen concentration within the S/C. Since it was confirmed in February 2026 that the hydrogen concentration within the S/C had fallen below the flammable limit, lowering the water level will commence.
- The PCV water level reduction will be carried out in stages by reducing the reactor water injection rate. For this phase of the reduction, the plan is to lower the water level to near the bottom of the PCV (approximately T.P. 4044).
- Since the water level will fall below the level previously experienced (approx. T.P. 7300), it will be lowered gradually at a rate of approx. 400 mm/week (approx. 50 mm to 60 mm/day) to ensure that the water level can be stabilized or raised promptly even if abnormal parameters are detected.
- Furthermore, during this water level reduction, the reactor water injection rate is expected to be approx. 1.9 m^3/h.

- Since the S/C gas phase section is a closed space, a pressure drop due to expansion is expected as the PCV water level decreases, and it is anticipated that negative pressure will result. Therefore, the water level reduction below the D/W bottom will be conducted after measures to prevent negative pressure in the S/C gas phase section have been implemented.

Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➢ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has generally remained constant but temporarily increased from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, and 0-3-2. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and a larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant across the area overall, but has been increasing or declining at observation holes with low concentrations, and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including ascertaining the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started passing from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started passing.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. For Cs-137 concentrations, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. For Sr-90 concentrations, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the expected range based on oceanic dispersion simulation results.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side



Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

➢ Results of seawater and seabed soil investigation inside the port for measures pertaining to the fish inside the port (FY2025)

- Regular seawater monitoring is ongoing within the port area of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
- Additionally, maintenance dredging is currently underway in the intake open channels of Units 5 and 6, which are used to take in seawater for diluting ALPS treated water to be discharged into the sea, and seabed soil monitoring is also being conducted.
- Seabed soil recovering work was completed in February 2024 in the intake open channels of Units 1–4.
- Following last year (FY2024), an investigation of cesium concentrations in seawater and seabed soil was conducted throughout the entire port area (excluding the intake open channels for Units 1–4 and Units 5–6).
- As in the previous year, seawater samples from near the surface, the mid-water layer and near the seabed, as well as seabed sediment, were collected at 10 points within the port (excluding the intake open channels for Units 1–4 and Units 5–6). Analyses were conducted to determine the concentration of cesium-137 and the chemical properties of cesium-137 adhering to the seabed soil.
- The cesium-137 concentrations in seawater ranged from 0.0779 to 0.4708 Bq/L, remaining below 0.5 Bq/L at all points, and no trend such as higher concentrations near the seabed was observed.
- The concentration of cesium-137 in seabed soil ranged from 194.2 to 3,878 Bq/kg. As in the previous year, concentrations tended to increase from the port entrance toward the inner port; however, concentrations in the inner port were slightly lower than those of the previous year.
- The chemical properties of the cesium-137 adhering to the seabed soil were, as in the previous year, predominantly in a form presumed to be difficult for fish to absorb.
- Furthermore, there were no indications that Cesium-137 in the seabed soil was affecting the concentration of Cesium-137 in seawater; therefore, it is considered that the impact of seabed soil within the port (excluding the intake open channels for Units 1–4 and Units 5–6) on fish is minimal.

➢ Status of the radiation dose inside the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

- To determine the detailed radiation dose rate inside the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, they are divided into 30m square meshs, the radiation dose rate is measured for approx. 3,800 meshes during FY2025-2028.
- Result of measurement of FY 2025, the average radiation dose rate around Units 1-4 remained constant in both T.P.+2.5m and T.P.+8.5m areas compared with FY2024.
- Compared with last year, a reduction in the radiation dose rate was confirmed around the slope of Units 1-4, the seismic isolated building, the multi-nuclide removal system and the solid waste storage facility.
- Reduction from the previous measurement is considered attributable to embankment and site preparation carried out as part of the site development, as well as rubble removal.

