

## Main decommissioning works and steps

All fuel had been removed from Unit 4 SFP by December 22, 2014. Work continues toward fuel removal and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Unit 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident.


Unit 1: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2023  
 Unit 2: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2023  
 Unit 3: Fuel removal scheduled to start in around mid-FY2018\*  
 Unit 4: Fuel removal completed in 2014

\* Based on a series of defects, preparation will be made toward removal from the end of March 2019.

(Note 2) The method employed to retrieve fuel debris for the first unit will be confirmed in FY2019.


**Toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool**  
 Regarding fuel removal from Unit 3 SFP, after confirming the cause of the defects in the FHM and crane and implementing measures for similar parts, works will continue toward removal; starting from the end of March 2019 with safety first.

As measures to reduce the dose on the Reactor Building operating floor, the decontamination and installation of shields were completed in June and December 2016 respectively. Installation of a fuel removal cover started from January 2017 and installation of all dome roofs was completed in February 2018.




Status inside the cover for fuel removal (March 15, 2018)

Fuel Removal from SFP



Fuel Debris Retrieval



Dismantling Facilities



## Three principles behind contaminated water countermeasures:

Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

### 1. Eliminate contamination sources


- ① Multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.
- ② Remove contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)  
(Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

### 2. Isolate water from contamination

- ③ Pump up groundwater for bypassing
- ④ Pump up groundwater near buildings
- ⑤ Land-side impermeable walls
- ⑥ Waterproof pavement

### 3. Prevent leakage of contaminated water

- ⑦ Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
- ⑧ Sea-side impermeable walls
- ⑨ Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks



**Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.**


- This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.
- Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 via multi-nuclide removal equipment, additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a subsidy project of the Japanese Government (operation commenced in October 2014).
- Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being re-treated in ALPS.



High-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment

**Land-side impermeable walls**

- Land-side impermeable walls surround the buildings and reduce groundwater inflow into the same.
- Freezing started on the sea side and part of the mountain side from March 2016 and on 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.
- In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths: based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.



(Inside the land-side impermeable wall) (Outside the land-side impermeable wall)

**Sea-side impermeable walls**

- Impermeable walls are being installed on the sea side of Units 1-4, to prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the sea.
- The installation of steel pipe sheet piles was completed in September 2015 and they were connected in October 2015. These works completed the closure of the sea-side impermeable walls.



(Sea-side impermeable wall)

## Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 15-25°C<sup>\*1</sup> over the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings in the air<sup>\*2</sup>. It was evaluated that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.


\*1 The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.

\*2 In December 2018, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated as less than 0.00029 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).

### Start of work toward covering the Unit 1 opening

Toward work to protect the spent fuel pool (SFP), etc., the opening will be covered to create an access route from the west working floor and prevent small rubble from falling from the operating floor while removing rubble at the center and on the south side.

Mockup tests regarding the installation of the opening cover were conducted in November and December 2018 and onsite work started from January 2019. After completing the installation by around March 2019, work will shift to removing small rubble around the SFP.




### Confirmation of reduced airborne radiation dose rate on the Unit 2 operating floor

Toward spent fuel removal, as one of the investigations to understand the contamination condition across the operating floor, the airborne radiation dose rate at low locations of the operating floor was measured in November and December 2018.

The results confirmed a significant reduction from the previous investigative findings, which was considered attributable to natural reduction, the effect of rainwater flowing into buildings and containment of remaining objects inside the operating floor.


Based on the results obtained, the distribution of dust density required to formulate future work plans will be evaluated, including dust scattering and shielding design.




### Implementation of safety measures, including entry restrictions in response to falling material from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack

On January 9, 2019, a steel plate having fallen near Unit 4 Radioactive Waste Treatment Building (Rw/B) was detected. The plate was deemed scaffold material for maintenance, which was located 76m from the ground of the 3/4 exhaust stack.

No work was conducted around the area. However, to ensure safety for four exhaust stacks onsite, zoning and entry restrictions were immediately imposed. Investigation into the cause will continue and physical measures, e.g. to ensure a safe passage with roof will be implemented.



Part where the scaffold for maintenance was located (approx. 76m from the ground)



### Ongoing steady implementation of work toward fuel removal from Unit 3

For 14 defects detected in the safety inspection, measures were completed on January 27, 2019 and a function check after cable replacement is currently underway.

After the check, work will be conducted according to the following steps: training for fuel removal ⇒ fuel removal (1st transfer container) ⇒ review ⇒ additional training ⇒ fuel removal (2nd and later transfer containers).


Toward the start of fuel removal from the end of March 2019, work will continue with safety first.

### Plan to determine the characteristics of deposits in the Unit 2 PCV inside investigation

The purpose of the scheduled investigation inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) from mid- to late-February is to determine the characteristics (hardness and fragility) of deposits detected on the bottom of the pedestal.

