Due to the Tsunami generated by Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake 
which occurred on March 11th 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our 
nuclear power stations have been severely damaged, released radioactive 
materials. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused to 
local residents near the site, residents of Fukushima prefecture and 
throughout the entire society.

Based on the instruction document on emergency countermeasures for safety 
at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station received from the Minister of 
Economy, Trade and Industry on 21st April, we have summarized 
implementation status of emergency countermeasures for safety at Fukushima 
Daini Nuclear Power Station to prevent damages of reactor core and spent 
fuel, suppress discharge of radioactive materials and restore cooling 
function of reactor facility, even if three functions such as function of 
all facilities that supplies AC power, function of all facilities that 
cools reactor facility and function of all facilities that cools spent 
fuel pool by seawater are lost by tsunami and to maintain reactor cold 
shutdown, and reported to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 
today.

[1. Implementation of the emergency countermeasures for safety]
I. Based on the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, we 
have drawn up the response procedure in case that the above mentioned 
three functions were lost.
(1)Securing of power source in case of lost of all AC power supply
(2)Enhancement of water injection and cooling functions of the reactor
(3)Securing of source of fresh water
(4)Securing of decompression function of Primary Containment Vessel
(5)Enhancement of water injection and cooling functions of spent fuel pool
(6)Enhancement of heat removal function of reactor and spent fuel pool

II. We have implemented following emergency countermeasures for safety to 
prevent damages of reactor core and spent fuel, suppress discharge of 
radioactive materials and restore cooling function of reactor facility 
even if three functions are lost by tsunami, by 19th May 2011.
(1)Implementation of emergency inspection
 -Implementation of visual observation and function check of necessary 
  equipments and facilities in emergencies
(2)Implementation of review and training of emergency response plan 
 -Preparation of response plan (manual) in emergencies
 -Implementation of response training to be prepared for emergencies
(3)Securing of power source in emergencies
 -Drawing up of procedure to supply power to motor driven pump for water 
  injection to the reactor in case of lost of all AC power supply, and 
  deployment of necessary power-supply car and/or equipments
(4)Securing of definitive heat removal function in emergencies
 -Drawing up of procedure of alternative water injection to maintain 
  water injection to the reactor, and deployment of necessary equipments
 -Drawing up of procedure of securing of water source to prevent 
  exhaustion of water source for alternative water injection (Condensate 
  Storage Tank) and procedure of securing of water source by 
  fire-extinguishing vehicle, etc.
 -Drawing up of procedure to secure decompression function of Primary 
  Containment Vessel in case of lost of all AC power supply
(5)Securing of cooling of spent fuel pool in emergencies
 -Drawing up of procedure of alternative water injection to maintain 
  water injection to spent fuel pool, and deployment of necessary 
  equipments
(6)Implementation of immediate countermeasures taken in consideration of 
configuration of power station
 -Implementation of measures to prevent building in which facilities 
  important to safety are installed from flood such as banking and sandbag
 -Deployment of heavy machineries to secure accessibility of roads in 
  power station (debris removal)

[2. Measures to be taken in the future]
We will implement following measures to maintain reactor cold shutdown 
with certainty.
I. Making building in which facilities important to safety are installed 
watertight
   We will close equipment hatch and/or doorway and/or make them 
   watertight in order to prevent facilities important to safety from 
   being submerged.
II. Deployment of large power-supply facility
   We will deploy large power-supply facility considering reliability of 
   power supply to facility necessary for securing of cooling function of 
   reactor and spent fuel pool.
III. Others
   We will strengthen environmental monitoring facility and communication 
   facility to make assurance doubly sure on information gathering and 
   communication in emergencies.

In addition to above mentioned measures, from a viewpoint of further risk 
mitigation, we will consider necessity of implementation on expansion of 
banking, additional installation of fresh water source, installation of 
alternative cooling source and supplement of emergency power panel for 
large power-supply facility.
And hereafter, , we will take necessary measures immediately if any issue 
to be reflected to Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station is verified 
through analysis and/or evaluation of the accident cause.
At Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, all the reactors have been in 
cold shutdown since 15th May 2011, we continue to make our endeavors to 
improve reliability of cold shutdown of plants.

Attachment: Outline of emergency countermeasures for safety at Fukushima 
Daini Nuclear Power Station
Reference: Implementation status report on emergency countermeasures for 
safety at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station

Appendix: Emergency Countermeasures for Safety at Fukushima Daini Nuclear 
          Power Station (Summary) (PDF 94.0KB) 

Reference: Emergency Countermeasures for Safety at Fukushima Daini Nuclear 
           Power Station (report of the implementation status)
           No.1, No.2, No.3, No.4, No.5 
           * The attachment is available only in Japanese version.


* Instruction Document
"Order to conduct enforcement of emergency countermeasures for safety at 
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (Order)"

                                          20th Release of April 20th, 2011
                                      Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

Regarding the emergency countermeasures for safety, Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA) have ordered enforcement of emergency countermeasures 
for safety to the Nuclear Power Station other than Fukushima Daiich 
Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. The Order 
is based on the "order to conduct enforcement of emergency countermeasures 
for safety at Fukushima Daiich Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini 
Nuclear Power Station" (dated March 28th, 2011; 7th Release of March 28th, 
2011 NISA).
Based on the situation of cold shutdown at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power 
Station, we will give an order to the site to conduct enforcement of 
emergency countermeasures for safety.

Enforcement of emergency countermeasures for safety is intended to resume 
cooling feature at reactor in the situation of power outage due to Tsunami, 
with limiting released radioactive materials.
The proceeding of this enforcement go through the following steps, TEPCO 
conduct enforcement of emergency countermeasures and NISA confirm by 
inspection to prevent core damage caused by loss of power due to Tsunami. 
This will lead to prevent nuclear disaster.

Therefore, we demand TEPCO to conduct enforcement of emergency 
countermeasures below immediately, following the regulations dated March 
30, 2011 laying down safety regulation for maintenance regarding 
installation and operation of commercial power reactor to maintain Reactor 
Facility in cases where Tsunami occurs.
In the meantime, NISA ask TEPCO to report implementation status to keep 
reactor cold shutdown by May 20th, 2011. 

Note:
TEPCO should take following emergency countermeasures for safety to 
prevent damages of reactor core and spent fuel, suppress discharge of 
radioactive materials and restore cooling function of reactor facility, 
even if three functions such as function of all facilities that supplies 
AC power, function of all facilities that cools reactor facility and 
function of all facilities that cools spent fuel pool by seawater are lost 
by tsunami.

1.Implementation of emergency inspection
  Implementation of emergency inspection of equipments and facilities for 
  emergency response caused by tsunami
2.Implementation of review and training on emergency response plan
  Implementation of review and training on emergency response plan that 
  assumes losses of function of all facilities that supplies AC power, 
  function of all facilities that cools reactor facility and function of 
  all facilities that cools spent fuel pool by seawater
3.Securing of power source in emergencies
  Securing of backup power source which can supply necessary power agilely 
  in case any power sources in Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station are 
  lost and any emergency power sources cannot be secured
4.Securing of definitive heat removal function in emergencies
  Preparation of restoration countermeasures of agile heat removal 
  function that assumes loss of seawater system facility or its function
5.Securing of cooling of spent fuel pool in emergencies
  Implementation of countermeasures to supply cooling water agilely in 
  case of stoppage of cooling of spent fuel pool and normal water supply 
  to spent fuel pool in Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
6.Implementation of immediate countermeasures taken in consideration of 
  the configuration of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station