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

➢ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from December 2025 – February 2026 was approx. 9,200 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), exceeding the monthly average workforce requirement (approx. 8,200). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in May 2026 (approx. 4,800 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,600 to 5,100.
- The number of workers from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture remained constant. As of March 2026, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.16, 2.18 and 2.08 mSv/person-year during FY2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively (the legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)



Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker
(monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➢ FY2025 accident occurrence status and FY2026 safety activity plan

- The number of work accidents (excluding heat stroke) in FY2025 decreased slightly to 11 from 15 in FY2024. There were no serious injuries (incapacitating workers for 14 days or more) (one in FY2024). Accidents involving incapacitation of workers (for one day or more) remained constant at three as in FY2024.
- The number of heat stroke cases in FY2025 increased to nine (degree-II: none; degree-I: six cases; dehydration: three cases) from eight (degree-II: two cases; degree-I: four cases; dehydration: two cases) in FY2024. In FY2025, there were no cases diagnosed as degree II and two cases of slight-1 (with incapacitating).
- In FY2025, partly due to efforts to encourage active use of the ER, the number of ER users doubled compared to FY2024 (13 -> 26 cases, June–September). Furthermore, as the number of ER users increased, it became easier to grasp the circumstances surrounding the onset of symptoms, revealing that “symptoms tend to occur during the morning hours when WBGT values rise sharply” and that “about half of the cases occur after work or during breaks.” These trends regarding symptom onset were shared with internal staff and cooperating companies as appropriate. Encouragement of active use of ER will continue in FY2026.
- In FY 2026, measures to enhance (and advance) the understanding of work inspections will be implemented. This will be achieved by utilizing the “Work Inspection Follow-up,” an evaluation by the Secretariat of the implementation status of work inspections for incidents that occurred, in training and by having the Secretariat review records of work inspections conducted by the responsible groups to disseminate best practices. This will ensure that all construction personnel approach work inspections from the same perspective, thereby aiming to prevent accidents before they occur.

➢ Health management of workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

- As health management measures in line with the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (issued in August 2015), a scheme was established and operated, whereby prime contractors confirmed reexamination at medical institutions and the subsequent status of workers who were diagnosed as requiring “detailed examination and treatment” in the health checkup, with TEPCO confirming the operation status by the prime contractors.
- The recent report on the management status of the health checkup during the third quarter (October - December) in FY2025 confirmed that the prime contractors had provided appropriate guidance and managed operations properly under the scheme. The report on the follow-up status during the second quarter in FY2025 previously confirmed that responses to workers, which had not been completed by the time of the previous report, were being provided on an ongoing basis and the checking of operations would continue.

➢ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic preventive measures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs”, frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker. TEPCO continues decommissioning while prioritizing safety.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during March 30 - April 20)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Summary of TEPCO data as of April 21, 2026

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

Cesium-134 :	ND(0.28)		
Cesium-137 :	0.49		
Total β :	ND(14)		
Tritium :	1.8		*1

Cesium-134 :	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.25)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137 :	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.27)	Below 1/20
Total β :	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium :	68 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/200

Cesium-134 :	3.3 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.27)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137 :	9 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/30
Total β :	74 (H25/8/19)	→	14	Below 1/5
Tritium :	67 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.9)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134 :	3.5 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.37)	Below 1/9
Cesium-137 :	7.8 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/20
Total β :	79 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(13)	Below 1/6
Tritium :	60 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.8)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134 :	4.4 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.31)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137 :	10 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.26)	Below 1/30
Total β :	60 (H25/7/4)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium :	59 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.9)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134 :	32 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.36)	Below 1/80
Cesium-137 :	73 (H25/10/11)	→	0.65	Below 1/100
Total β :	320 (H25/8/12)	→	15	Below 1/20
Tritium :	510 (H25/9/2)	→	2.5	Below 1/200

Cesium-134 :	5 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137 :	8.4 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/20
Total β :	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium :	52 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.8)	Below 1/20