In this investigation, therefore, a finger will be operated according to the characteristics of the deposits to determine the adhesion and the existence of any contact trace on the deposit surface. Videos, dose and temperature data close to the deposits will also be collected.

Information obtained from this investigation will be utilized in the internal investigation in late FY2019.



### Release of the final report of the IAEA Review Mission

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed the final report of the review mission Japan received from November 5 to 13, 2018.


The final report will be published today (January 31) on the websites of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the IAEA.

### Implementation of additional safety measures toward dismantling the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack

Toward dismantling the Unit 1/2 stack, a demonstration test of the dismantling equipment is currently underway. Based on the insights obtained in the demonstration test to date, to consolidate the safety measures, the dismantling equipment will be improved and trouble shooting training provided additionally.


Specifically, a guide part was added to prevent blade nick of the cutting machine due to the horizontal sway occurring when the equipment is shaken by strong wind during work to cut horizontal materials of the iron tower.

For these additional measures, the demonstration test will be extended until March 2019. After completing the test, the dismantling equipment will be transferred to the site and assembled to start dismantling of the exhaust stack from May.



Example of modified dismantling equipment

# Major initiatives – Locations on site




\* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)  
 Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.423 – 1.527  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$  (December 26, 2018 – January 29, 2019). We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction works, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012. Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site. The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

Provided by Japan Space Imaging, photo taken on June 14, 2018  
 Product(C) [2018] DigitalGlobe, Inc.

## I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

### 1. Temperatures inside the reactors


Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 15 to 25°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



\* The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.

### 2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of December 2018, the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 in the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx.  $2.8 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-134 and  $1.2 \times 10^{-11}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-137, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00029 mSv/year.



Note: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

### 3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any abnormality in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

## II. Progress status by each plan

### 1. Contaminated water management

*To tackle the increase in stagnant water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water*

#### ➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by subdrains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, reduced the groundwater inflow into buildings.

- Following the steady implementation of “isolation” measures (groundwater bypass subdrains, frozen walls, etc.), the inflow reduced from approx. 470 m<sup>3</sup>/day (the FY2014 average) when the measures were first launched to approx. 220 m<sup>3</sup>/day (the FY2017 average), though the figure varied depending on rainfall, etc.
- Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.




Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater, rainwater, etc. into buildings

#### ➤ Operation of the groundwater bypass

- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until January 29, 2019, 442,560 m<sup>3</sup> of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

#### ➤ Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains

- To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015 onwards. Up until January 29, 2019, a total of 650,898 m<sup>3</sup> had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until January 29, 2019, a total of approx. 197,239 m<sup>3</sup> had been pumped up and a volume of under 10 m<sup>3</sup>/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period December 13, 2018 – January 16, 2019).
- As one of the multi-layered contaminated water management measures, in addition to waterproof pavement (facing; as of the end of December 2018, approx. 94% of the planned area was completed) to prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground, etc., facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system were installed and went into operation from April 2018; increasing the treatment capacity to 1,500 m<sup>3</sup> and improving reliability.
- To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover those already in place is underway. The additional pits are going into operation sequentially from a pit for which work was completed (the number of pits which went into operation: 12 of 14). For recovered pits, work for scheduled 3 of 3 pits was completed and they went into operation from December 26, 2018 (the number of pits which went into operation: 3 of 3).

- To eliminate the need to suspend water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facilities was completed.
- Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to under 150 m<sup>3</sup>/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m but increased during rainfall.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Unit 1-4 subdrains

### ➤ Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls

- A maintenance operation for the land-side impermeable walls to prevent frozen soil from thickening further continued from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where frozen soil of sufficient thickness was identified. The scope of the maintenance operation was expanded in March 2018.
- In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths; based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.




Figure 3: Closure of part of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)

### ➤ Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.


- As of January 24, 2019, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 400,000, 525,000 and 103,000 m<sup>3</sup> respectively (including approx. 9,500 m<sup>3</sup> stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until January 24, 2019, approx. 559,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.

### ➤ Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks

- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. Up until January 28, 2019, approx. 503,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.

### ➤ Measures in the Tank Area

- Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fenced-in area of the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of January 24, 2019, a total of 123,820 m<sup>3</sup>).



