Implementation Status of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Toky Primary Containment Vessel Internal Investigation (Preliminary report)

- In order to deliberate equipment and methods for recovering deposits from inside the primary containment vessel (hereinafter referred to as, "PCV"), internal investigations of the PCV shall be conducted to obtain information, such as the amount and origins of such deposits. Going forward, separately developed remotely operated vehicles (hereinafter referred to as, "submersible ROV") will be used to perform a detailed visual investigation of the inside and the outside of the pedestal^{*1}, measure the thickness of deposits, detect deposit debris, sample debris, and create 3-D maps of the deposits.
- Prior to performing these investigations, guide rings^{*2} need to be installed inside the PCV. On January 12, when commencing preparations to insert submersible ROV-A to perform this task, the dose data built-in to the submersible ROV did not display correctly. Thereafter, the cause of the malfunction was ascertained and countermeasures put in place thereby rectifying the problem. (Referred to slides 4, 5)
- At 11:17 AM today (February 8), submersible ROV-A was inserted the X-2 penetration^{×3} and work to install the guide rings began.
- The aforementioned guide rings will be installed on the four jet deflectors^{*4} on the south side of the PCV. The task should be completed on February 10.
- This investigation was performed after constructing boundaries^{*5} to prevent gases inside the PCV from leaking to the outside, and there were no significant fluctuations in data from monitoring post or dust monitors, or with plant parameters before and after the investigation, so there was no radiological impact on the surrounding environment. We will continue to prioritize safety while carefully conducting these investigations.

^{%1} Pedestal: Work space below the primary containment vessel

^{%2} Guide ring: Ring installed to prevent the cables attached to the submersible ROV from getting twisted.

 $[\]times$ 3 X-2 penetration: Hole used by workers to enter the PCV

^{×4} Jet deflector: Disk-shaped metal plate installed on the PCV-side of the pipe connecting the PCV to the pressure suppression chamber.

^{%5} Boundary: PCV containment function

Sequence of events during the internal investigation of the PCV on February 8 (as of 4:30 PM)

- 10:00 AM PCV internal investigation preparations begin (Power is turned on for each piece of equipment)
- 10:38 AM It is confirmed that dose data built-in to the submersible ROV-A and the timestamp on submersible ROV-A camera monitors are displaying correctly

11:17 AM <u>PCV internal investigation commences</u> (Isolation valve on the X-2 penetration is opened)

- 3:27 PM Submersible ROV-A arrives at the surface of the water inside the PCV
- 3:58 PM Operations check of submersible ROV-A begins
- 4:16 PM Operations check of submersible ROV-A concludes (No abnormalities)

Photos taken during the PCV internal investigation on February 8



Photo 1. Work in the remote operations room



Photo 3. ROV arrives at the surface of the water at the bottom of the PCV




Photo 2. Lowering the submersible ROV



Photo 4. Photos from underneath the water at the bottom of the PCV

[Reference] Causes and countermeasures for the nonconformities found during preparations on January 12 (1/2)

- From the results of additional investigations we have hypothesized that noise originating from the drum control box propagated as follows and affected the instruments. (1): Noise propagating from the south grounding line, 2): Noise propagating from the HUB)
- By implementing the countermeasures (A)~(D) shown in the diagram below and cutting off each noise propagation route, we eliminated instrument indicator malfunctions (0.00~0.01Gy/h)




[Reference] Causes and countermeasures for the nonconformities found during preparations on January 12 (2/2)

Cause

Tension from the outside was put on one of the camera communication cables thereby causing signal interruption and affecting the timestamp display.


Countermeasure

The malfunctioning cable was replaced with a longer cable to avoid the cable from being put under tension from the outside. During reproducibility tests thereafter, no abnormalities were found with the timestamp display.




[Reference] Investigation device details Toolbox and other equipment

6)




Source: International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) ${f b}$

[Reference] Investigation device details ROV-A guide ring installation device




[Reference] Investigation device details ROV-A2 For detailed visual investigation



[Reference] Investigation device details ROV-B~E for different investigations

Investigation device	Instruments	Details
ROV-B 3-D mapping of deposits	 Scanning ultrasonic rangefinder Water temperature gauge 	Scanning ultrasonic rangefinder used to examine the height distribution of deposits.
ROV-C Deposit thickness measurements	 High output ultrasonic sensor Water temperature gauge 	High output ultrasonic sensor used to measure the height of deposits and examine objects underneath them in order to estimate debris height and distribution.
ROV-D Deposit debris detection	CdTe semiconductor detector Improved mini B10 detector	Debris detection sensors will be dropped on the surface of the deposits to analyze nuclides and measure neutron flux in order to examine if debris exists inside the deposits.
ROV-E Deposit sampling	Suction sampling device	The deposit sampling device will be dropped on the surface of the deposits to take samples from the surface of the deposits.

Quantity: 2 each; Cruising time: Approx. 80 hours/unit Since the units need to be agile for the investigations flexible PVC cables (ROV-B : ϕ 33mm, ROV-C : ϕ 30mm, ROV-D : ϕ 30mm, ROV-E : ϕ 30mm) will be employed



High output ultrasonic sensor