Cesium-134 :	ND(0.40)			
Cesium-137 :	5.2			
Total β :	ND(13)			
Tritium :	23			*1



Cesium-134 :	2.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.34)	Below 1/8
Cesium-137 :	5.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.24)	Below 1/20
Total β :	46 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(13)	Below 1/3
Tritium :	24 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(2.1)	Below 1/10

Cesium-134 :	5.3 (H25/8/5)	→	ND(0.37)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137 :	8.6 (H25/8/5)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/20
Total β :	40 (H25/7/3)	→	13	Below 1/3
Tritium :	340 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(1.7)	Below 1/200

*1: Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

*2: For the point, monitoring was finished from December 12, 2018 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*3: For the point, monitoring point was moved from February 6, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float. The point was further moved to the outside of the silt fence from January 20, 2023, to install the silt fence to the Drainage Channel K outlet as a measure for fish in the port. (The sampling point was moved to approx.. 3m east side)

*4: For the point, monitoring was finished from April 3, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*5: For the point, monitoring point was moved to the land side from May 25, 2023 along with work in the surrounding area.

*6: For the point, with the completion of work to install ALPS related facilities and others, monitoring point was moved from "In front of Unit 6 intake" to "In front of Unit 5 intake" from July 3, 2023.

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port
(comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during March 18 - April 20 2026)

Summary of TEPCO data as of April 21, 2026

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

【Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.27)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.30)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	ND (H25)	→	14	

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.30)	
Cesium-137	1.6 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.29)	Below 1/2
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium B15	6.4 (H25/10/18)	→	1.1	Below 1/5

【Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.34)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.37)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.38)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	4.7 (H25/8/18)	→	0.67	Below 1/5

【North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.25)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.27)	Below 1/20
Total β	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Tritium	68 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/200

【Port entrance】

【South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.27)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.31)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(14)	
Tritium	ND (H25)	→	0.44	

Cesium-134	1.8 (H25/6/21)	→	ND(0.62)	Below 1/2
Cesium-137	4.5 (H25/3/17)	→	ND(0.58)	Below 1/7
Total β	12 (H25/12/23)	→	14	
Tritium	8.6 (H25/6/26)	→	1.3	Below 1/6

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.78)	
Cesium-137	3 (H25/7/15)	→	ND(0.59)	Below 1/5
Total β	15 (H25/12/23)	→	12	
Tritium	1.9 (H25/11/25)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/2

【Near south release outlet (*)】



* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout

Appendix 2
April 23, 2026

Area G
Area i
Area AA
Area P1
Area P2
Area L
Area E2
Area E1
Area F
Area C
Area A1, A2
Area D
Area B
Area CC
10th Solid Waste Storage Facility
Area BB
Area H
Volume Reduction Facility
1st Large Waste Storage Facility
Area I
Area k
Area f
Area M
Area d
Area e
Area a
Area j
Area b
Area o
Radioactive Waste Incinerator
1st and 2nd Solid Waste Storage Facilities
3rd-8th Solid Waste Storage Facilities
9th Solid Waste Storage Facility
Vehicles maintenance site
Water treatment facility for Subdrain
Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator
Downstream Pool
Upstream Pool
Unit 6
Unit 5
Area X
Area W
Mega float
Sea-side impermeable wall
Land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Water desalinations (RO)
Decontamination instruments (Process Main Building)
Spent Cesium Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Waste Sludge Storage Facility
Waste Sludge Temporary Storage Facility
Area T
Cesium absorption apparatus (Incineration Workshop Building)
Common pool
2nd Cesium adsorption apparatus (HTI Building)
3rd Cesium adsorption apparatus (Onsite Bunker Building)
Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Main Anti-Earthquake Building
Periodical Inspection Material Storage (cutting of flanged-tanks)
Area m
Area V
Area V
Area O
Area N
Area J
Large equipment decontamination facility
High-performance multi-nuclide removal system
Groundwater bypass temporary storage tank
Underground reservoir
Area U
Measurement/ Confirmation
Temporary Cask Custody Area
Additional multi-nuclide removal system
Spent Cesium Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage
Underground reservoir
Multi-nuclide removal system
Concentrated waste liquid storage tank (completed)
Water desalinations (evaporative concentration)
Water desalinations (RO)
Underground reservoir
Area EE2
Area EE1
Area DD
K1 North
K1 South
K2
K3
K4
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H8
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
G1
G1 South
G3・G4・G5
G6
G7
B
C
D
E
MP-1
MP-2
MP-3
MP-4
MP-5
MP-6
MP-7
MP-8
Tank installation status
Access Control Building
Large rest house
New Administration Office Building
Heliport
Partner Companies' Building
Vehicle screening and decontamination site
JAEA Analytical Facility Laboratory-1
JAEA Analytical Facility Management Building
Futaba Town
Town boundary
Okuma Town