- \*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
- \*2: To detect storage increases more accurately, the calculation method was reviewed as follows from February 9, 2017: (The revised method was applied from March 1, 2018) [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)]
- \*3: Reevaluated by adding groundwater and rainwater inflow into the residual water areas (January 18 and 25, 2018).
- \*4: Reviewed because SARRY reverse cleaning water was added to "Storage increase." (January 25, 2018)
- \*5: The effect of calibration for the building water-level gauge was included in the following period: March 1-8, 2018 (Unit 3 Turbine Building).
- \*6: The method used to calculate the chemical injection into ALPS was reviewed as follows: (Additional ALPS: The revised method was applied from April 12, 2018) [(Outlet integrated flow rate) - (inlet integrated flow rate) - (sodium carbonate injection rate)]
- \*7: Reevaluated based on the revised calculation formula of stagnant water storage volume in Unit 2-4 Turbine Building seawater system pipe trenches. (Period of reevaluation: December 28, 2017 - June 7, 2018)
- \*8: Reevaluated based on the revised method to manage the transfer volume from the Unit 1 seawater pipe trench. (Period of reevaluation: May 31 - June 28, 2018)
- \*9: Inflow into buildings increased due to the effect of repair work on the K drainage channel.
- \*10: The storage amount increased due to transfer to buildings in association with the decommissioning work. (The transferred amount comprised ①an ALPS chemical injection amount of approx. 14 m<sup>3</sup>/day, ②transfer from wells and groundwater drains: approx. 11m<sup>3</sup>/day, ③transfer from On-site Bunker: approx. 85m<sup>3</sup>/day, etc.)
- \*11: Changed from December 13, 2018 from rainfall in Namie to that within the site.
- \*12: Since January 17, 2019, Unit 3 C/B stagnant water has been managed in addition to stagnant water storage in buildings. For inflow of groundwater, rainwater, etc. to buildings and increase in storage have been reflected since January 24, 2019.
- \*13: Considered attributable to the increased inflow of groundwater, rainwater, etc. to buildings due to the decline in the level of stagnant water in buildings on January 17, 2019.

Figure 4: Status of stagnant water storage

- Status of groundwater inflow to buildings outside the land-side impermeable walls such as the Onsite Bunker Building
  - Regarding groundwater inflow to the Onsite Bunker Building, an ongoing increase (from approx. 5 to 40 m<sup>3</sup>/day) since mid-November 2018 was confirmed. In response, the status of groundwater inflow to buildings outside the land-side impermeable walls was investigated.
  - For these buildings, work to shut off water was implemented and the groundwater inflow rate was low except for the Onsite Bunker Building in which an ongoing increase was detected.
  - For the Onsite Bunker Building, after installing a temporary pump at a lower position and decreasing the water level to around the basement floor, the inflow parts will be investigated.
  - During the period pending preparation to decrease the water level by the temporary pump, the water level of the Onsite Bunker Building will be maximized to suppress inflow.
- Sampling of water contained in the Unit 5/6 suppression pool water surge tank
  - The Unit 5/6 suppression pool water surge tank (SPT) contains water which was held in the plant before the earthquake.
  - To treat water as planned, the water was sampled and analyzed. The sampling results were Cs-134, below the detection limit (7.6×10<sup>0</sup> Bq/L); Cs-137, 6.2×10<sup>1</sup> Bq/L; Co-60, 4.9×10<sup>1</sup> Bq/L; tritium, 2.9×10<sup>3</sup> Bq/L.
- Leakage from the cross-flow filter outlet valve gland of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment (B)
  - On January 22, 2019, leakage from the gland for the cross-flow outlet valve, which was installed in the pre-treatment equipment of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment (B), was detected.
  - The leakage (approx. 40 x 200 cm x 1 mm depth) was deemed to be system water of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment.
  - An inspection after tightening the valve gland confirmed that the leakage had ceased and the leaked water was wiped out.
  - The cause will be investigated and measures implemented.

## 2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

*Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014*

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
  - The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
  - As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 22, 2018.
  - Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around the site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.
  - Once removed, rubble is stored in solid waste storage facilities or elsewhere depending on the dose level.
  - Before formulating a plan to remove rubble around the SFP, an onsite investigation started from July 23, 2018 and was completed on August 2.
  - To create an access route for preparatory work to protect the SFP, etc., work to remove four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side respectively) started from September 19, 2018 and all planned four sections had been removed by December 20.
  - Toward work to protect the SFP, etc., the opening will be covered to create an access route from the west working floor and prevent small rubble from falling from the operating floor while removing rubble at the center and on the south side.

- Mockup tests regarding installation of the opening cover were conducted in November and December 2018 and onsite work started from January 2019. After completing the installation by around March 2019, work will shift to removing small rubble around the SFP.
- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2
  - An investigation near the opening wall on the operating floor using a remote-controlled unmanned robot detected no significant scattering obstacles that would hinder the operation of the robot.
  - Contamination of the robot was below the level that would prevent maintenance by workers in the front room.
  - To formulate a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop, etc., the entire operating floor will be investigated.
  - Before this investigation, work to move and contain the remaining objects was completed on November 6, 2018.
  - Toward spent fuel removal, as one of the investigations to understand the contamination condition across the operating floor, the airborne radiation dose rate at low locations of the operating floor was measured in November and December 2018.
  - The results confirmed a significant reduction from the previous investigative findings, which was considered attributable to natural reduction, the effect of rainwater flowing into buildings and containment of remaining objects inside the operating floor.
  - Based on the results obtained, the distribution of dust density required to formulate future work plans will be evaluated, including evaluation of dust scattering and shielding design.
- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 3
  - Regarding the fuel-handling machine (FHM) and crane, consecutive defects have occurred since the test operation started on March 15, 2018.
  - For the FHM, an alarm was issued during the pre-operation inspection on August 8, 2018, whereupon operation was suspended. This was confirmed as attributable to disconnection due to corrosion by rainwater ingress to the cable connection and investigation of the cause detected an abnormality in several control cables.
  - For the crane, an alarm was issued during the work to clear materials and equipment on August 15, 2018 and operation was suspended.
  - To determine the risks of defects in fuel-handling facilities, the FHM was temporarily recovered on September 29, 2018 and a safety inspection (operation check and facility inspection) was implemented.
  - For 14 defects detected in the safety inspection, measures were completed on January 27, 2019 and a function check after cable replacement is currently underway.
  - After the check, work will be conducted according to the following steps: training for fuel removal ⇒ fuel removal (1<sup>st</sup> transfer container) ⇒ review ⇒ additional training ⇒ fuel removal (2<sup>nd</sup> and later transfer containers).
  - Toward the start of fuel removal from the end of March 2019, work will continue with safety first.
- Progress status toward dismantling the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack
  - Toward dismantling the Unit 1/2 stack, a demonstration test of the dismantling equipment is currently underway.
  - Based on the insights obtained in the demonstration test to date, to consolidate the safety measures, the dismantling equipment will be improved and troubleshooting training provided additionally. Specifically, a guide part was added to prevent blade nick of the cutting machine due to the horizontal sway occurring when the equipment is shaken by strong wind during work to cut horizontal materials of the iron tower.
  - For these additional measures, the demonstration test will be extended until March 2019. After completing the test, the dismantling equipment will be transferred to the site and assembled to start dismantling of the exhaust stack from May 2019.
- Falling of scaffold material from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack
  - On January 9, 2019, a steel plate having fallen near the Unit 4 Radioactive Waste Treatment Building (Rw/B) was detected. The plate was deemed to be scaffold material for maintenance, which was located 76m from the ground of

the 3/4 exhaust stack.

- No work was conducted around the area. However, to ensure safety for four exhaust stacks onsite, zoning and entry restrictions were immediately imposed. Investigation into the cause will continue and physical measurements, e.g. to ensure a safe passage with a roof, will be implemented.

### 3. Retrieval of fuel debris

#### ➤ Investigation inside the Unit 1 PCV from X-2 penetration

- The investigation inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in March 2017 detected deposits in water. Based on this result, a boat-type access and investigative equipment including a submersion function is currently being developed.
- In the 1st half of FY2019, the PCV inside will be investigated through an access route to be built by boring X-2 penetration, which had been used when works entered the PCV.
- Before the investigation, work to build the access route will start within this fiscal year at the earliest.
- During the work, as was done in previous investigations, measures to prevent gas leakage from the PCV will be implemented and the dust density monitored. If any abnormality is detected, the work will be suspended and the necessary actions taken. Work will be conducted carefully with safety first.

#### ➤ Investigation inside the Unit 2 PCV

- The purpose of the scheduled investigation inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) from mid- to late-February 2019 is to determine the characteristics (hardness and fragility) of deposits detected on the bottom of the pedestal.
- In this investigation, therefore, a finger will be operated according to the characteristics of the deposits to determine the adhesion condition and the existence of any contact trace on the deposit surface. Videos, dose and temperature data close to the deposits will also be collected.
- Information obtained from this investigation will be utilized in the internal investigation in the 2nd half of FY2019.

### 4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

*Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste*

#### ➤ Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of December 2018, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 255,800 m<sup>3</sup> (+3,200 m<sup>3</sup> compared to at the end of November, with an area-occupation rate of 66%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 134,000 m<sup>3</sup> (±0 m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 53,100 m<sup>3</sup> (+1,200 m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 75%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction related to tanks and storage of general onsite waste. The increase in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to acceptance of used protective clothing.

#### ➤ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of January 3, 2019, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 85%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,318 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 90%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 4,250 (area-occupation rate: 67%).

#### ➤ Progress status of measures for decontamination equipment sludge

- Sludge generated from accumulated water treatment by the decontamination equipment (hereinafter, referred to as sludge) is stored in the underground reservoir D of the Process Main Building.
- On September 28, 2018, closure of the building entrance and line penetrations, which was conducted as measures to prevent external leakage from the system due to the tsunami, was completed. As additional countermeasures against tsunami, a plan to extract sludge from the reservoir D and transfer it to an area at elevation is currently being examined.
- In the plan, sludge will be extracted using a remote-controlled arm and suction equipment, dehydrated by a

centrifugal, contained in storage containers in low-dose outdoors and transferred to an area of high ground.

- Toward the start of sludge extraction within FY2020, examination will continue.