Treatment facility
Rubble storage area
Trimmed trees storage area
Used protective clothing storage area
"Rubble and others"
Spent Cs Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Waste sludge storage facility and concentrated waste liquid storage tank (completed)
"Water treatment secondary waste"

Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corporation, photo taken on April 8, 2021
Product(c)[2021] DigitalGlobe, Inc., a Maxar company.


1st Large Waste Storage Facility


Radioactive Waste Incinerator


Volume Reduction Facility

10th Solid Waste Storage Facility


Solid Waste Storage Facility


Waste Sludge Temporary Storage Facility


Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility

Storage status of rubble and water treatment secondary waste is quoted from "Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Solid Waste Storage Management Plan ~FY2024 Revision~" published in December 2024

1 Contaminated water management

- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:
  ① "Removing" the contamination source ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
  ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

April 23, 2026
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026

Contaminated water management【Remove】

Contaminated water treatment facility

▽Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building
▽Decontamination equipment (AREVA)
▽Evaporative concentration equipment
▽Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
▽2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)
Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
▽Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete
▽Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.1.6)
▽Reduction of strontium by 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) (from 2014.12.26)
▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
▽Purification of strontium-reduced water complete
▽Reduction of strontium by 3rd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY II) (from 2019.7.12)
▽Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15)
▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted)
▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (additional ALPS)
▽Start of full-scale operation (from 2017.10.16)
▽Multi-nuclide Removal System (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted)
▽Inspection prior to use granted (2023.3.2)


Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)


Multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS)

Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench

【Removal of contaminated water in seawater pipe trench】
Unit 2
▽Trench Purification by mobile equipment
▽Completion of tunnel filling
▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
▽Completion of shaft filling
▽Completion of tunnel filling
▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
▽Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D)
Unit 3
▽Completion of tunnel filling
▽Filling of openings II and III complete
▽Transfer stagnant water complete
▽Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel
Unit 4


Unit 2 seawater pipe trench Shaft D filling work



Contaminated water management【Redirect】

Groundwater bypass


Pumping well

▽Installation start of groundwater bypass
▽Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21)
Suppressing the average ▽ amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 80 m3/day

Subdrain


Subdrain purification system

▽Recovery of existing subdrain pit and start of new installation
▽Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains
▽Operation start of subdrain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) (Treatment capacity: 1000 m³/day)
▽Enhancement of treatment capacity (2000m³/day)

Land-side impermeable wall


Land-side impermeable wall brine (refrigerant) circulation pipe

▽Start of maintenance operation on north and south sides
▽Freezing completion
▽Start of maintenance operation in all sections
In some temperature measurement tubes near the K drainage ▽ channel cross, temperature exceeded 0℃ locally
Start of maintenance operation on east side ▽
▽Installation start of land-side impermeable walls
▽Freezing start
▽Freezing completion (except for some parts)
Although no influence was detected on the impermeable function of the land-side impermeable walls but test investigation is underway for the stoppage effect