#### ➤ Cause investigation and recurrence prevention measures regarding the trigger of the large-equipment decontamination facility dust collector (C) rupture disk

- On November 20, 2018, in the building of the large-equipment decontamination facility for decontaminating dismantled flange tank pieces, the dust collector to remove decontaminated radioactive materials through filters was inspected to adjust the exhaust flow rate. During the inspection work, the rupture disk of dust collector (C) was triggered.
- Based on the results of the investigation into the cause, the trigger of the rupture disk was considered attributable to damage to the main valve body of the dust collector (C) nitrogen supply system valve. The pressure inside the dust collector had increased due to leaked nitrogen and triggered the rupture disk.
- To prevent recurrence, measures to prevent damage to valves and allow early detection in the event of any such damage to a valve were implemented.

### 5. Reactor cooling

*The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue*

#### ➤ Replacement of the Unit 1-3 nitrogen generator, etc.

- To improve the reliability of the nitrogen injection facility, the equipment will be replaced and the facility transferred to high ground. In addition, a new dedicated diesel generator will be installed and work to duplicate the RPV nitrogen injection line will be implemented.
- The transfer to the new equipment will be conducted in a phased manner while using the existing facility to prevent any influence on nitrogen injection into the reactor.
- Preparation is currently underway and work will be implemented toward completion in the 1st half of FY2019.

#### ➤ Test to check the cooling condition of the Unit 2 fuel debris

- Currently, the decay heat of fuel debris has declined significantly over time.
- Water injection into the reactor will be temporarily reduced and suspended to determine the status of the cooling condition of fuel debris. This will lead to enhancing emergency response procedures optimizing operation and maintenance.
- For Unit 2, offering highly reliable temperature measurement, tests to reduce the water injection volume from 3.0 to 1.5m<sup>3</sup>/h (for about seven days) and suspend the injection (for about 7 hours) will be conducted after preparation is completed.

#### ➤ Suspension of the Unit 2 reactor water injection pump

- To duplicate the water source of the reactor water injection system, the Unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST) was restored on January 8, 2019 to be used as the water source of the Unit 1 and 2 reactor water injection.
- During the operation, the suction pressure of the operating Unit 2 CST reactor injection pump (B) declined. To switch the pump (System B → System A), pump (A) was started up. The discharge pressure of the pump increased and (A) and (B) pumps were automatically suspended.
- In association with the automatic suspension of the Unit 2 CST reactor injection pump, deviation from the limiting condition for operation LCO was declared.
- One minute after the automatic suspension of the pump, the Unit 2 CST reactor injection pump (A) was immediately started up to resume water injection to the reactor. After confirming that there was no problem in water injection conditions, recovery from the deviation from the LCO was declared.
- No abnormality was detected in plant parameters and readings of monitoring posts.
- The investigation into the cause of the decline in suction pressure of the Unit 2 CST reactor injection pump (B) is

currently underway.

- An investigation into the cause of the automatic pump suspension is currently underway.
- Decline in the Unit 4 condensate storage tank water level
  - During an inspection of stagnant water in the building connection trench, stagnant water was detected in the Unit 4 fluid pipe duct, in which a high tritium density was confirmed.
  - As a part of the investigation into stagnant water inflow from ducts, the operation status of the Unit 4 condensate storage tank was inspected. The inspection confirmed that the tank water level was gradually declining from around November 2016.
  - The Unit 4 condensate storage tank was a dual structure and pipes from the tank connected only to the Unit 4 building. An onsite inspection on January 22, 2019 detected no leakage from the Unit 4 condensate storage tank and pipes. Based on these results, water in the Unit 4 condensate storage tank was considered as inflow to the building through pipes.
- Circulation suspension of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool
  - For the Unit 4 spent fuel pool (SFP), fuel removal from the pool was completed in 2014 and currently irradiated equipment, etc. (e.g. spent control rods) are stored.
  - SFP circulation facilities continued operation to maintain the water quality of the SFP. Based on constant and stably maintained water quality, a plan to suspend the circulation operation and maintain the SFP water quality through periodical water quality inspection and chemical injection was considered.
  - When circulation was first suspended, the water quality status during the suspension was monitored from July to November 2018.
  - No abnormality was confirmed in water quality (radiation density, chloride ion density, electric conductivity, etc.) and the level of microorganism generation is below the detection limit.
  - Circulation suspension will continue except during winter seasons when circulation operation is necessary as an anti-freezing measure.

## 6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination


*Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment*

### ➤ Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4


- The H-3 density at No. 0-3-1 had been increasing from around 120 Bq/L since October 2018 to around 1,900 Bq/L, before declining and currently stands at the level before increasing.
- Since March 2018, the H-3 density at No. 1-6 has been repeatedly declining and increasing and currently stands at around 4,500 Bq/L.
- The density of gross β radioactive materials at No. 1-12 had been decreasing from around 800 Bq/L since September 2018 to around 200 Bq/L. It has since been increasing and currently stands at around 600 Bq/L.
- The H-3 density at No. 1-14 remained constant at around 3,000 Bq/L, then declined since September 2018 and currently stands at around 1,600 Bq/L. Since August 15, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14 - 23, 2015).
- The H-3 density at No. 2-3 had been increasing since November 2017 and then remained constant at around 5,000 Bq/L. It has been declining since January 2019 and currently stands at around 3,800 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 600 Bq/L since December 2017 and currently stands at around 8,000 Bq/L.
- The H-3 density at No. 2-5 had been increasing from around 1,200 Bq/L since December 2018 and currently stands at around 2,300 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 30,000 Bq/L since December 2018 and currently stands at around 82,000 Bq/L. Since December 18, 2013,

pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes: December 18, 2013 - October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015).

- The H-3 density at No. 3-4 had been declining from around 2,000 Bq/L since January 2018 to around 900 Bq/L, then increasing and currently stands at around 2,700 Bq/L. Since April 1, 2015, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes: April 1 – September 16, 2015; at the repaired well: from September 17, 2015).
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in Cs-137 and Sr-90 during rain. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The density of Cs-137 has been increasing since January 25, 2017, when a new silt fence was installed to accommodate the relocation.
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area within the port, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in Cs-137 and Sr-90 during rain. They have been below the level of those in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area and have been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area outside the port, densities of Cs-137 and Sr-90 have been declining, but remained unchanged following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 5: Groundwater density on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 6: Seawater density around the port

## 7. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

*Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers' exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers' on-site needs*

### ➤ Staff management

- The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from September to November 2018 was approx. 9,500 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 7,200). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in February 2019 (approx. 4,320 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,000 to 6,200 since FY2016 (see Figure 7).
- The number of workers from within Fukushima Prefecture increased and outside, decreased. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of December 2018 has remained constant at around 60%.
- The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015, approx. 0.39 mSv/month during FY2016 and approx. 0.36 mSv/month during FY2017. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year  $\doteq$  1.7 mSv/month)
- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 7: Changes in the average number of workers per weekday for each month since FY2016 (actual values)




Figure 8: Changes in monthly individual worker exposure dose (monthly average exposure dose since March 2011)

### ➤ Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus

- Since November 2018, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from October 24 to November 30, 2018) and medical clinics around the site (from November 1, 2018 to January 31, 2019) for partner company workers. As of January 25, 2019, a total of 6,307 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swift exit of possible patients and control of entry, mandatory mask-wearing in working spaces, etc.).

### ➤ Status of influenza and norovirus cases

- Until the 4<sup>th</sup> week of 2019 (January 21-27, 2019), 178 influenza infections and eight norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed 123 cases of influenza and five norovirus infections.

### ➤ Health management of workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

- As health management measures in line with the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (issued in August 2015), a scheme was established and operated, whereby primary contractors confirmed reexamination at medical institutions and the subsequent status of workers who are diagnosed as requiring "detailed examination and treatment" in the health checkup, with TEPCO confirming the operation status by the primary contractors.

- The recent report on the management status of the health checkup during the second quarter (July – September) in FY2018 confirmed that the primary contractors had provided appropriate guidance and properly managed the operation under the scheme. The report on the follow-up status during the first quarter in FY2018 and before confirmed that responses to workers, which had not been completed by the time of the previous report, were being provided on an ongoing basis and that checking of operations would continue.

#### 8. Other

- Release of the final report of the IAEA Review Mission
  - Japan received the 4<sup>th</sup> visit of the review mission team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the period November 5-13, 2018 regarding the decommissioning work in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
  - The final report of the review mission will be published on January 31, 2019.

# Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during January 21-29)”; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html>

Sea side impermeable wall  
Silt fence

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.23) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 9.0 (2013/10/17) → 0.61 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **74** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(18) Below 1/4  
Tritium: 67 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 4.4 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.37) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: **10** (2013/12/24) → 0.31 Below 1/30  
Gross β: **60** (2013/ 7/ 4) → ND(18) Below 1/3  
Tritium: 59 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 5.0 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.29) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 8.4 (2013/12/2) → 0.35 Below 1/20  
Gross β: **69** (2013/8/19) → ND(18) Below 1/3  
Tritium: 52 (2013/8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/20

Cesium-134: 2.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.50) Below 1/5  
Cesium-137: 5.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.48) Below 1/10  
Gross β: **46** (2013/8/19) → ND(16) Below 1/2  
Tritium: 24 (2013/8/19) → ND(2.1) Below 1/10