Facing

▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for areas of 2.5 and 6.5m above sea level and around Units 1-4)
Placement of seaside impermeable walls complete
▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Units 1-4)

Contaminated water management【Retain】

Bank groundwater measures

High concentration of radioactive materials detected from observation well of bank ▽
▽Area 2.5m above sea level – Start of ground improvement by water glass
▽Completion
▽Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point)
▽Installation start of seaside impermeable walls
▽Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete
▽Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5)

Storage facility

▽Completion of purification treatment of RO concentrated salt water
▽Storage in steel square tanks
▽Completion of replacement of steel square tanks
▽Removal of steel horizontal tanks complete (except for condensed waste liquid storage tank)
▽Commencement of decontamination/dismantling of unused horizontal tanks
▽Water leakage (300L) from flanged tank
▽Water leakage (100t) from flanged tank
▽Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks
▽Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding
▽Water leakage (10L) from flanged tank
▽Work to raise fence height complete
▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
▽Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks
▽Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks
▽Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete
▽Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks
▽Purification of strontium-reduced water complete
▽Sprinkling start of rainwater within tank fences by rainwater treatment facility (from 2014.5.21)


Construction of welded-joint tanks


Flanged and welded-joint tanks

Commencement of dismantling of J9 area tanks ▽
Commencement of dismantling of J8 area tanks ▽
Completion of dismantling of J9 area tanks ▽

Treatment of stagnant water

▽Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start
▽Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes)
▽Start to maintain water-level difference with subdrain water level
▽Transfer start from each building to Central Rw Building
▽Treatment of stagnant water in buildings complete
▽ Reduction of stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved
▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 T/B
▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2
▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 Rw/B
▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 3 and 4
▽Floor exposure of Unit 2 T/B, Rw/B
▽Floor exposure of Unit 3 T/B, Rw/B
▽Floor exposure of Unit 4 R/B, T/B, Rw/B
▽Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 R/B
▽Completed lowering to target water level of Units 1, 3 R/B

Countermeasures to tsunami risks

Closure of openings

▽Examination start of measures to close building openings
▽Work for Units 1 and 2 T/B complete
▽Work for common pool complete
▽Work for HTI building complete
▽Work for Process Main Building complete
▽Work for Unit 3 T/B complete
▽Work for Units 1-3 R/B complete
▽Measures to close openings were completed
▽Work for Units 1-4 RwB was completed

Seawall

▽Installation of outer-rise tsunami seawall complete
▽Construction start of Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall
Japan Trench tsunami seawall
▽Completion of installation ▽On-site start
Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall Completion of main wall constructio▽

Mega float

▽Start of marine construction
Temporary grounding of mega float▽
▽Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks)


Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete

2 Handling of ALPS treated water

In “the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues” held on April 13, 2021, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.





Information provision and communication to foster understanding

■ Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.



■ On the dedicated website “Treated Water Portal Site” (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.


Dialogue meeting

■ Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since FY2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages in the Hamadori region. From FY2021 onward, these activities have been expanded to include the entire Fukushima Prefecture.

■ Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

● Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.

During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2026>

Tank group discharged	Tank Group A
Tritium concentration	240,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	April 2, 2026
Discharge termination	April 20, 2026
Discharge amount	7,865 m^3
Total tritium amount	Approx. 1.9 trillion Bq

● Rearing test of marine organisms

All planned marine organisms rearing tests have been completed. The results confirmed by the rearing tests were as follows:

・Marine organisms rearing tests were conducted both in “normal seawater” and in “ALPS treated water diluted with seawater”. The marine organisms in these two environments were compared via rearing data to confirm the absence of any significant differences between the two populations.

・TEPCO confirmed that “tritium is not concentrated in the living bodies and that the concentration of tritium in living bodies does not exceed that of the rearing environment” as demonstrated in previous knowledge.

・Flounders and abalones that were being raised in normal seawater were put in “water discharged into the environment” and TEPCO confirmed that there was no remarkable change in the growth of the flounders or abalones around this time. Flounder and abalone were reared in water discharged into the environment for approximately six months and we confirmed that there is no change in the growth of them.

● Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water


Tank area viewed from the Large Rest House (2015.10.29)

- Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)
- 2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce
- Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 – 2020.1, 17 meetings)
- 2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions
- 2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water
- Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 – 2020.10, 7 meetings)
- 2021.4.13 The basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water was set
- 2021.4.16 The response of TEPCO was announced
- 2021.12.21 The “Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility” regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
- 2021.12.28 “The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water” was formulated
- Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (2021.7 - 2022.4, 15 meetings)
- 2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15 Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted
- 2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved
- 2022.8.4 Work has commenced
- 2022/8/30 The "Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was summarized
- 2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)
- 2023.2.14, 20 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)
- 2023.5.10 Approval
- 2023.6.26 Completion of installation
- 2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Inspection Prior to Use
- 2023.8.24 Commencement of discharge

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)

Legend: Rubble removal, etc. | Installing a fuel removal machine | Fuel removal | Storage and handling of fuel

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026~

Unit 1

For Unit 1, a large cover will be installed over the whole building, within which rubble will be removed.

<Reference> Progress to date
Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned, was investigated, followed in August and September by the conditions of the overhead crane. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: Installing a cover after rubble removal, initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble inside the cover.



Rubble removal (image)



Fuel removal (image)

▼2017.12 Completion of building cover dismantling and windbreak fence installation
▼2018.1-2020.12 Rubble removal on the north side of Reactor Building
▼2018.9-12 Removal of X-braces
▼2020.3-6 Installation of spent fuel pool cover
▼2020.9-11 Measures to prevent and alleviate rubble falling
▼2020.11-2021.6 Dismantling of remaining cover
▼2021.8 Start of large cover pre-work
▼2022.4 Start of large cover installation work
▼2026.1 Completion of large cover installation



In order to install a large cover at the Unit 1 Reactor Building, high-dose locations were detected on the south exterior wall, and as a measure to reduce radiation exposure, shielding was installed over the high-dose locations.
The target to complete the installation of the Unit 1 large cover had been around the summer of FY2025, based on the impact of hot spots detected on the south side (announced in December 2023).
The process needs to be extended, because as the lower structure was installed and the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, radiation exposure reduction measures need to be implemented to ensure safer work. In addition, days when work was forced to be suspended due to bad weather increased, and trouble occurred with the craned used for the work.
Based on the possibility of future process extension for similar reasons, and the necessity to assume shortened work time due to intense heat and others, expected completion of installation of a large cover was changed from around the summer in FY2025 to within FY2025.
The last block of the retractable roof was installed on January 13, 2026, and a function check of the retractable roof was performed on January 19, thereby marking the completion of large cover installation. Among the milestones of the Mid-and-Long-term Roadmap, the start of fuel removal from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, which is set from FY2027 to FY2028, is not reviewed at present, because future process can be shortened by reviewing the work procedures and others in work after rubble removal.

Unit 2

For Unit 2, with the removal of spent fuel in mind, a “gantry for fuel removal” (gantry and front room) will be constructed on the south side of the building.

<Reference> Progress to date
Previously, scope to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel-handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side was examined.

▼2018.8-2020.12 Moving and containment of remaining objects
▼2020.6 Investigation inside the spent fuel pool
▼2021.6-2022.1 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (1)
▼2021.9-2022.5 Shielding installation in R/B operating floor (1)
▼2022.5-2022.6 Transfer of FHM
▼2022.7-2023.1 Removal and clean-up of FHM operation room
▼2022.12-2023.3 Removal of existing facilities in operating floor
▼2023.4-2023.11 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2023.11- Shielding of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2024.4 Start of preparation for installing an opening
▼2024.6 Completion of installation of gantry for fuel removal
▼2024.9 Start of trial operation of ventilation equipment
▼2024.10 Start of installation of runway girder
▼2025.3 Completion of installation of runway girder
▼2025.5 Completion of hanging of fuel-handling machine
▼2026.3 Completion of installation of fuel handling system



Installation of the runway girder (2024.3.19)

As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on the south side and use a boom crane. Examination continues to initiate fuel removal from FY2024 to FY2026.