Cesium-134: ND(0.51)  
Cesium-137: 0.69  
Gross β: ND(17)  
Tritium: 2.7 \*

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.52) Below 1/6  
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → ND(0.54) Below 1/10  
Gross β: **69** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/4  
Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 3.5 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.30) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 7.8 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.29) Below 1/20  
Gross β: **79** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(18) Below 1/4  
Tritium: 60 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: **32** (2013/10/11) → ND(0.37) Below 1/80  
Cesium-137: **73** (2013/10/11) → 4.4 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **320** (2013/ 8/12) → ND(16) Below 1/20  
Tritium: 510 (2013/ 9/ 2) → 6.3 Below 1/80  
From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Cesium-134: ND (0.85)  
Cesium-137: 4.1  
Gross β: 20  
Tritium: 8.5 \*1

Cesium-134: ND (0.49)  
Cesium-137: 4.2  
Gross β: 19  
Tritium: 27 \*1


\*1: Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

\*2: For the point, monitoring was finished from December 12, 2018 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Cesium-134: 5.3 (2013/8/ 5) → ND(0.52) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 8.6 (2013/8/ 5) → 0.52 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **40** (2013/7/ 3) → ND(16) Below 1/2  
Tritium: 340 (2013/6/26) → ND(1.8) Below 1/100

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000



Summary of TEPCO data as of January 30, 2019

# Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

(The latest values sampled during January 21-29)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

○【Northeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】      ○【East side of port entrance (offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.87)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.64)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (18)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.92)

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.70)  
 Cesium-137: 1.6 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.45) Below 1/3  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (18)  
 Tritium: 6.4 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.93) Below 1/6

○【Southeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.95)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.82)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (18)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.92)

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.74)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.63)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (18)  
 Tritium: 4.7 (2013/ 8/18) → ND (0.92) Below 1/5

○【South side of south breakwater(offshore 0.5km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.71)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.62)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (18)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.93)

○【Port entrance】

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND (0.52) Below 1/6  
 Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → ND (0.54) Below 1/10  
 Gross β: 69 (2013/ 8/19) → ND (17) Below 1/4  
 Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND (1.8) Below 1/30

○【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134: 1.8 (2013/ 6/21) → ND (0.76) Below 1/2  
 Cesium-137: 4.5 (2013/ 3/17) → ND (0.78) Below 1/5  
 Gross β: 12 (2013/12/23) → 14  
 Tritium: 8.6 (2013/ 6/26) → ND (0.84) Below 1/10


Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.75)  
 Cesium-137: 3.0 (2013/ 7/15) → ND (0.60) Below 1/5  
 Gross β: 15 (2013/12/23) → 14  
 Tritium: 1.9 (2013/11/25) → ND (0.84) Below 1/2

○【Near south release outlet】

Sea side impermeable wall  
 Silt fence


Note: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet. Samples were also taken from a point approx. 280m south from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.



Summary of TEPCO data as of January 30, 2019

# TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout



# Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

**Immediate target**

Commence fuel removal from the Unit 1-3 Spent Fuel Pools

## Unit 1

Regarding fuel removal from Unit 1 spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor). All roof panels and wall panels of the building cover were dismantled by November 10, 2016. Removal of pillars and beams of the building was completed on May 11, 2017. Modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of building cover were completed by December 19. Rubble removal from the operating floor north side started from January 22, 2018. Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.



<Installation status (January 22)>



October 2015



November 2017

Scope of rubble removal (north side)

<Status of the operating floor>

## Unit 2

To facilitate removal of fuel assemblies and retrieval of debris in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the scope of dismantling and modification of the existing Reactor Building rooftop was examined. From the perspective of ensuring safety during the work, controlling impacts on the outside of the power station, and removing fuel rapidly to reduce risks, we decided to dismantle the whole rooftop above the highest floor of the Reactor Building. Examination of the following two plans continues: Plan 1 to share a container for removing fuel assemblies from the pool and retrieving fuel debris; and Plan 2 to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal from the pool.




Image of Plan 1




Image of Plan 2

## Unit 3

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018. Regarding fuel removal, after confirming the cause of the defects in the FHM and crane and implementing measures for similar parts, works will continue toward removal starting from the end of March 2019 putting safety first.



Installation of dome roof (February 21)




Image of entire fuel handling facility inside the cover

## Unit 4

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1<sup>st</sup> Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)


This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

\* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.



Fuel removal status

## Common pool




An open space will be maintained in the common pool (Transfer to the temporary cask custody area)

### Progress to date

- The common pool has been restored to a condition allowing it to re-accommodate fuel to be handled (November 2012)
- Loading of spent fuel stored in the common pool to dry casks commenced (June 2013)
- Fuel removal from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool began to be received (November 2013 - November 2014)

### Temporary cask (\*) custody area



Spent fuel is accepted from the common pool

Operation commenced on April 12, 2013, from the cask-storage building, transfer of 9 existing dry casks completed (May 21, 2013); fuel stored in the common pool sequentially transferred.

### <Glossary>

- (\*) Operating floor: During regular inspection, the roof over the reactor is opened while on the operating floor, fuel inside the core is replaced and the core internals are inspected.
- (\*) Cask: Transportation container for samples and equipment, including radioactive materials.

**Immediate target** Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

### Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room<sup>(1)</sup>. (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations<sup>(2)</sup> (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

### Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C<sup>(3)</sup>)

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.



Leak point





Image of the S/C upper part investigation

## Unit 1

Air dose rate inside the Reactor Building:  
Max. 5,150mSv/h (1F southeast area) (measured on July 4, 2012)




\* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, January 30, 2019

### Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore:  $\phi$  100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.



<Image of investigation inside the PCV>




Image of hanging of dosimeter and camera



Image near the bottom

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
Feb - May 2015	Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.

<Glossary>  
 (1) TIP (Traversing In-core Probe)  
 (2) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV  
 (3) S/C (Suppression Chamber): Suppression pool, used as the water source for the emergent core cooling system.  
 (4) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool):  
 (5) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)  
 (6) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)


**Immediate target**

Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

**Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation**

- Replacement of the RPV thermometer
  - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
  - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.
- Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
  - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
  - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

**Unit 2**




\* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, January 30, 2019

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Jan 2012)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature
	2nd (Mar 2012)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate
	3rd (Feb 2013 – Jun 2014)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (Jan – Feb 2017)	- Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C	

**Investigative results on torus chamber walls**

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), “the status” and “existence of flow” were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer<sup>(5)</sup> by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)



**Status of investigation inside the PCV**


Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

**[Investigative outline]**

- Investigative devices such as a robot will be injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration<sup>(1)</sup> and access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

**[Progress status]**

- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was investigated using an investigative device with a hanging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits probably including fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal. In addition, multiple parts higher than the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple routes of fuel debris falling.



**Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons**

Period	Evaluation results
Mar – Jul 2016	Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.

<Glossary> (\*1) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV (\*2) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (\*3) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (\*4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (\*5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

**Immediate target** Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

### Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve\* room


On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected.

This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

\* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

### Unit 3



\* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, January 30, 2019

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Oct – Dec 2015)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (December 2015)
	2nd (Jul 2017)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (August 2017)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in May 2014)	

### Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.



- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.


Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

### Investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

#### [Investigative outline]

- The status of X-53 penetration<sup>(4)</sup>, which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.



Status inside the pedestal

### Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
May – Sep 2017	The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.

<Glossary>

(<sup>1</sup>) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (<sup>2</sup>) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (<sup>3</sup>) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (<sup>4</sup>) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV


## Immediate target

Stably continue reactor cooling and stagnant water treatment, and improve reliability

### Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer stagnant water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.
- To accelerate efforts to reduce the radiation density in stagnant water inside the buildings, circulating purification of stagnant water inside the buildings started on the Unit 3 and 4 side on February 22 and on the Unit 1 and 2 side on April 11.
- For circulating purification, a new pipe divided from the water treatment equipment outlet line was installed to transfer water purified at the water treatment equipment to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings.
- The risks of stagnant water inside the buildings will continue to be reduced in addition to reduction of its storage.

\* The entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3km).



### Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016, in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017, in H3 B area (31 tanks) in September 2017, in H5 and H5 north areas (31 tanks) in June 2018, in G6 area (38 tanks) in July 2018 and H6 and H6 north areas (24 tanks) in September 2018. Dismantling of flange tanks in G4 south area is underway.



Start of dismantling in H1 east area




After dismantling in H1 east area

### Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)

Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks.

The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.



### Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings

#### Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water

To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping-up of groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

#### Via a groundwater bypass, reduce the groundwater level around the Building and groundwater inflow into the Building

Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented. The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets.




Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately. At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked.

The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

#### Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.

In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas and on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.



## Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site


### Immediate targets

- Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
- Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

### Optimization of radioactive protective equipment


Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work.

From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G zone was expanded.



R zone (Anorak area)	Y zone (Coverall area)	G zone (General wear)
Full-face mask 	Full-face or half-face masks 	Disposable disposable mask 
Anorak on coverall Or double coveralls 	Coverall 	General*3 Dedicated on-site wear 

\*1 For works in buildings including water-treatment facilities (multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.) (excluding site visits), wear a full-face mask.  
 \*2 For works in tank areas containing concentrated salt water or Sr-treated water (excluding works not handling concentrated salt water, etc., patrol, on-site investigation for work planning, and site visits) and works related to tank transfer lines, wear a full-face mask.  
 \*3 Specified light works (patrol, monitoring, delivery of goods brought from outside, etc.)



### Installation of dose-rate monitors

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016.

These monitors allow workers to confirm real time on-site dose rates at their workplaces.

Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.



Installation of Dose-rate monitor

### Installation of sea-side impermeable walls

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed.

Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.



Installation of steel pipe sheet piles for sea-side impermeable wall

### Status of the large rest house

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015.

Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.