▼2015.3-2016.11 Yard construction
▼2016.9-2017.4 West-side gantry installation work
▼2017.5 Opening a hole in the west-side external wall
▼2021.10-2022.4 Ground improvement work
▼2023.1 Start of steel erection
▼2023.2 Start of south-side existing facilities dismantling

Unit 3

All fuel assemblies from Unit 3 had been removed by February 2021.

Overview of the fuel-handling facility inside the cover



Before installing a cover for fuel removal, the process of removing large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training via remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine to be installed on site (February – December 2015). Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.
With fuel removal in mind, rubble retrieval training inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15, 2019 and fuel removal started from April 15, 2019. Fuel removal was completed on February 28, 2021.

<Unit 3 Cover for fuel removal (dome roof) 2019.2.21>

▼2013.10 Completion of removal of large rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2015.8 Completion of removal of the fuel-handling machine B within the spent fuel pool
▼2016.12 Completion of shielding on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2017.1 Installation start of a cover for fuel removal
▼2019.4.15 Start of fuel removal
▼2021.2.28 Fuel removal completed (566 assemblies)

Unit 4

All fuel assemblies from Unit 4 had been removed by December 2014.


<Unit 4 Cover for fuel removal>


Fuel removal

In the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap, the Phase 1 target involved starting to remove fuel from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completing Step 2 (by December 2013).
On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, namely the first Unit, got underway and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.
On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing fuel removal work, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (two of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)
This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building.

▼2011.11- 2012.7 Removal of rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2012.4-2013.3 Ground improvement and foundation work
▼2013.4-2013.7 Installation of external walls and roof panels
▼2013.6-2013.10 Installation of overhead crane and fuel-handling machine
▼2013.8-2013.10 Removal of rubble inside the reactor well and pool
▼2013.11.18 Start of fuel removal
▼2014.12.22 Fuel removal was completed (1533 assemblies)

4 Work toward fuel debris retrieval

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)

Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

・In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.

・In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



<Image of investigation>

・In February 2022, "the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.



<Status inside the PCV (February 9)> <Bar arrangement on the left side of the pedestal opening>

Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)

Unit 2 Investigation overview

・In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.

・In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.

・In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.


Bottom of the pedestal (after being processed in panoramic image visualization)



・In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.

<Conditions of deposits before and after contact>


<Work in front of the penetration>

・From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.

Gripping fuel debris with the end tool



Collecting gripped fuel debris in the transportation box

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)

Unit 3 Investigation overview

・In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.

・In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.

・In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.

・Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

<Conditions inside the pedestal>



Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)

Images are provided by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

5 Management of solid radioactive waste

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



● Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in February 2026)



Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026～

▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.

External viewof Access Control Facility

▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.

▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment on and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.

Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)

Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)

▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time.

▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.

▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015.
Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.

Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)

Facing (2017.4.13)

▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building.

▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relaying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.

▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Units 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.



Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)

Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)

Visit by Prime Minister Ishiba to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2024.12.14)
(Left) Observation of the decommissioning state at high ground from which whole view of Units 1-4 can be seen
(Right) Encouragement from Prime Minister Ishiba

<Travel survey results of major roads within the site>
Compared with the last fiscal year, no significant variation was identified.

<FY2024 4th Quarter>
(Measured in March 2025)

<FY2025 4th Quarter>
(Measured in February 2026)

▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas.

▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site.

▼ In March 2017, the G-zone area was expanded (to cover 95% of the whole site).

▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Units 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.



▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.



▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).